

Re-Regulation after the GFC

“The System Worked” after the GFC (Drezner)

- The Fed and other central banks stepped in to support markets

- Governments provided short-term fiscal support

(Although there was a shift to austerity in Europe, in 2010, following Rogoff & Reinhart’s work on public debt and growth)

- A (re)newed drive to regulate finance

Coordination through the G20

	Argentina	Cristina Fernández de Kirchner ^[20]	President
	Australia	Kevin Rudd ^[20]	Prime Minister
	Brazil	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva ^[20]	President
	Canada	Stephen Harper ^[20]	Prime Minister
	China	Hu Jintao ^[20]	President
	France	Nicolas Sarkozy ^[20]	President
	Germany	Angela Merkel ^[20]	Chancellor
	India	Manmohan Singh ^[20]	Prime Minister
	Indonesia	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ^[20]	President
	Italy	Silvio Berlusconi ^[20]	Prime Minister
	Japan	Tarō Asō ^[20]	Prime Minister
	Mexico	Felipe Calderón ^[20]	President
	Russia	Dmitry Medvedev ^[20]	President
	Saudi Arabia	Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz ^[20]	King
	South Africa	Kgalema Motlanthe ^[20]	President
	South Korea	Lee Myung-bak ^[20]	President
	Turkey	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ^[20]	Prime Minister
	United Kingdom	Gordon Brown ^[20]	Prime Minister
	United States	George W. Bush^[20]	President
	European Union (European Commission)	Jose Manuel Barroso ^[20]	President



President Bush and the other summit leaders at a working dinner in the East Wing of the White House.

... and worked... through Covid

- After massive financial market instability in March 2020
- The authorities stepped in... massively
- Monetary & fiscal support have been substantial
- But – significantly – the Trump administration did not coordinate policies.
- In Europe (and UK) – an effort not to repeat mistakes of moving to austerity too quickly. Support for keeping workers in their jobs (Germany pursued this policy after the GFC)

G20 and Basel III

- Apart from dealing immediately with the GFC, G20 initiated principles of re-regulation, including:
- Higher reserve ratios and liquidity requirements:
 - Stronger Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital (mainly [common stock](#) (i.e. shares): $CET1/RWA \geq 4.5\%$ | ratios of risk-weighted assets.
 - Plus “capital conservation buffer”: mandatory 2.5% RWA
 - And “discretionary counter-cyclical buffer” (national regulators may require) 2.5%
 - Additional Tier 1 (AT1) Capital Requirement (Basel III+/IV): 1.5% RWATherefore total Tier 1 capital requirement is: **$CET1+AT1=4.5\%+1.5%=6\%$**

In practice (according to GPT-4, 17 October 2023) US banks today have Tier 1 capital ratios of between 12% and 16% or higher, and in the UK 13% to 17%+

Bank balance sheets

Traditional commercial bank

Assets	Liabilities
Reserves	Deposits
Short-term loans	Short-term debt
Long-term loans	Long-term debt
Other instruments	
	Shareholder equity

Large (multifunctional/universal) bank

Assets	Liabilities
Cash	Deposits
Loans	Other debt (mostly short-term)
Trading and other assets	Long-term debt
	Equity

Source: Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, *The Bankers' New Clothes*, Princeton University Press, 2013.

Risk-weighted assets

- **Banks have assets**, including central bank reserves, cash holdings, securities and loans. The riskiness of these loans varies, depending on collateral.
- Government bonds > mortgage backed securities > unsecured loans (like consumer credit)
- These are weighted to give an idea of banks' overall asset risks, and hence their capital requirements. See <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/riskweightedassets.asp>
- Liabilities: check (cheque) and deposit accounts, borrowings, bank capital (net worth, funds from selling equity, retained earnings)

Liquidity

- Leverage ratio $CET1/Total\ exposure \geq 3\%$ (total exposure all consolidated assets, including non-balance sheet assets)
- Liquidity coverage ratio (LCR):

$$LCR = \frac{\text{High quality liquid assets}}{\text{Total net liquidity outflows over 30 days}} \geq 100\%$$

New regulatory structures

- Monitoring of 30 Globally-systemically important banks (G-SIBs)...
... by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the Basel Committee on Banking (BCBS) and national authorities.

Involving stress-testing

- Macro-prudential regulation of finance

Other post- GFC measures

- Bank resolution procedures (“living wills”) have been established, to bail-in private investors.
- Standardised derivatives are now traded on exchanges (central counter-parties).
- Stronger consumer protection for households.



London
Clearing
House

Potential weaknesses of post-GFC regime

- Much new regulation
- Little or no structural change in banking and finance
- Too-big-to-fail has become an even bigger problem
- Shadow banking activities – probably not regulated enough
- The essential nature of global finance seems unchanged

Takeouts

- Significant regulation after GFC – through international cooperation
- No structural reform
- Resilient to Covid-19 shock & to the rise in interest rates since late 2021 – so far
- Macro-indicators (monetary policy and fiscal policy) are stretched –
is this a “fuite en avant”?