Macroeconomics: Economic Growth (Licence 3) Lesson 6: Overlapping generations model

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Lesson 6

- Before starting the presentation of the 'endogenous growth theories', we discuss in this course the assumption of the Solow model about exogenous saving rate
- This course presents a version of the overlapping generations model (OLG), where saving rate is endogenous
- The OLG model introduces on the demand side an **intertemporal consumption choice**.

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Demande side

- The intertemporal consumption choice is influenced by:
- (1) Interest rate: if today we decide to investment instead of consuming one unit of the good, tomorrow we will receive 1 + r
- (2) Preferences for today's consumption: one unit of consumption tomorrow is worth 1/(1 + r) today.

Assumptions

- (1) The economy is populated by two generations: young (generation 1) and old (generation 2)
- (2) There are two periods individuals of a generation live two periods (period t and period t + 1)
 - At the beginning of each period, a young generation is born
 - At the end of each period, the generation born in the previous period passes away.

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Assumptions

- For this presentation, we will take the point of view of a single generation:
- $(1)x_t$ is the value of a given variable x for the young generation
- (2) x_{t+1} the value of x for the old generation (i.e., when the generation that was born at time t gets old)

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Assumptions on labor market, savings and consumption

• Each young individual

- (1) Labor market: supplies 1 unit of labor when she is young only and receives a wage (*w_t*)
- (2) Consumption and saving decisions: decides the part of income to be consumed in the present period (c_t) and the part to be saved for the future (s_t)
- (3) Budget constraint for young individual at t: $w_t = c_t + s_t$
- Each old individual
 - (4) **Production:** is the owner of capital, which is combined with the labor supplied by the young generation to produce,
 - (5) **Consumption and saving decisions:** consumes all the saved income plus the interest she eventually receives
 - (6) Budget constraint for old individual at t + 1; $c_{t+1} = s_t(1 + r)$

Assumptions on labor market, savings and consumption

- Combining both budget constraints we get the intertemporal budget constrain (IBC) for the young individual
- Budget constraint for young individual at t: $w_t = c_t + s_t$
- Budget constraint for old individual at t + 1: $c_{t+1} = s_t(1 + r)$
- The intertemporal budget constrain (IBC) for the young individual is

$$w_t = c_t + \frac{c_{t+1}}{(1+r)}$$
(1)

Assumptions on labor market, savings and consumption

• The utility function for the representative young individual is

$$U = u(c_t) + \beta u(c_{t+1})$$
⁽²⁾

Where $\beta = 1/(1 + \rho)$

- The rate of depreciation of capital $\delta = 1$ (assume it for simplicity)
- The growth rate of the population is exogenous and equal to n
- The production function is Cobb Douglas: $Y = K_t^{\alpha} L_t^{1-\alpha}$
- Perfect competition: Factor markets are competitive (factor prices are equal to their marginal products): $r = \alpha k_t^{\alpha-1}$ and $w = (1 \alpha)k_t^{\alpha}$

Solving the model: consumers

• The Lagrangian for the maximisation problem of utility subject to the intertemporal budget constraint for the young generation is:

$$L = u(c_t) + \beta u(c_{t+1}) + \lambda (w_t - c_t + c_{t+1}/(1+r))$$
(3)

• First order conditions (FOC)

•
$$u'(c_t) - \lambda = 0 \rightarrow u'(c_t) = \lambda$$

- $\beta u'(c_{t+1}) \lambda/(1+r) = 0 \rightarrow \beta u'(c_{t+1})(1+r) = \lambda$
- Then we have:

$$\frac{u'(c_t)}{\beta u'(c_{t+1})} = 1 + r \tag{4}$$

Solving the model

- To solve the model we assume that u(c)=ln(c) :
- The Lagrangian becomes

$$L = ln(c_t) + \beta ln(c_{t+1}) + \lambda(w_t - c_t + c_{t+1}/(1+r))$$
(5)

• First order conditions (FOC)

•
$$1/c_t - \lambda = 0 \rightarrow 1/c_t = \lambda$$

- $\beta 1/c_{t+1} \lambda/(1+r) = 0 \rightarrow \beta(1+r)/c_{t+1} = \lambda$
- Then we have:

$$\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} = \beta(1+r)$$

$$c_{t+1} = \beta(1+r)c_t$$

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Solving the model

- To solve the model we assume that u(c)=ln(c) :
- Substitute $c_{t+1} = \beta(1+r)c_t$ into the IBC and solve for c_t

$$w_t = c_t + \frac{c_{t+1}}{(1+r)}$$
(8)

$$w_t = c_t + \frac{\beta(1+r)c_t}{(1+r)} = c_t(1+\beta)$$
(9)

$$c_t = \frac{w_t}{(1+\beta)} \tag{10}$$

Solving the model: finding the endogenous saving rate

- Substitute $c_t = \frac{w_t}{(1+\beta)}$ into the first budget constraint and solve for s_t :
- Budget constraint for young individual at t: $w_t = c_t + s_t$

$$w_t = \frac{w_t}{(1+\beta)} + s_t$$
(11)
$$s_t = \frac{\beta w_t}{(1+\beta)}$$
(12)

Solving the model:

- Substitute $s_t = \frac{\beta w_t}{(1+\beta)}$ into the second budget constraint and solve for c_{t+1} :
- Budget constraint for old individual at t + 1: $c_{t+1} = s_t(1 + r)$

$$c_{t+1} = \frac{\beta w_t (1+r)}{(1+\beta)}$$
(13)

• Notice that, when $\beta = 1/(1+r)$, then $c_t = c_{t+1}$

$$c_{t+1} = \frac{w_t}{(1+\beta)} \tag{14}$$

Equilibrium

• In a close economy, in equilibrium, investment is equal to saving:

$$s_t L_t = S = I = K_{t+1}$$
 (15)

Since $L_t = L_{t+1}/(1 + n)$

$$s_t = k_{t+1}(1+n)$$
 (16)

Factor markets are competitive (factor prices are equal to their marginal products): w_t = (1 - α)k_t^α and s_t = βw_t/(1+β), so:

$$s_t = \frac{\beta(1-\alpha)k_t^{\alpha}}{(1+\beta)} \tag{17}$$

Combining the previous equation, we get k_{t+1}

$$k_{t+1} = \frac{\beta(1-\alpha)k_t^{\alpha}}{(1+\beta)(1+n)} \tag{18}$$

Equilibrium

• At the steady state, $k^* = k_t = k_{t+1}$:

$$k^* = \left(\frac{\beta(1-\alpha)}{(1+\beta)(1+n)}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$$
(19)

Equilibrium of golden rule

- Is the previous equilibrium also the one that maximizes the steady-state consumption (i.e., golden rule)?
- At the steady state: $c^* = y^* sy^* = k^{*lpha} (\delta + n)k^*$
- To find the value of k^* that maximizes c^* , we differentiate respect to k^* and set equal to 0:

$$\frac{dc^*}{dk^*} = 0$$

$$\alpha k^{*\alpha-1} - (\delta + n) = 0$$

$$\alpha k^{*\alpha} = (\delta + n)k^*$$

$$k^{*1-\alpha} = \frac{\alpha}{\delta + n}$$

$$k^{gr} = (\frac{\alpha}{\delta + n})^{1/(1-\alpha)} = (\frac{\alpha}{1+n})^{1/(1-\alpha)}$$
the Calcumption parameters of the second s

Where gr states for the Golden Rule where c is maximized, under assumption that $\delta = 1$

Dynamic inefficiency

- The comparison between k^* and k^{gr} shows that agents' choices do not necessarily lead to the maximum consumption
- If $k^* > k^{gr}$, then we have too much capital accumulation (and lower than maximum consumption)
- In this case, a public intervention can be optimal

Dynamic inefficiency

- In this case, a public intervention can tax the young (thus, they will save less) and redistribute the payments to the old.
- This can lead capital accumulation towards the k^{gr} level and consumption in any period can increase

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