

Chapter 4: The Global Right

I/ Follow-up: “Neoliberals against Europe” (Slobodian & Plehwe)

Neoliberalism = an example of elite/intellectual mobilization.

Mount Pèlerin Society (1947).

Association of scholars (economists, philosophers, historians), including Nobel Prizes:

Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992), chair of MPS (1947-1961)



Austrian school of economics

Milton Friedman (1912-2006)

Chicago school of economics

About The Mont Pelerin Society

The Mont Pelerin Society is composed of persons who continue to see the dangers to civilized society outlined in the statement of aims. They have seen economic and political liberalism in the ascendant for a time since World War II in some countries but also its apparent decline in more recent times.

Though not necessarily sharing a common interpretation, either of causes or consequences, they see danger in the expansion of government, not least in state welfare, in the power of trade unions and business monopoly, and in the continuing threat and reality of inflation.

Again without detailed agreements, the members see the Society as an effort to interpret in modern terms the fundamental principles of economic society as expressed by those classical economists, political scientists, and philosophers who have inspired many in Europe, America and throughout the Western World.

Slobodian & Plehwe: logical fallacy.

'To say that the EU has been neoliberal in its outcome does not imply ipso facto that neoliberal actors were responsible for its genesis. Scholars have rightly emphasized the need to distinguish between the use of the category of neoliberalism as a description of a historical period or variety of capitalism, on the one hand, and an organized intellectual and political movement rooted in the Mont Pèlerin Society, on the other.'

German ordo-liberalism as an inspiration for EU integration (social market economy).

Walter Eucken (1891-1950).

Common point between ordo-liberalism and neoliberalism: emphasis on the role of the state (government) to ensure free market (but rejection of welfare state).

Guarantee:

- Free circulation of goods, capitals, labour, and services.
- Competition to attract investment and productive people.

Brexit referendum, 2016.

'the intellectuals, think tankers and policy entrepreneurs organized in the actual existing neoliberal movement since the early 1990s have more often been the EU's critics than its champions. While the Left has seen the EU as an austerity machine, the most engaged neoliberals have seen it as a framework for socialist expansion.'

Reactions against Jaques Delors' Commission in the early 1990s ('left-leaning federalism').

Establishment of eurosceptic think tanks.

The Bruges Group (1989)

The European Constitutional Group (1992)

The Center for the New Europe (1993)

The European Science and Environment Forum (1994).

Thatcher, Europe as a 'family of nations'.

Opposition to 'social Europe'.

Alliances with Eastern European partners after 1989.

Model of Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institute: combine free markets with traditional morality.

“


The Bruges Speech
20 September 1988

“Willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European Community.

“To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardise the objectives we seek to achieve.”

*'A change emerged in the years after the **Maastricht Treaty** (1992) and the move to the introduction of the Euro in 1999. While some Eurosceptic neoliberals retained hope for a reformed union, others began forging alliances with cultural nationalist parties. In the process, their opposition to Europe became more absolute, culminating in calls like the Brexit campaign for secession from both the European Monetary Union and the EU itself.'*

Vidéos ▶ Tout lire



From the Bruges group's YouTube channel:

'Brexit and the National Interest'

'How the Rise of the Administrative State is Undermining Democracy'

'From Bruges to Brexit: The vision that best serves the British National Interest'

'Is Immigration in the National Interest?'

'A dividing line was created between those neoliberals who felt supranational governance was necessary to defend overall economic order and right-wing neoliberals who felt that such an order must be anchored more soundly in national states. Neither were opposed to an active role for the state per se. The disagreement was about whether a central European bank or national central banks were the most effective site for monetary management.'

Political alliances between neoliberals and radical right parties.

AfD, protest against Germany's position in the eurozone crisis.

'The closed-borders libertarianism of nationalist neoliberals like the AfD is not a rejection of globalism but is a variety of it.'



European Alliance of Conservatives and Reformers
(2009).

European Conservatives and Reformists.

New Direction (think tank).

'The decision of the British Conservative party along with the Czech ODS and the Polish PiS to end their traditional cooperation with the majority conservatives and social democrats in the European Parliament marked a break with the integration policy of the past. The new formation introduced a conservative perspective with no ties to the previous policy of integration.'



The Prague Declaration

Conscious of the urgent need to reform the EU on the basis of Eurorealism, Openness, Accountability and Democracy, in a way that respects the sovereignty of our nations and concentrates on economic recovery, growth and competitiveness, the European Conservatives and Reformists Group shares the following principles:

- Free enterprise, free and fair trade and competition, minimal regulation, lower taxation, and small government as the ultimate catalysts for individual freedom and personal and national prosperity.
- Freedom of the individual, more personal responsibility and greater democratic accountability.
- Sustainable, clean energy supply with an emphasis on energy security.
- The importance of the family as the bedrock of society.
- The sovereign integrity of the nation state, opposition to EU federalism and a renewed respect for true subsidiarity.
- The overriding value of the transatlantic security relationship in a revitalised NATO, and support for young democracies across Europe.
- Effectively controlled immigration and an end to abuse of asylum procedures.
- Efficient and modern public services and sensitivity to the needs of both rural and urban communities.
- An end to waste and excessive bureaucracy and a commitment to greater transparency and probity in the EU institutions and use of EU funds.
- Respect and equitable treatment for all EU countries, new and old, large and small.

Transnational dimension: establishment of a new European right. Role of the EP in this respect (Datta, Delaine).


'In a painful irony, the directly elected members of European parliament, originally intended to help bridge the so-called democratic deficit and legitimate Europe-wide governance, ended up offering a stage to those suspicious of the European project as such. Although there was already a robust transnational network of Eurosceptic right-wing parties by 1994, few scholars paid attention or took them seriously as part of the system of national and transnational European civil society. The fact that the hurdle for a seat in the European parliament is only 3% (as opposed to 5% in the German Bundestag) lowered the barriers to entry for protest parties.'

Neil Datta, 'Tip of the Iceberg. Religious Extremist Funders against Human Rights

For Sexuality and Reproductive Health in Europe (2009-2018)',

European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual & Reproductive Rights:

[https://www.epfweb.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/Tip%20of%20the%20Iceberg%20June%202021%](https://www.epfweb.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/Tip%20of%20the%20Iceberg%20June%202021%20.pdf)



Conclusion

The shift in neoliberal Eurosceptic organization from 1988 to the 2010s as a passage from reform to radicalism, from demands for conservative reconstruction to separatism and secession.

II/ Case-study: the conservative International

NATIONAL CONSERVATISM



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The Global
(intellectual) Right

- Hypothesis : reconfiguration of the global right, along illiberal (anti-liberal?) lines:

-> Questioning of multiculturalism (immigration), LGBT rights, 'gender ideology', 'wokeism', etc.

➔ References to 'natural order' and 'traditional values'; ethno-cultural definition of the political community.

➔ Questioning of the separation of powers, Rule of Law, international organizations and courts.


➔ 'Progressivism' as a new form of 'Marxism' (transformations of Cold War anticommunism).

Research approach: decentred; conservative International reconstructed from Central Europe.

Ramona Coman, Valentin Behr & Jan Beyer 'The shaping power of anti-liberal ideas', *European Politics and Society*, (2023).

Central Europe as
the new 'hub' of
the Global Right?





1/ The legacy of the Cold War

- Anti-communist dissent and its conservative fraction.
- Polish *Arka* Review and its international advisory board: Leszek Kolakowski, Alain Besançon, François Bondy (*Preuves*), Melvin Lasky (*Encounter*), Norman Podhoretz (*Commentary*)).
- Roger Scruton (Jan Hus Foundation, Jagiellonian Trust).
- Ryszard Legutko (philosopher & MEP): *The Demon in Democracy* (2016).





1/ The legacy of the Cold War

- 'Conservative civil society' after 1989.
- Centre for Political Thought (OMP, Cracow, 1992). Michael Novak (American Enterprise Institute) ; George Weigel (Ethics and Public Policy Center).
- Public intellectuals close to the PiS party: Zdzislaw Krasnodebski, sociologist, MEP; Ryszard Terlecki, historian, MP; Krzysztof Szczerski, political scientist, head of cabinet of the Polish President, Poland's ambassador to the UN.

2/ The EU as a space of transnational mobilizations

- EU enlargement to the East (2004) and the consolidation of the eurosceptic right.
- Key role of the British Tories.
- Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR), 2009.
- European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR): PiS, ODS, Fratelli d'Italia, Vox, Swedish Democrats, ...
- New Direction (think tank).





3/ Transnational mobilizations of intellectuals

- Vanenburg conferences.
- Centre for European Renewal (CER).
- *The European Conservative*.
- Legutko, Scruton, Chantal Delsol, David Engels, Douglas Murray, Andras Lanczi, Roman Joch, ...

THE EUROPEAN CONSERVATIVE

Issue 6 • Spring 2012

The Political Impact of Utøya

Dag Eilertsen

One week after last summer's Vanerburg Meeting in Leuven, one of the worst acts of domestic terrorism in modern European history took place in Norway. While the first thought on many people's minds was that Islamic terrorists were to blame, the authorities soon revealed that a 32-year-old Norwegian, Anders Behring Breivik, was responsible. He had first detonated a fertilizer-based bomb in Oslo's government district, killing eight people, and then had gone to a youth camp run by the Social Democrats on the island of Utøya where he shot and killed 69 people—the vast majority of them children and teenagers. In connection with the attack, Breivik published an on-line manifesto, which had been crudely cut-and-pasted from a variety

of sources—and which mirrored the words of Winston Churchill, John Locke, and Mahatma Gandhi, among others. In it, Breivik called for an armed struggle against Islam and the European Left.

This heinous attack had a huge impact on the social, cultural, and political debate in northern Europe. Anyone thought to be critical of Islam or opposed to left-wing ideas was quickly seen as having contributed in some way to Breivik's rash actions. Conservatives and conservative ideas were said to be responsible for creating a "milieu" in which a crime like Breivik's could take place. In addition, the Scandinavian media soon went on a hunt for everyone and anyone who had initially speculated that radical Islamists had carried out the attack. In the end, a list of people had to

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
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what many saw as the sole monument of the country's Communist past. The first official step was taken on September 7, 2010, when an ad hoc parliamentary committee started to make preparations. After numerous debates on some matters of principle, the early drafts of the new constitution, were written between January and March of 2011. The final

Continued on p. 7

A publication of the Center for European Renewal



4/ The role of illiberal democracies: state-sponsored intellectual networking

- Danube Institute (Budapest, 2013).
- John O'Sullivan (former ghost-writer to Margaret Thatcher).
- Budapest Demographic Summit (since 2015).
- Mathias Corvinus Colegium (MCC).
- *Polska Wielki Projekt* (since 2011).
- Ordo Iuris.
- Collegium Intermarium.

How did LGBTQ take over the EU? How the EU used LGBTQ advocacy to demonise the East

“Visiting fellows” of Mathias Corvinus Collegium (Budapest)



Thibaud Gibelin

French historian; political scientist

Guest Speaker, Visiting Fellow

Thibaud Gibelin is enrolled in a doctoral thesis in political science at the University of Paris Est-Créteil. His research is focused on the reaffirmation of politics in Europe, through recent developments in Hungary. In 2020, he published his first essay: *Pourquoi Viktor Orbán joue et gagne* [Why Viktor Orbán Plays and Wins], by Fauves Editions. After studying history and political science, Thibaud Gibelin worked mainly in the European Parliament, but also in Moscow and finally as a teacher in a private high school.

Visiting Fellow at MCC: September 2021 – July 2023




Francesco Giubilei

Italian author and professor; president, *Fondazione Tatarella*; founder, *Nazione Futura*; journalist, *Il Giornale*; professor, *University G. Fortunato in Benevento*


Visiting Fellow

Francesco Giubilei is an author, publisher, and professor based in Italy. He is the President of the Italian Conservative foundation, *Fondazione Tatarella*, and the founder of the think tank, *Nazione Futura*. He also teaches at the *University G. Fortunato of Benevento*. Mr. Giubilei was recently included in *Forbes's* list of 100 most influential youths in Italy under 30. He has authored eight books including *The History of European Conservative Thought*, (his first work to be published in English). His writings frequently appear in the Italian daily, *Il Giornale*, *The American Conservative*, and *The European Conservative* magazines.



4/ ... and the role of the US

- Reconfiguration of the US right (Tea Party, Trump, ...).
- NatCon conferences.
- Yoram Hazony (Herzl Institute & Edmund Burke Foundation).



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The anti-communist matrix: the specter of cultural Marxism

Legutko, *The Demon in Democracy*:

*“Ryszard Legutko lived and suffered under communism for decades—and he fought with the Polish anti-communist movement to abolish it. Having lived for two decades under a liberal democracy, however, he has discovered that **these two political systems have a lot more in common than one might think. They both stem from the same historical roots in early modernity, and accept similar presuppositions about history, society, religion, politics, culture, and human nature.**”*

Hazony, “The Challenge of Marxism”:

*“For a generation after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, most Americans and Europeans regarded Marxism as an enemy that had been defeated once and for all. But they were wrong. A mere 30 years later, **Marxism is back, and making an astonishingly successful bid to seize control of the most important American media companies, universities and schools, major corporations and philanthropic organizations, and even the courts, the government bureaucracy, and some churches.**”*

Behr, Valentin, et al. « An anti-communist Consensus: The Black Book of communism in Pan-European Perspective », *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest*, vol. 2-3, no. 2-3, 2020, pp. 55-88.

Anne Appelbaum, *Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism* (2020).

-> Invites to consider “really existing liberalism”, the role of anti-communism in the reinvention of the far-right after WWII, the legacy of older ideological traditions (“anti-Enlightenment”, historical fascism).



Concluding remarks

- 'right-wing Gramscianism' (metapolitics).
- Role of civil society (intellectuals, scholars, NGOs, media) in the production and diffusion of conservative ideas.
- Modes of intellectual engagement ('fast thinkers').



III/ Transnational culture wars

Culture Wars

See *Culture Wars in Europe*, Edited by Eszter Kováts, Illiberal Studies Program (2023).

Political polarization along cultural-values lines.

Political uses of morality and causes that are often labelled cultural or relating to recognition.

Most of the time by far right, populist, radical right or illiberal actors.

As with other **loaded concepts** (populism, illiberalism, backlash) the notion of culture wars is often used not only in analytical terms but also in political debates to delegitimize the opponent.

Analytical advantage of the concept of 'culture wars': taking into consideration both sides of the cultural divide.

Clifford Bob, *The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics* (2012).

understudied operations of right-wing activists. Equally, I analyze their continuous clashes with human rights, environmental, and social justice groups – not only the rivals' efforts to sway decision makers, but also their strategic attacks on one another. In particular, I highlight fights over gay rights and gun control at the United Nations and in countries such as Brazil, Romania, Sweden, and the United States.

4 main arguments:

- Transnational politics is ideologically diverse and conflictive.
- The battles cut across institutions and borders.
- This globalized combat influences outcomes (policy or nonpolicy).
- Global civil society is not a harmonious field of like-minded NGOs. It is a contentious arena riven by fundamental differences criss-crossing national and international borders.

Illustration with anti-gender campaigns.

David Paternotte & Roman Kuhar, 'Disentangling and Locating the "Global Right": Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe', *Politics and Governance* (2018).

In a nutshell: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ftBhcHFoUvw>

Sara Garbagnoli, 'Against the Heresy of Immanence: Vatican's 'Gender' as a New Rhetorical Device Against the Denaturalization of the Sexual Order', *Religion&Gender* (2016).

'Gender ideology' as new rhetorical device created by the Vatican to contest the denaturalization of the sexual order that ensued from the claim of sexual minorities' movements.

This argumentative construction travelled from the Vatican's texts to the anti-gender demonstrations in France and Italy.

Ex.: French 'Manif pour Tous' and the likes:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lo8W-YWeA6s>




Backlash

Special issue on 'backlash politics', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* (2020).

Eds.: Karen J. Alter and Michael Zürn.

The term backlash has been invoked in very different contexts: in discussions of reactionary movements, anti-feminism, the pushback against LGBT rights, movements for local autonomy, radical right-wing populism, when discussing policy reversals, rejections of European and international institutions, and more.

Transnational dimension: Local antifeminist politics have migrated to the United Nations (UN); anti-gay backlashes arise in places where there are no gay-rights victories to reverse.



Donatella della Porta, 'Conceptualising backlash movements: A (patch-worked) perspective from social movement studies', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* (2020).

Backlash politics as characterised by the convergence of an intensified organisational networking, increased capacity for collective actions and aggressive framing by retrograde actors (including movements).

Retrograde objectives -> backward-looking move.

Cf. radical right-wing and far right movements.

These movements are collective actors that aim at the reversal of some rights, doing so in the name of restoring old privileges.

'a main challenge to address is then how to assess if and how much a movement (or political actor more in general) is retrograde – that is, backward looking. As other contributions to this special issue also observe, discourses by actors considered as illustrative of backlash are never purely backward looking, but rather connect the past to some vision of the future.'

*'Similar to other types of social movements, right-wing social movements (and backlash movements in general) are **not just groups, but rather networks of more or less formal groups and individuals**; the extent and structure of these networks defines their mobilising capacity. In particular, the radical right is at times able to rely upon powerful actors for material and symbolic actors.'*

'Research on backlash politics should therefore look at the organisational networks of collective actors that are spreading retrograde frames, considering the complex interaction of hierarchical organisations, but also grassroots ones.'

<https://nationalconservatism.org/natcon-brussels-2/about/>

From NatCon London 2023:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FIMkqUyrSI0>


<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SVr4Ws6Imkl>

Theda Skocpol and Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, 'The Koch Network and Republican Party Extremism', *Perspectives on Politics* (2016).



<https://checksandbalancesproject.org/koch-strength-increases/>


The evolution of Koch core political organisations:



Notes: Blue bars indicate idea organizations and think tanks; yellow bars indicate coordination organizations; red bars indicate constituency mobilization; and purple bars indicate political utilities.

Neill Datta, 'Tip of the Iceberg. Religious Extremist Funders against Human Rights for Sexuality and Reproductive Health in Europe 2009-2018', European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual & Reproductive Rights (2021).

Tip of the Iceberg is the first attempt understand the anti-gender mobilisation in Europe through the perspective of their funding base. This report assembles financial data covering a ten year period of over 50 anti-gender actors operating in Europe. It then takes a deeper look at how religious extremists generate this funding to roll back human rights in sexuality and reproduction.




FROM THE US CHRISTIAN RIGHT

US CHRISTIAN RIGHT 'MEGA-DONORS' FOOTPRINT IN EUROPE

US Christian Right 'Mega-donor' and their net worth	US Anti-Gender Private Foundation	Total ten year spend	Anti-gender activism in Europe
Anonymous (a collection of donor advised funds)	Donors Trust (Donors Capital Fund)	USD400 million	Acton Institute, Cato Institute, Federalist Society, Heritage Foundation,
Anonymous (a collection of donor advised funds)	National Christian Foundation	USD1.57 billion	ADF
Charles Koch (USD50 billion)	Charles Koch Foundation	USD575 million	Acton Institute, Federalist Society
DeVos Family (USD5.4 billion)	Four DeVos Foundations	USD691 million	Acton Institute, Federalist Society
Knights of Columbus (USD185 million)	Chiaroscuro Foundation	USD44 million	Acton Institute, HLI, WYA
Prince Family (USD5.1 billion)	Prince Foundation	USD49.8 million	Acton Institute, ADF, Leadership Institute
Templeton Family (USD13 billion)	Templeton Foundation	USD1.6 billion	Acton Institute

FROM THE US CHRISTIAN RIGHT

SELECTED US CHRISTIAN FUNDING FLOWS TO EUROPE FROM 2009 TO 2018



FROM THE US CHRISTIAN RIGHT

SNAPSHOT OF US CHRISTIAN RIGHT FUNDING IN EUROPE

- Funding from US Christian Right actors active in Europe has nearly doubled from USD4.7 million to USD7.6 million annually to reach a 10-year total of USD81.3 million.
- US Christian Right funding in Europe comes from US NGOs and think tanks funded by US foundations which are themselves the creation of US right-wing billionaires. The number of actors has increased from 8 to 10.
- ADF International and the ECLJ have built up a Christian Right legal infrastructure in Europe, with offices in all the continent's human rights decision-making hubs serving as a launch pad to engage in over 30 cases before European courts to undermine human rights since 2013.
- Methodologically, the figures for the United States are accurate and complete; they are all available on the database of the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

FROM THE EAST

RUSSIAN ANTI-GENDER INFLUENCE IN EUROPE



Vladimir Yakunin

- Funding to:
- **DOC** in Berlin
 - **Sanctity of Motherhood** in Serbia and Belarus
 - **WCF** in Tbilisi, Chisinau, Budapest and Verona




Konstantin Malofeev

- Funding to:
- **CitizenGO** in Madrid
 - **La Manif Pour Tous** in Paris
 - **Rassemblement National** in Paris
 - **Vienna meeting** in Vienna
 - **WCF** in Tbilisi, Chisinau, Budapest and Verona



Luca Volontè

- €2.39 million from Russian-Azerbaijani laundromat to **Fondazione Novae Terrae** in Milan, funding:
- **Citizen GO** in Madrid
 - **Dignitatis Humanae** in Rome
 - **Iona Institute** in Dublin
 - **Mum, Dad & Kids** in Brussels



FROM THE EAST

SNAPSHOT OF RUSSIAN ANTI-GENDER FUNDING IN EUROPE

- Russian anti-gender funding appears suddenly in 2013 and quickly reaches over USD24 million annually, outpacing US Christian Right funding, reaching a 10-year total of USD188.2 million.
- Russian anti-gender funding in Europe comes from entities linked to two Russian oligarchs (Vladimir Yakunin and Konstatin Malofeev), dark-money laundromats and State-funded agencies.
- Anti-gender funding dovetails Russian geopolitical interests and objectives in Europe by supporting anti-EU, anti-liberal and anti-human rights actors and agendas. Narratives of sovereignty can resonate well with actors on the right to far-right, while decolonisation and Soviet nostalgia can be seductive to the far-left.
- Methodologically, the data for Russian funding are mixed. Financial data for the oligarchs' entities are relatively complete and originate from Russian tax authorities. The data on laundromats are not transparent, and there are no financial data on the state agencies.

RELIGIOUS EXTREMIST FUNDERS

OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN ANTI-GENDER NGO FUNDERS

NGOs	Headquarters	Financial weight from 2009 to 2018	Anti-gender activism
One of Us Federation and members (Catholic anti-abortion activism)	Belgium	USD31.5 million	Anti-abortion at EU and national levels
Mum, Dad & Kids and members (Anti-LGBTQI campaigning)	France	USD23 million	Anti-LGBTQI campaigning across EU
ECPM (Christian political activism)	Netherlands	USD8.2 million	Anti-abortion, LGBT, VAW, Agenda Europe, PNFV
Hazte Oir and CitizenGO (Ultra-conservative social media mobilisation)	Spain	USD32.8 million	Agenda Europe, PNFV, One of Us
TFP (Pseudo-Catholic, far-right mobilisation)	France and Poland	USD113.4 million	Far-right Catholic activism, Agenda Europe

SNAPSHOT OF EUROPEAN ANTI-GENDER ACTORS

- Funding from within the EU for anti-gender mobilisation has increased dramatically from USD17.5 million to USD63.8 million annually to reach a 10-year total of USD437.7 million for 2009–2018.
- European anti-gender funding originates from private foundations, civil society actors, political parties, and religious actors. The number of European anti-gender actors has increased over the past decade as a result of the emergence of new actors: CitizenGO, the ECPM, the One of Us Federation and homophobic activism through LMPT and the Mum, Dad & Kids ECI among others.
- European anti-gender actors have innovated to generate funds: astroturfing, tapping into public funding and transnational networking are responsible for the anti-abortion and anti-LGBTQI activism since 2013.
- Methodologically, the data for European actors are the most inconsistent, with significant data gaps leading to an underestimation. The data gaps are the result of an absence of financial transparency requirements, such as US or Russian equivalents, at Member State and EU level. There are financial data for only 36 European anti-gender actors.

EUROPEAN PUBLIC FINANCIAL SUPPORT

SAMPLE OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC FINANCIAL SUPPORT

Country	Source	Beneficiary	Year	Funding	Purpose
France	Local authorities	NGOs active in anti-LGBT campaigning	Since 2013	Varies	General support
EU	EU Common Agricultural Policy	Aristocratic families: Liechtenstein, von Thurn und Taxis, von Oldenburg, von Westphalen, von Habsburg, de Villiers, Bourbon/Borbon, von Beverfoerde, Eulenbug-Hertefeld, von Reinersdorff, Rüsck von Siemens, Tschugguel	Annual	Varies	Maintenance of agricultural/forest properties in the EU
EU	European Commission ERASMUS+ Programme	WYA-Europe	Annually since 2010	Annual grants and projects totalling USD380,000	Transnational youth exchange; 'human dignity' training
EU	European Parliament	European Christian Political Movement (ECPM)	Annual grant since 2010	Total: USD8.2 million	Operational costs for an anti-gender political party
EU	European Parliament	Fascist political parties: Coalition for Life and Family (CLF); European Alliance of National Movements (EANM); Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF)	2012-2017	Total: €4.7 million	Operational costs of far-right political parties
EU	EU employment and social solidarity programme PROGRESS	Hungarian government	2011	€416,000	Anti-abortion billboard campaign
EU	European Social Fund and European Regional Development Fund	Forum Zivota (Slovakia)	2018	<i>Unknown</i>	To operate CPCs: Centrum Femina and Alexis
Hungary	Hungarian government	WCF, Budapest	2017, on-going	<i>Unknown</i>	Support to hold WCF 2017 in Budapest and for hosting an international summit on demography
Hungary	Hungarian government and Fidesz party political foundation	PNV	2019, 2021	Various	Sponsor of PNV summit and opening PNV office in Budapest
Hungary	'Hungary Helps'	Various religious entities around the world	2020	Total: HUF4.6 billion (€12.9 million)	Humanitarian and development work of religious entities
Italy	Local and regional authorities	Centri di aiuto alla vita of the Movimento per la Vita	Since 1975	<i>Unknown</i>	Crisis pregnancy counselling
Italy	Italian government and local authorities: Italian Ministry for Family and Disability; the Autonomous Region of Venice-Friuli; the Region of Veneto; the Province of Verona; the Commune of Verona	WCF, Verona	2019	<i>Unknown</i>	Support to hold WCF 2019 in Verona
Malta	Government of Malta	Life Network Malta	2020	€130,000	Biased abortion counselling
Netherlands	Government of the Netherlands	SIRIZ	Since 2013	Annual grant ranging from €700,000 to €1.7 million	To set up and operate a network of crisis pregnancy centres
Poland	Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Science and Higher Education; Ministry of Development and Finance; Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Policy	Fondacja Lux Veritatis	Several years	€47 million in multiple contracts	Various religious, socially conservative activities

EUROPEAN PUBLIC FINANCIAL SUPPORT

SAMPLE OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC FINANCIAL SUPPORT

Country	Source	Beneficiary	Year	Funding	Purpose
Poland	Polish government: National Freedom Institute; Ministry of Culture – Polish Centre for Culture	KIPR: TFP-affiliated Ordo Iuris as manager	2020	€219,000 €12,000	Funding government-friendly conservative civil society
Poland	Polish Ministry of Justice	Municipality of Tuchow and other LGBT-free signatory cities which lost EU funding	2020	PLN250,000 (€60,000)	Offset loss of EU funding for signing homophobic charter
Poland	Ministry of Justice 'Justice Fund'	Ultra-conservative/far-right Polish entities, including Lux Veritatis	2020	PLN13.3 million (€3.2 million)	Various projects, including: 'counteracting crimes related to violation of the freedom of conscience committed under the influence of LGBT ideology'
Poland	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland	Ministerial Meeting to Advance Freedom of Religion or Belief	2021	Unknown	International ministerial meeting
Poland	Polish National Freedom Institute	Cegjelski Analysis Centre (TFP-affiliated)	2020	€224,000	For basic support
Poland	Over 900 local schools	CZIR (TFP-affiliated)	Since 2017	Unknown	'Family-friendly school certificates' (Certyfikat 'Szkoła Przyjazna Rodzinie')
Slovakia	Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family	Forum Života, Alexis and Ano Pre Život	Annual	Varies – between €2,000 and €20,000 per year	For basic support
Slovenia	Ministry of Labour (allocating EU funds)	Iskreni Institute	2021	€130,000	European funds for projects aiming to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on vulnerable groups
Spain	Federal and regional governments	Red Madre	2014–2018	€1.19 million	Biased abortion counselling
Spain	Federal and regional governments	Several anti-gender organisations across the country: Fundación Madrina, Foro Español de la Familia, Adevida, Federación Provida	Several years	Unknown	Support for a range of anti-gender organisations, including providing core support
Russia	Government of the Russian Federation	Russian government agencies: Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund; Rossotrudnichestvo; Russkiy Mir Foundation	Several years	Total: Unknown (USD1.5 million in Baltic countries)	Promoting Russian interests abroad, including pro-Russian NGOs
Russia	Government of the Russian Federation	Eurasian Women's Forum	Since 2015	Unknown	Regular summits on 'women's agenda'
Ukraine	Ministry of Youth and Sport, Ukraine	Far-right groups: National Corp and C-14	2018–2019	UAH845,000 (USD35,000); UAH450,000 (USD15,000)	National-patriotic education aimed at young people, including youth camps
Various: Croatia, Malta, The Philippines	National public authorities in charge of primary and secondary education	WYA	Several years	Unknown	Human dignity school curriculum
Most countries	National governments	Catholic Church via 'concordats'	On-going	Various	Maintenance of Catholic Church

David Paternotte, 'Backlash: une mise en récit fallacieuse', *La Revue Nouvelle* (2021).

Conceptually erroneous:

- teleological approach to history, where certain moves generate a riposte (+ linear understanding of history as progress);
- simplistic approach to feminist and LGBTIQ movements, perceived as homogeneous and by definition threatening 'privileges' of dominant groups.
- same goes for the understanding of backlashing actor: the Right is a complex constellation of actors (see Paternotte & Kuhar).

Empirically weak:

- Anti-gender mobilisations share claims, arguments, repertoires and strategies, but: they are triggered by different issues: sexual and reproductive rights; LGBTIQ rights; children's rights; gender (Istanbul Convention); legislations against discriminations and hate speech.
- In some countries (Bulgaria and Romania), reaction (backlash) occurred before action (role of local factors and international diffusion). Anti-gender campaigns of a preventive nature.

Politically problematic:

- Risk of isolating gender and sexuality issues from the rest of society, while anti-gender campaigns are part of a broader agenda seeking to establish a new political order, less liberal and less democratic.
- Preventing the establishment of cross-sectoral alliances.
- Self-censorship.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

Della Porta:

'The radical right is made of different types of groups, in alliance but also in competition with each other, with fragmentation fuelled by ideological as well as personalistic divisions, strong tensions between political and countercultural areas, strategical dilemmas between radicalisation and moderation of action and rhetoric.'

Electoral campaigns of the Tea Party, Donald Trump, radical Right parties in Europe have been generously financed by groups within the upper classes that have also been pivotal in the construction of a global radical right (Bob, 2012).

The ultra-conservative positions of the Western so-called 'anti-gender movements' have been sponsored by religious leaders – including in the Vatican (Kuhar and Paternotte, 2017). This cast some doubts on the consideration of the backlash as presenting a rupture with dominant discourses.