# Macroeconomics: Economic Growth (Licence 3) Lesson 9: Schumpeterian model

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#### Lesson 7: Summary

- Romer model: endogenous technological progress
  - (1) Technological progress is viewed as an increase in the number of intermediate goods ("horizontal innovation")
  - (2) It is a function of the number of researchers (certain).

- Once an intermediate good has been invented, it continues to be used forever.
- The Romer model thought of innovation as adding new intermediate goods to the market (cars, robots, iPhones), but once invented, each good was fixed in **quality**.

#### Lesson 9: Schumpeterian model

- An alternative way to model endogenous technological progress:
- Creative destruction: is to allow innovations to replace existing intermediate good with a more productive (or better quality) goods
- The innovation can be **uncertain** (a probability of being able to find an innovation)
- This alternative approach is based on Schumpeter's (1939, 1942) original idea of creative destruction (see Aghion and Howitt, 1988 and Grossman and Helpman (1991)

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Lesson 9: Schumpeterian model

• Creative destruction implies that:

• Economic growth required the continual obsolescence of old techniques when new ones were invented

 Implying an improvement of quality of the techniques and of the productivity at each step

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• Schumpeterian growth changes the mechanical details of growth, but not the general conclusions

- The long-run trend growth rate depends on population growth as in Romer (1990)
- The allocation of workers to research may not be optimal as in Romer (1990)
- One advantage of the Schumpeterian model is that it explicitly allows us to think about alert dynamics, or the creation and destruction of firms over time.

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Aggregate production function

$$Y = K^{\alpha} (A_i L_Y)^{1-\alpha} \tag{1}$$

• where *i* is the index of ideas (larger i, then larger A)

$$A_{i+1} = (1+\gamma)A_i \tag{2}$$

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- where  $\gamma$  is called the "step size" that corresponds to the **amount of** productivity growth if innovation occurs
- If innovation occurs, the growth rate of A is  $\gamma$
- Therefore γ is not the growth rate of A over time, it depends on the probability of innovation

- In this model economic growth depends on innovation:  $\rightarrow$
- Growth occurs when we innovate, but that doesn't always happen.
- The growth rate of A<sub>i</sub> from innovation to innovation is

$$\frac{A_{i+1} - A_i}{A_i} = \gamma \tag{3}$$

• but this is not how fast A<sub>i</sub> grows over time.

#### • The Speed of Innovation or probability to innovate

• The chance that any given researcher will produce an innovation at any given moment is

$$\overline{\mu} = \theta \frac{L_A^{\lambda-1}}{A_i^{1-\phi}} \tag{4}$$

- or the probability of innovating μ depends on the same forces as before: amount of other researchers (L<sub>A</sub>) and the spillovers of A<sub>i</sub> (stock of ideas)on research.
- For the economy the probability of innovation is the individual probability times the number of researcher =  $\overline{\mu}L_A$

• For the economy as a whole, the probability of making an innovation depends on how many researchers are working, so

$$P(\text{Innovation}) = \overline{\mu}L_A = \theta \frac{L_A^{\lambda}}{A_i^{1-\phi}}.$$
(5)

- As in the Romer model we have two opposite effects of A on innovation:
- (1) "standing on the shoulders of the giants" : increasing A increases the chances of findings a new innovation
- (2) "congestion of researchers" effects: the probability of finding new innovations is lower as A increases. (new possibilities are far away)
- However, here these factors affect the probability (not the size) of innovation

- Capital and labor accumulation
- The capital stock K evolves in the same way as in the Solow model

$$\dot{K} = S_K Y - \delta K \tag{6}$$

• Where  $S_K Y$  is the investment and  $\delta$  stands for the depreciation rate of K

#### • Population grows at a constant rate n

•  $L = L_A + L_Y$ , where  $L_A$  are the people involved in research activities and  $L_Y$  the workers in the production sector

#### Economic Growth

- Since innovations occur randomly, we cannot specify the precise path of the income per capita, but
- we can only look at the growth over long periods of time
- At a given point in time, we have an expected growth of innovation, which is given by

$$E\left[\frac{\dot{A}}{A}\right] = \gamma \overline{\mu} L_A = \gamma \theta \frac{L_A^{\lambda}}{A_i^{1-\phi}}.$$
(7)

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- $\gamma$  tells us how much A jumps when an innovation occurs
- $\overline{\mu}L_A$  tells us the expected value of the number of jumps (probability of innovation)

#### Economic Growth

• For the law of large numbers, in the very long period the actual average growth approaches the expected average growth:

$$E\left[\frac{\dot{A}}{A}\right] = g_A = g_Y = g_K \tag{8}$$

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- Growth along the BGP
- In equilibrium along the BGP the expected growth rate of A will be constant.

$$E\left[\frac{\dot{A}}{A}\right] = \gamma \overline{\mu} L_A = \gamma \theta \frac{L_A^{\lambda}}{A_i^{1-\phi}}.$$
(9)

• Using the above and taking logs and derivative respect to time of the right hand side and set it equal to zero:

$$0 = \lambda \frac{\dot{L}_A}{L_A} - (1 - \phi) E\left[\frac{\dot{A}}{A}\right]$$
(10)

- where A is replaced with its expected value
- Recall that in the long run  $\dot{L}/L = \dot{L}_A/L_A = n$  along the BGP, means that

$$E\left[\frac{\dot{A}}{A}\right] = g_A = \frac{\lambda}{1-\phi}n\tag{11}$$

• which is identical to what we got in the Romer model for growth on the BGP



- The bold line shows how log income per capita actually changes over time:
- $\bullet\,$  There are flat sections  $\rightarrow\,$  no innovations have been made
- When someone innovates,  $A_i$  jumps by  $\gamma$ , so growth is very rapid in that moment
- On average income per capita is growing along the line called "BGP" which depends on population

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#### A first comparison between Romer and Schumpeterian models

- The Schumpeterian model does not change our conclusion about the long run trend growth rate.
- Not relevant whether A is a larger variety of goods or better goods
- It is interesting to note that  $\gamma$  does not affect the growth rate along the BGP

$$g_A = \frac{\lambda}{1 - \phi} n \tag{12}$$

- $\bullet\,$  on the one hand, a larger  $\,\gamma\,$  boosts the size of jumps in A, which is good for growth
- $\bullet\,$  while, on the other hand, larger  $\gamma$  , though, raises A, making it harder to find the next innovation
- The Schumpeterian model differs in the underlying economics, and will differ in the equilibrium value of  $S_R$

- Assumptions of the Schumpeterian model
  - **Imperfect competition:** Necessary to generate profits to compensate the researchers work
  - 3 sectors in the Economy:
    - Final Goods Sector: perfect competition
    - Intermediate Goods Sector: only a single input produce by one monopolist that owns the patent producing capital good used by final good sector
    - **Research sector:** individuals trying to generate a new version of the capital good more productive for the final good sector.
  - Difference with Romer (1990) → Creative destruction: The research sector can sell the patent to a new intermediate good firm that monopolize the market and replace the old one.

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- Main differences between Schumpeterian model and Romer model
  - How intermediate goods are used
  - Nature of innovation
- Different solution of the Schumpeterian model for:
  - The proportion of researchers
  - Implications for the role of competition

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### **Final Goods Sector**

• Final goods produced under perfect competition and CRS using

$$Y = L_Y^{1-\alpha} A_i^{1-\alpha} x_i^{\alpha} \tag{13}$$

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- where x<sub>i</sub> is a single intermediate (or capital) good x<sub>i</sub> = K used in the final goods sector. (Different Romer)
- x<sub>i</sub> is indexed by *i* because each intermediate good (units of machine used) has a specific productivity level, A<sub>i</sub> (efficiency) associated with it.
- Similar to before, final good firms will maximize profits,
  - Choose how many units of x<sub>i</sub> to use
  - Choose which version of x<sub>i</sub> to use (latest, or older less productive version)
  - Will turn out that all versions cost the same, so they will pick best one (the latest version) that gives the highest productivity level
  - Nobody uses the oldest version that becomes obsolet

#### **Final Goods Sector**

• Final Good Sector Profits:

$$max_{L_Y,x_i}L_Y^{1-\alpha}A_i^{1-\alpha}x_i^{\alpha} - wL_Y - p_ix_i$$
(14)

• giving first-order conditions of

$$w = (1-\alpha)\frac{Y}{L_Y} \tag{15}$$

$$p_i = \alpha L_Y^{1-\alpha} A_i^{1-\alpha} x_i^{\alpha-1}$$
 (16)

- which again is just that the firm sets marginal cost equal to marginal product.
- As in the Romer model, the elasticity of demand for the intermediate good is  $\alpha 1$

#### Intermediate Good Sector

- Intermediate good firms are monopolists at producing their version of the int. good.
- They have bought the design from the research sector and there is patent protection
- As before, they transform one unit of capital into one unit of the int. good.
- Their profits are

$$\pi_i = p_i(x_i)x_i - rx_i \tag{17}$$

The first-order condition is

$$p'_i(x_i)x_i + p_i(x_i) = r$$
 (18)

• or set marginal revenue to marginal cost.

#### Intermediate Good Sector

• As before, we can transform this FOC into

$$p_{i} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{p_{i}'(x_{i})x_{i}}{p_{i}}}r$$
(19)

• which given the elasticity  $1 - \alpha$ , we found that they charge a constant markup over MC:

$$p_i = \frac{r}{\alpha} \tag{20}$$

- Since the intermediate good firm will always charge the same price for a unit of input, buying the old version of machine costs the same as the new version
- Since the productivity of the new version if higher, all final good producers will buy the latest version.
- The economy operates at its technological frontier

#### Markup Pricing

- Similar to the Romer model, int. good firms charge a markup over marginal cost.
  - This generates the profits that will motivate innovation
  - The price they charge does *not* depend on the version of the int. good they produce
  - So all versions of x<sub>i</sub> sell for the same price, final good firms only buy the best one (highest A<sub>i</sub>)
- This set-up ensures the creative destruction in the economy.

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#### Aggregate Output

• Given that only one int. good firm operates at a time, it must be that

$$x_i = K \tag{21}$$

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• meaning that aggregate output is as in Romer (1990)

$$Y = K^{\alpha} (A_i L_Y)^{1-\alpha}$$
<sup>(22)</sup>

• which is the same as the standard production function we always use.

#### **Research Sector**

- Innovation is the main difference with Romer
- Inventing a new version x<sub>i+1</sub> gives you a patent on that good you can sell (or use to be the monopolist).
- ullet Researchers have a constant probability of finding the new version  $\overline{\mu}$
- The one that discovered the new version gets the patent and sell it to the intermediate good firm
- We use an arbitrage condition to get the value of the patent

$$rP_A = \pi + \dot{P}_A - (\overline{\mu}L_A)P_A \tag{23}$$

- rPA is again the value of putting your money in the bank instead
- $\pi + \dot{P}_A$  is the value of the patent: profits plus capital gains
- With  $L_A$  people doing research each with a probability  $\mu$  of innovating then:
- $(\pi I_A) P_A$  contures the fact that with probability  $\pi I_A$  volu will be replaced M. Bas Macro: Economic Growth- Paris I

**Research Sector** 

• Re-arrange to

$$r = \frac{\pi}{P_A} + \frac{\dot{P}_A}{P_A} - \overline{\mu}L_A \tag{24}$$

• and for convenience let 
$$\mu = \overline{\mu}L_A$$
 so

$$r = \frac{\pi}{P_A} + \frac{\dot{P}_A}{P_A} - \mu \tag{25}$$

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•  $(\overline{\mu}L_A)$  is the probability of a new innovation and it is constant in BGP

Patents Along BGP

$$r = \frac{\pi}{P_A} + \frac{\dot{P}_A}{P_A} - \mu \tag{26}$$

- As in the Romer model, we want to consider the value of a patent along the BGP, where *r* is constant.
- This implies  $\pi$  and  $P_A$  must grow at the same rate.
  - We know that profits are  $\pi = \alpha(1-\alpha)Y$ , so profits grow at the rate  $g_Y + n$
  - We know that  $g_Y = \gamma \overline{\mu} L_A = \gamma \mu$  along the BGP since  $E\left[\frac{\dot{A}}{A}\right] = \gamma \mu = g_A = g_Y = g_K$

• ightarrow Patents should grow at the same rate as profits  $rac{\dot{P}_A}{P_A}=\gamma\mu+n$ 

so we have that

$$r = \frac{\pi}{P_A} + \gamma \mu + n - \mu \tag{27}$$

Patents Along BGP

so we have that

$$r = \frac{\pi}{P_A} + \gamma \mu + n - \mu \tag{28}$$

which solves to

$$P_A = \frac{\pi}{r - n + \mu(1 - \gamma)}.$$
(29)

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• Again, patents are the present discounted value of profits.

Patents Along BGP

$$P_A = \frac{\pi}{r - n + \mu(1 - \gamma)}.$$
(30)

• Again, patents are the present discounted value of profits.

- Relative to Romer model, the discount rate is higher because of  $\mu$ , which captures the chance of being replaced.
- A higher probability of innovation means that the current capital good is more likely to be replaced quickly making the value of the patent for the current capital good lower
- As the size of innovation increases (gamma), the value of patents increases

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#### Equilibrium for Labor

- Again, individuals can either do research to get the next idea, or work in the final goods sector.
- They move back and forth until the returns to these two activities are identical, or

$$(1-\alpha)\frac{Y}{L_Y} = \overline{\mu}P_A \tag{31}$$

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• where  $\overline{\mu}$  is the chance that an individual will innovate, and  $P_A$  is the value of that innovation to them.

#### Equilibrium for Labor

$$(1-\alpha)\frac{Y}{L_Y} = \overline{\mu}\frac{\pi}{r-n+\mu(1-\gamma)}$$
(32)

$$(1-\alpha)\frac{Y}{L_Y} = \overline{\mu}\frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)Y}{r-n+\mu(1-\gamma)}$$
(33)

$$\frac{1}{L_Y} = \frac{\mu}{L_A} \frac{\alpha}{r - n + \mu(1 - \gamma)}$$
(34)

$$\frac{L_A}{L_Y} = \mu \frac{\alpha}{r - n + \mu(1 - \gamma)}$$
(35)

$$\frac{s_R}{1-s_R} = \mu \frac{\alpha}{r-n+\mu(1-\gamma)}$$
(36)

which solves to

$$s_R = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{r - n + \mu(1 - \gamma)}{\alpha \mu}}.$$
(37)

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#### Equilibrium s<sub>R</sub>

$$s_{R} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{r - n + \mu(1 - \gamma)}{\alpha \mu}} \tag{38}$$

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- Same discount factor r n. If that goes up, value of patents goes down, lower  $s_R$
- $\bullet\,$  Two opposite effects of the probability of innovation  $\mu\,$

#### Equilibrium s<sub>R</sub>

Found

$$s_R = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{r - n + \mu(1 - \gamma)}{\alpha \mu}} \tag{39}$$

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- Two opposite effects of the probability of innovation  $\mu$ :
- (1) First effect of  $\mu$ : from  $\mu(1-\gamma)$  captures the fact that as the probability of innovation goes up, the value of patents declines due to replacement effects
- (2) Second effect of μ: from αμ captures the fact that as the probability of innovation goes up, you are more likely to get a patent in the first place
- On net, the second effect "wins". You get a patent now, and will only be replace later, so if  $\mu$  goes up,  $s_R$  goes up

#### **Comparing Schumpeter and Romer**

- For realistic values of  $\phi < 1$ , the long-run growth rate depends on *n* and is identical  $g = \lambda n/(1 \phi)$ .
- So whether innovation takes the form of inventing more and new intermediate goods or replacing the existent ones is not essential for economic growth.
- The main contribution of the Schumpeterian model is to connect growth theory to firm dynamics

**Comparing Schumpeter and Romer** 

- The difference is in the level of income along the BGP implied by the value of  $s_R$ .
  - Schumpeterian model has higher s<sub>R</sub> if g < r − n. In this case the discount rate is very large, and so I care most about profits in the immediate future and little about the fact that I might be replaced some day → So more people do research than in Romer.</li>
  - Schumpeterian model has lower  $s_R$  if g > r n. In this case the discount rate is low, so people do care about the future replacement a lot.  $\rightarrow$  Hence  $s_R$  is low compared to Romer.

**Comparing Schumpeter and Romer** 

- Remember that higher s<sub>R</sub> is not necessarily optimal. y(t) along the BGP depends both positively and negatively on s<sub>R</sub>.
- There is no sense in which Romer or Schumpeter is "better". They are different ways of conceiving of the growth process.

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