

Development studies/Politics/History/Anthropology

During the past fifty years, colonial empires around the world have collapsed and vast areas that were once called "colonies" have become known as "less developed countries," or "the third world." The idea of development—and the relationship it implies between industrialized, affluent nations and poor, emerging nations—has become the key to a new conceptual framework. Development has also become a vast industry, involving billions of dollars and a worldwide community of experts. These essays, written by scholars in many fields, examine the production, transmission, and implementation of ideas about development within historical, political, and intellectual contexts, emphasizing the changing meanings of development over the past fifty years.


The concept of development has come under attack in recent years both from those who see development as the imperialism of knowledge, imposing on the world a modernity that it does not necessarily want, and those who see development efforts as a distortion of the world market. These essays look beyond the polemics and focus on the diverse, contested, and changing meanings of development among social movements, national governments, international agencies, foundations, and scholars. Authors from the fields of economics, anthropology, history, political science, and public health critically explore the relationship of academic knowledge to development practice, asking important questions about the best ways to improve people's lives.

"This superb collection assembles a number of stimulating and theoretically current contributions by outstanding scholars. . . . The masterful introduction lays out the book's intellectual terrain and offers an insightfully rational rationale for investigating what the 'development era' means historically and for analyzing how development knowledge is produced, circulated, contested, and refashioned."

Angelique Hauguerud, author of *The Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya*

Frederick Cooper is Charles Gibson Collegiate Professor of History at the University of Michigan. He is the author of *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (1996). Randall Packard is Asa Griggs Candler Professor of History and International Health at Emory University. He is the author of *White Plague, Black Labor: Tuberculosis and the Politics Economy of Health and Disease in South Africa* (California, 1989).

University of California Press
Berkeley 94720



International Development and the Social Sciences

Essays on the
History and Politics of Knowledge

Edited by
**Frederick Cooper
and Randall Packard**

Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept

Frederick Cooper

Colonial governments in the 1940s thought of development as an idea which would reinvigorate colonialism, but it turned out to be central to the process by which colonial elites convinced themselves that they could give up colonies. French and British officials believed that their development initiatives would make colonies simultaneously more productive and more ideologically stable in the tumult of the postwar years; they sent waves of experts to Africa to refashion the way farmers farmed and workers worked, to restructure health and education. Postwar imperialism was the imperialism of knowledge. But within a scant ten years, the development initiative had lost its reformist zeal, and instead of development being a colonial initiative—requiring authority as well as expertise—it was being discussed as a natural unfolding of a universal social process, which human agents could facilitate but which was driven by history. As such, it could be administered by Africans as well as Europeans. Unlike other justifications of empire, development came to have as strong an appeal to nationalist elites as to colonizers. In the end, Africans took over the development project along with the state apparatus built by the colonial regime, and the departing colonizers could convince themselves that their successors would inevitably tread the path they had laid out.

The question this leaves is why Africa ended up with a development project framed in a particular way. This chapter—which is an early formulation of a new research project—takes up part of that question, focusing on the thinking of imperial bureaucracies in the postwar years. First, I situate the development initiative in the imperial crisis of the 1940s. Then, I begin to explore the conceptual categories through which French and British bureaucrats approached the development problem, looking at the implicit social theory behind economic policy. Here, I run

into a striking feature of imperial discourse at the most senior levels: the Africa France and Great Britain sought to develop was not the complex, varied, changing social field African historians have now shown it to be, but a flat, unchanging, primitive landscape. Development was something to be done *to* and *for* Africa, not with it. I next look at the disillusionment with the development drive beginning to become evident in the early and mid 1950s, reflected in the enormity of primitive Africa which both governments felt they had to remake. What emerges from all this is the dualism in colonial thinking: a modern future set against a primitive present. It was a brittle conception of change, but its very abstraction allowed France and Great Britain to preserve their sense of future mission even as they acknowledged that they could not manage its present. Finally, I open up (and no more than that) the connection of the modernizing thought of the colonial bureaucracies to modernization theory in the social sciences, notably the dualistic approaches in economics that came into fashion in the 1950s.

THE IMPERIAL CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT

France and Great Britain came to their postwar development initiatives via different paths. In both cases, the idea of economic progress had much deeper roots, and in both cases governments had long supported initiatives to "open" Africa—especially railway, road, and port construction. But more explicit and ambitious schemes in the 1920s were rejected. The colonial ministers of Great Britain and France, Lord Milner and Albert Sarraut, proposed the use of metropolitan funds to overcome the barriers to expanding colonial production. Their initiatives were rejected by governments not ready to give up the tradition of colonial self-sufficiency, and fearing that limited capital resources were better spent in the metropole, and fearing that development would disrupt colonial societies (Constantine 1984; Havinden and Meredith 1993; Marseille 1984; Coquery-Vidrovitch et al 1988). Both regimes were happy to take what they could get from African cash crop growers or private European initiatives—and colonial states supported (and at times compelled) such efforts in a variety of ways, but at the cost of colonies' resources themselves. They also pioneered what was later assimilated into the development framework: actions, notably in the domains of health, agriculture, urbanism, and transport, that were most often seen as technical but which also constituted authoritarian interventions into African society in the name of the general good (Anderson and Grove 1987; Beinart 1984; Vaughan 1991; Packard, this volume).

The depression deepened this backward imperialism on the ground, even as it began to undercut self-confidence in London or Paris. Declining

economies sloughed off their social security problems into the country-side. The misnamed Colonial Development Act of 1939—advertised to Parliament as a social imperialist measure, creating jobs in England making steel for colonial railways—didn't do much to accomplish even that. France and Britain adopted more mercantilist trade policies, seeking to use the empire as a unit that could save itself. This protected the metropolis of colonial economies. In France, the Popular Front sketched out another plan for colonial investment along Sarraut's lines—both underscoring and undercut by claims that such a policy would harmonize the interests of colonial and metropolitan subjects and allow Africans to improve themselves in the context of their own communities. Arguments for the use of planning in order to build a colonial economy "in the general interest" began to be heard. The development fund never received governmental approval, and the main benefit Africans received from the Popular Front was a temporary easing of the burden of forced labor (Métail 1936; Cotte 1981; Marseille 1984).

The break occurred first in British colonies, after the economy got better and social conflict got worse. The anxious rethinking among metropolitan leaders that led to Keynesian economics was part of the story. But what explains the timing and the fact that this thinking actually penetrated the political process was what the British called "disturbances" in the colonies. The most critical ones took place in Trinidad and Jamaica in 1935, 1937, and 1938. They began as strikes in key industries, but became general strikes and led to riots, including some in plantation areas of Jamaica. The 1935 copper mine strike in Northern Rhodesia was part of this too: the strike spread from mine to mine, brought in nonminers, including women, in the mine towns, spread without benefit of a trade union via religious groups, dance societies, personal networks, and mass meetings. There were strikes in the Gold Coast in 1939 as well as a cocoa selling boycott in 1937–1938, and a general strike in Mombasa in 1939. All these events were far more than industrial relations problems, bringing in a mass of people sharing common poverty and subordination and lacking permanent jobs and career possibilities. The investigating committee in the copperbelt saw "detribalization" as a danger but thought it could be solved by repatriating workers after contracts; they were wrong and a second strike occurred in 1940. The committee in Mombasa said the opposite but could not do anything about it: port labor should be decasualized, allowing controlled housing to be devoted to a compact, steadily working dock force, and enabling this body of men to be separated from the urban mass with whom it had made common cause (Cooper 1996). The West Indies Royal Commission report was so critical that it was suppressed until the end of the war—it saw disorder as the result of unremedied legitimate grievances and called for metropolitan efforts both

to increase production and employment and to remedy the miserable state of social services.¹ But while the Royal Commission deliberated, Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald was convinced that he could use the consternation caused by the West Indian riots to make a new initiative in colonial economy policy.²

The Treasury did not like to spend money and warned, in its wonderful choice of a word, against creating a colonial "dole." To this, the Colonial Office proposed to reply that spending money on education, health, a labor department, and other basic services would improve productivity and lead to growth which would help governments pay their bills—a human capital theory in today's parlance. But in an internal memo not intended for treasury eyes, one of the Colonial Office's top officials, George Greasy, commented that such arguments

appear to me to lay too much emphasis on the desirability of making the African (or West Indian, etc.) into a more efficient producer or labourer for the needs of the country. This is a point which, of course, will appeal to the Treasury. . . . I feel, however, that so far as the Colonial Office is concerned our real aim should be the more general one of turning the African into a happier, healthier more prosperous individual in which case all the other subsidiary objects will automatically be attained.

MacDonald added "if we are not now going to do something fairly good for the Colonial Empire, and something which helps them to get proper social services, we shall deserve to lose the colonies and it will only be a matter of time before we get what we deserve."³

The closet paternalists of the Colonial Office won passage of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, and spent its funds largely on services, above all those intended for urban workers—water, health facilities, housing, education—although the constraints on supplies and shipping were such that not much could be used until the end of the war. The Colonial Office argument for a trickle-up effect was no more clearly spelled out than later arguments for trickle down, but it was a break-through in spending imperial funds—grants, not just loans—without social imperialist justification. Officials saw the word "welfare" as a disavowal of intention to exploit the colonies more efficiently.⁴ Indeed, an implicit theory of the relationship of economic change and social protest lay behind the discussion within the Colonial Office: welfare—social services in the short run and a higher standard of living in the long—was the antidote to disorder. Even as the colonial strike wave exposed the complexity of labor issues, London was trying to shoehorn the labor question into the development question.

But the labor question would not stay put. Chronic labor unrest during the war forced officials on the spot to grapple with labor issues on their

own terms: as complex questions of how workers were to live and reproduce themselves. The government created labor bureaucracies alongside its growing development bureaucracy and opened a dialogue with African trade unionists in the hope that workers' protests could be channeled into a framework similar to that of industrial relations in the metropole.⁵

In the midst of this, the most talented economist within miles of Whitehall, W. Arthur Lewis, resigned as secretary of the Colonial Office's economic advisory committee. He argued that the bureaucrats were narrowly defining issues that the committee was being allowed to raise, including studies of the question of whether African farming units were "economically small" and how to plan for industrial development. The Colonial Office did not want such "political" questions even discussed in its advisory committee.⁶ Lewis was talking about an issue of discourse: the boundary of what could be debated.

In 1944, as the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Stanley, asked Parliament to double the funding of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, he was still hesitating between bold initiative and limited promises. Stanley noted, "Nothing could be worse than to give Colonial peoples the impression that the Colonial Development and Welfare Act was a permanent subsidy to their social services which the taxpayer of this country would undertake to pay without thought either of return, or indeed of supervision." He was moving toward the human capital theory that his predecessors covertly rejected: metropolitan funding for social services could be justified for their contribution to colonial production, but that production would eventually have to pay for those services. He was serving notice that the British Empire was not a single unit, in which all subjects could claim a similar standard of living, and he thereby turned attention to the productionist side of the development-welfare nexus.⁷

In wartime France, meanwhile, the Vichy regime revived the idea of a metropolitan-directed and financed development plan—a ten-year plan this time—and stripped away much of its predecessors' ambivalence about it. Vichy officials mocked the timidity of those who feared that development in the colonies, including industrialization, would upset the social order; they could keep things under control. Jacques Marseille (1984) asserts that this plan demonstrates that the right-wing Vichy planners were less trapped in the colonial past and more willing to let Africans share in social change than their left-wing predecessors and successors who wanted to maintain Africa in its agrarian role. Actually, what was visionary about Vichy was pure fantasy, and what wasn't fantasy was brutal.

Corporatist structures in each economic branch would plan the optimal activities for each region; European techniques would remake African agriculture; firms would "watch over [the worker's] health, his hygiene, and his comfort." There was a little problem: "the repugnancy of the native

to wage labor." The answer was a legal obligation to work. Claiming that "the problem of labor must nevertheless be studied seriously, scientifically," Vichy's planners thought that corporatist organization and discipline would solve the development and the labor problem together. The end would be rapid growth of "production and income of peoples, not only the evolved people but the two billion individuals who inhabit our planet."⁸

In French West Africa at this time, largely cut off from European commerce by France's defeat, the lack of imports gave workers virtually no incentive to seek wage labor, and production depended more than ever on forced labor. Governor General Boisson kept warning Vichy that the limits of coercion had already been reached, even in the absence of the Ten Year Plan. To Boisson this level of forced recruitment exposed his own administration to danger, and it confirmed his own essentialist reading of Africa: "Africa is peasant, it must in its necessary evolution remain peasant." Boisson was all but threatened from Vichy for suggesting that labor shortages might limit the development initiative. But his reports were mild compared to the evidence of brutality that later emerged from French West Africa (Boisson 1942; Fall 1993; Cooper 1996).

While the Free French, taking over from Vichy, exposed and repudiated the forced labor regime, they insisted that free labor was so hard to get that they could only gradually wean themselves from coerced recruitment. Officials meeting at Brazzaville early in 1944 went back to something like the Popular Front's approach: reducing the importance of French settlers and lowering the pressure on African communities to supply labor over five years. African society was seen to be the remedy for two problems: the insufficiency of production would be countered by letting African communities grow more crops, enhanced by the organization of rural cooperatives, and population shortage would be countered by letting Africans reproduce within the community setting, with their notions of marriage and family. The new-old *plan d'équipement* would improve infrastructure so that African communities would be linked to the colonial marketing network, and mechanization would keep labor demands as low as possible. Conferences debated whether too much industrialization would cause socially disruptive proletarianization or whether too little would condemn Africa to backwardness. The concluding formula—"prudent industrialization"—suggested that the issue had not been dealt with. The conferences did not make a clear break with the old *patte coloniale*, a division of labor between an industrial metropole and agricultural colonies, and they finessed a crucial issue: Who would make sure that development would be simultaneously beneficial to African welfare and the imperial economy? The claim of mutual benefit depended on an assertion of central imperial

control: planning—"une économie dirigée et planifiée"—appears in the Brazzaville texts more as a mantra than a program.⁹

The claim to mutual benefit bolstered the assertion that the empire would remain unified, relabeled the Union Française. The *évolués*—French-educated Africans—would get an increasing voice in the Union's affairs not by the granting of more autonomy to individual territories, but by the possibility to elect representatives (with a limited franchise and a limited number of seats) to the Assemblée Nationale in Paris. Actually, these reforms were more far-reaching than French leaders realized—the logic of shared membership in the Union Française would provide a basis for claims to assimilation and equality that could not be contained. But even here, the particular sociology behind economic development and political reform in the French empire emerges: a two-class model of colonial society, divided into *évolués*, who could be brought into French institutions, and a majority of *peyssans* whose conditions of production, reproduction, and political interaction did not have to be examined at all. Neither wage workers nor an African petite bourgeoisie had a place in official sociology.¹⁰

But France did make one decisive break with the past: in 1946, with little debate in the legislature, it passed the Fonds d'Investissement et de Développement Economique et Social (FIDES), ending the tradition of colonial self-sufficiency and making available metropolitan funds for development projects. FIDES was accompanied by a contradictory rhetoric, claims that a modern infrastructure would integrate African communities into commerce without changing their nature and that modern sectors would be built with simple European-style houses and up-to-date urban amenities. Within that sector, Africans would be "working in European style, that is with output analogous in quality and rapidity to that of workers from the Metropole. *Bricolage* must give way to technique."¹¹

The ideological context in which Great Britain and France turned to development—the need to find a progressive basis for continued colonial rule in an era when major powers had made "self-determination" a slogan of international politics—coincided with the heightened needs both had for their empires. Battered by war, with Asian empires veering out of control, Great Britain and France saw Africa as the one place where new resources could be mobilized. Great Britain faced this imperative with particular acuity during the dollar crisis of 1947. The Labour Government's Minister for Economic Affairs, Stafford Cripps told the conference of African Governors in 1947, "the whole future of the sterling group and its ability to survive depends in my view upon a quick and extensive development of our African resources."¹² Great Britain's postwar Labour government embraced a productionist view of development more decisively than its Tory predecessors: so central was its need for African re-

sources and so much did it fear accusations of exploiting the colonies that its ministers no longer discussed the relationship of development and welfare and the two were elided in public and secret discussion into a single concept. As the dollar drive continued into 1948 and 1949, more assertions appeared that colonial and metropolitan economies were "complementary" or "harmonious," although Cripps revealed the hierarchy of values by telling the very people whose poverty was being alleviated that their interests depended on the health of the British economy and they should be willing to sacrifice "unnecessary current consumption" for that end. And when Creech Jones summarized his ministry's achievements at the end of 1948, the "export drive" came first, dollar earnings and savings second, and social programs in Africa and the West Indies thirteenth.¹³ Development discourse was increasingly equating development to growth—and not posing too many questions about the units whose growth was at issue.

It was because British Africa developed higher concentrations of workers at an earlier date—in the mines of Central Africa, ports like Mombasa, or complicated colonial systems like Nigeria—that the labor question was faced at an earlier date than in French Africa. Even so, officials—in London at least—kept trying to turn the labor question into something else. French officials, as the war ended, still thought the labor question could be avoided, or rather that the question was whether Africans would work for wages at all rather than what the social conditions of wage labor would be. London's sociology of development at war's end assimilated labor to welfare: if material conditions for workers came to some unspecified level of sufficiency (carefully kept apart from the metropolitan standard of living), then order could be preserved and the expansion of production could not be seen as exploitation. The momentous "and" in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act contained crucial questions that were not being asked, as did the French script for postwar development, run from France with the help of a small colonial elite assimilated to French culture who presided over an economy of peasants, producing and reproducing in ways that did not need to be understood.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT

In London and Paris, African cultivators appeared very African: French colonial officials seemed to have accepted the old British view ("indirect rule") of coherent communities with their way of life, while their British counterparts were just beginning to think of the rural world as offering more dynamic possibilities than that. In both cases, the terms in which high officials generalized about what they perceived to be African backwardness suggest that the notion of development was a highly abstract

one, focused on an endpoint, not a process of moving forward from a constrained but dynamic present. The productive cocoa farmers of the Gold Coast or western Nigeria were well known to local officials but did not figure in the intense discussions of "agricultural development" held in London in 1946 and 1947.

Labour's Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones, referred to Africans as "raw and ignorant"; a Governor in 1947 encompassed the continent as "a great mass of human beings who are at present in a very primitive moral, cultural and social state." When it came to agriculture, officials were willing to damn African practices and think about harsh and crude remedies. Sydney Caine, head of the Colonial Office's economic department, thought "African systems of land tenure and the cultural routines associated with them, if maintained to the full in their traditional form, would effectively prevent any rapid technical change, possibly any change at all." He noted that officials with whom he was conferring were willing to "accept a quite substantial degree of compulsion in the introduction of agricultural and other improvements." He himself thought colonial peoples, West Indians included, were

inferior in efficiency as manual labourers and in initiative, enterprise and organising ability as entrepreneurs and managers to the average of this and other countries which are advanced in the western sense. We cannot reject entirely the possibility of innate racial inferiority, but there is certainly insufficient reason at present to accept that explanation. Climatic and living conditions and a social structure which . . . is inimical to change, and therefore to enterprise, are at least substantial factors in this inferiority.

Creech Jones—long opposed to forced labor—now agreed that "economic development in the agricultural sphere is at present held back by the low standard of productivity of the African peasant, by his unwillingness to adopt improved agricultural methods and by his failure to take proper measures for the conservation of the soil," and he too concluded that compulsion would have to be used if African peasants didn't shape up.¹⁴

The architects of postwar development thus wanted Africa to have a completely different agricultural system, and hadn't much idea how to reform the current one. The Governors' Conference of 1947 was informed that the time of "the individual family working with primitive tools" was gone "and that radical changes in the system of agriculture are required to permit operations on a larger scale, with increased use of mechanical assistance and with the basic object of increased productivity." Some thought was given to encouraging plantation agriculture, and some to other ways of increasing scale. But officials pulled back, as contemp-

nuous of the possibility of an African landlord class as of African smallholders.¹⁵

The quest for the "progressive farmer" sat uneasily with habits of supporting "traditional" authorities, and condemnation of practices of African agricultural techniques coexisted with distrust of the very farmers who separated themselves from past practices. Many rural interventions relied on agricultural extension officers to cajole and coerce African cultivators to conserve the soil, fight plant diseases, and use better tools and equipment. The madcap quality of the British Groundnut Scheme or the French Office du Niger—huge agricultural projects directed like military operations—makes a little sense when one considers how little officials trusted Africans' market responsiveness with the vital task of supplying vegetable oil to the English working class or cotton to France's mills (Low and Lonsdale 1976: 12; Moore and Vaughan 1994: 110–28; Havinden and Meredith 1993: 276–83).

French colonial discourse at times seemed to be looking back to the peasant just as British discourse was looking toward mythic agricultural revolutions. But as expectations within the bureaucracy rose about what FIDES would accomplish, a similar discourse about the "primitiveness" of African cultivators emerged. "Unhappily," commented one report, "the current methods of land usage amount to 'agricultural nomadism': 'Technical experts, police methods, and cooperatives were called upon to get the cultivator to stay put. Another official complained of the archaic methods of cultivation and the passivity and discouragement which led peasants to make do with a subsistence existence 'without great effort' rather than try for something better."¹⁶ In French Equatorial Africa, top officials felt they "were starting from zero." A conference to review plans was told that, "Unfortunately, this agriculture is entirely in the hands of Africans, and for this reason its development will certainly be fairly slow, because it will be necessary to act on the native, to teach him to rationalize his methods, to improve his product. . . ." A governor insisted that one had to press development projects in the face of a population that remained "frozen in anachronistic and archaic concepts and does not see the necessity to participate by a voluntary and reasoned effort in the progress of their country. *On the whole the masses are not yet socially ready to adapt to the norms of a renewed life.*"¹⁷

The bright spot was the Ivory Coast, where African farmers—freed since 1946 from the pains of forced labor—were increasing their output of coffee and cocoa. Local officials pointed out that by the early 1950s the Ivory Coast was accounting for over 40 percent of French West Africa's exports by volume and 64 percent of its foreign exchange earnings. But what is curious is how little officials wanted to know about the social and

economic initiatives which made this possible. Officials wanted their cocoa and their prejudices too.¹⁸

In neither French nor British Africa were officials free to bring their visions of a new future to a *tabula rasa*. When they tried, they faced the social and political complexity of African countryside and city. Attempts to impose seemingly modern methods of soil conservation and agronomy on rural Africa led to enormous conflict (Beinat 1984; Throup 1987; Feierman 1990). In cities, British officials were reminded of what wartime inquiries into labor conflict had discovered, that a working class had come into being and its ability to survive and reproduce itself in urban conditions had to be a part of economic planning. When an extended strike movement—including a twelve-day general strike—disrupted Dakar and Senegal's other cities during a two-month period in early 1946, French officials realized that their bucolic dream was an impossibility and they would have to think seriously about the working class (Cooper 1996).

British and French officials both thought that the solution to the social problem lay in European knowledge of how to manage a working class. They began to separate out a compact body of men who would benefit from improved urban housing and resources and higher pay, who would acquire an interest in a specific career line, and who would bring their families to the city and become socialized and acculturated to urban life and industrial labor over generations. Officials thought trade unions would not only mold grievances into defined categories to which employers could respond, but that they would provide institutions through which workers would feel socially rooted in the city. This thinking was first developed in reaction to strike movements; it later became part of an argument for raising productivity articulated in such studies as the Kenyan *African Labour Efficiency Survey* of 1947 or the writings of the French Office d'Etudes Psychotechniques in the early 1950s. It became a rationale for raising minimum urban wages and for paying more to key workers in mines, docks, and railways, as well as for spending on housing and urban facilities under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act or FIDES.

The core of the argument was that the manner in which a working class reproduced itself—and the multigeneration process of altering culture—determined how that class would work and behave itself. In 1954, a conservative Colonial Secretary was convinced enough of the importance of stabilizing workers' families that he argued "even where the 'bachelor wage' still represents the supply price of labor, it may be below the level of wages necessary to secure efficient production."¹⁹

The wave of strikes of the late 1940s in both French and British Africa—and the major strikes of the 1950s—forced officials into an engagement with social life that went beyond the development framework. But it was not exactly the social life of workers in Africa's cities, ports, mines,

and railways that was being thought about. It was the more abstract idea of a working class—bounded, differentiated, and self-reproducing—as well as the idea of a system of industrial relations to regulate disputes that appealed to officials. Officials knew little about urban living conditions, and they mainly wanted to know about budgets: what numbers should be plugged into calculations of what a family needed to reproduce itself.

Yet this mode of knowledge was turned to advantage by trade unionists: the very Eurocentricity of official thinking and the universalistic language in which it was expressed became the basis for claims. If officials wanted Africans to work like Europeans, they should pay them like Europeans. These arguments—especially in the centralized structures of French Africa—were hard to ignore, not least because officials very much wanted to believe Africans could be the predictable, orderly, productive people they thought they had come to know from decades of class conflict in Europe (Cooper 1996).

In the late 1940s, official discourse treated only one class as a class—the working class. If it was more a hoped-for class than one which existed, at least the fantasy was both positive and fairly specific. Neither farmers nor educated Africans were thought of as classes: the former were too caught up in disparate and backward cultures, too unattached to parcels of land or an agricultural vocation, to be analyzed in such terms; the latter were too young, and those who spoke in public were seen as having another sort of relationship—demagogue to mass—that superseded self-identification as an upper class. Officials hoped education would mold a responsible upper class while worrying if they would learn the right lessons, and some wished for a petty bourgeoisie—attached to property and to trade—to develop itself, amid skepticism that it would.²⁰ Still, discussions in London suggest that high-level debate went on with little attention to people like the West African merchants of Nigeria or Senegal who came closest to filling the bill; fantasized classes were more important than existing social groups. Paris gave more credit to its évolues, but like London it tried to bound the terrain of legitimate politics carefully, excluding the rebels of Madagascar or Cameroon, just as Great Britain excluded the forest fighters of Kenya who attacked the very idea of the colonial state's modernizing project.

What colonial governments—in hitching their aspirations for a politically legitimate and economically productive empire to the idea of development—had given up was their old claim to be presiding over immutably distinct peoples, of providing order to savage peoples and slowly bringing them into civilization. The acultural concepts of development and industrial relations presumed that Africans could function as producers, merchants, or workers much like anyone else.²¹ There were two problems in this reconfiguring of hegemonic claims: they opened numerous points for

contestation within the colonial powers' own discourse, and the claims were measurable in a way that assertions about "civilization" were not. Trade unions could point to inequality in wage rates, while colonial governments' own accountants could tell whether the development drive was paying off.

THE DEVELOPERS' DISILLUSIONMENT

The concept of economic development had been asked to bear an enormous amount of political and economic weight. It could not. It was not the possibility of economic change *per se* that was under strain, but the particular vision of it that colonial regimes developed: colonial projects were top-heavy, involving large inputs of planning and expert personnel, funneling material through a clogged infrastructure, and inadvertently putting African trade unions in a position where they could effectively block key nodes in the development network and thus claim more entitlements. A comprehensive review in 1952 of the economic and financial condition of French West Africa by a mission headed by Inspector Mon-guillot painted a bleak picture six years into the development era. French Africa's production costs were high compared with those of British Africa: wages were double, railway charges were higher, the profits of commercial firms were high, and the bureaucracy was large, well-paid, and growing. Exports had barely reached prewar levels despite the accomplishments of the Ivory Coast; they did not cover the cost of imports, considering both consumer items and capital goods. Development projects were often ill-conceived; they often failed to run a profit; and they burdened budgets with high running costs once they were done.²²

The accountant's conception of the problem was vehemently contested by the Government of French West Africa, particularly in regard to social spending and labor costs. "I believe," said the Governor General, "that technical and social progress cannot be separated and should march together." Officials defended their labor policy, even if it pushed up wages, and insisted that removing racial distinctions from wage and benefit scales was politically necessary. The High Commissioner saw the roots of development as deeper than immediate returns to investment: "Progres, in this domain, can only be foreseen, alas! to be slow and difficult. The effort which is incumbent on the Administration, toward this end, must focus on the essential: to augment bit by bit the productive potential of the country."²³ The government in Paris was told that France was going to have to support Africa's productive "potential," not just its production, and France was not necessarily going to get anything out of this arrangement for a long time.

Even in social terms, the early results were problematic. The Governor

General, Cornu-Gentile, admitted, "the basic objective which was the elevation of the standard of living of the populations, has not been attained in a significant fashion." Deflecting unrealistic expectations onto others and implicitly deflecting blame onto African culture itself, he observed that Africans "are disappointed to find that progress is slower and more difficult than they imagined it to be in their simple and primitive spirit." The economic results of FIDES were meanwhile questioned in public. Tonnes exported from French West and Equatorial Africa had not regained their 1938 levels. The private capital expected to follow public was not forthcoming: only 20 percent of investment was coming from the private sector, versus 55 percent from the French taxpayer, 25 percent from the African.²⁴ Other inspections, reports, and evaluations showed not just mismanagement, but that FIDES was taking on a basically impossible task. The narrow, inadequate infrastructure that was the legacy of the previous fifty years of rule was choking on the capital goods being brought in; skilled labor was lacking; the weakness of urban facilities and the acute need for urban labor was leading to escalating demands from Africans; and the imbalances of the development effort were producing acute tensions among regions.²⁵ The "big push," as some economists at the time called the effort to concentrate resources to overcome barriers and break out of the vicious circle of poverty, was leading to a big clog. Not least important, the argument that development could solve a political and economic problem was losing its force.²⁶

The commission studying overseas development in 1953 acknowledged that in the current circumstances France's attempt to "fulfill her strategic, political and social duties in the territories she is charged with administering . . . risks to lead us to the exhaustion of the Metropole and to growing difficulties in our territories. . . ." It still held clung to the belief that looking upon France and Africa as a "vast integrated unity" would lead to progress. But that required redoubled efforts "to reform the mores and customs, to lift them progressively from whatever they have of the primitive, and to lead them to a stage closer to civilized conceptions." In short, the planners were still insisting that Africans remake themselves in the name of Greater France. It all rang hollow, and such an argument opened up the possibility that France should give in to its exhaustion.²⁷

Such an argument began to be taken seriously in public. In 1954, Pierre Mendes-France asserted that it was necessary to choose between Indochina and economic reform in France. In 1955 and 1956, some French commentators began to write about what they called "the Dutch complex": that the Netherlands became more prosperous when it lost its East Asian colony after the war. The journalist Raymond Cartier published in a popular magazine an account of wasted development spending, of territories so vast and so impoverished that they offered little to France.

He insisted on asking about each of France's African territories, "What is it worth? What does it cost? What does it bring in? What hopes does it allow? What sacrifices does it merit?" With Algeria and Indochina on his mind, he argued that African demands for self-government were growing and could not be prevented: "It is necessary to transfer as fast as possible as much responsibility to Africans. *At their risk and peril*!"²⁸ Cartier was in effect taking an old theme of colonialist writing—that Africa was poor and backward—and turning it from a rationale for colonizing into a reason for decolonizing.

What became known among France's intelligentsia as "Cartierisme" went against the imperial sentimentality shared in different versions by a right which wanted a wider field for French economic and political operations and a left which wanted a wider field for socialist reform. But as Jacques Marseille (1984) argues, the growing importance of intra-European trade and the prospect of the European Economic Community gradually tilted the argument toward the pragmatists, although it took the imperial figure of de Gaulle to convince the public that empire could be profitably surrendered. As early as 1956, French administrators were taking the crucial steps to devolve power and abrogate responsibility in Africa. The *Loi Cadre* (framework law) in effect gave elected territorial legislatures fiscal authority over their development and personnel budgets, telling them that if the territories wanted better social services and civil servants wanted better wages, the local taxpayers would have to pay for them.²⁹ But in withdrawing from the front lines of directed change—and reserving the right to decide how and where development aid should be provided—French officials did not deviate from the notion that their blueprint for a modern economy and a modern society retained its validity.

In Great Britain similar issues arose: in 1955, nearly a third of the CD&W funds appropriated in 1945 and 1950 remained unspent, mostly because the system was so clogged that spending more was "physically impossible," even though the original appropriation was regarded as modest in relation to the colonies' needs.³⁰ Unlike France, Great Britain hoped to manage the politics of declining empire by superintending the gradual evolution of self-government in its individual territories, each at its own pace. Officials made sure to put on the record that approaching self-government implied that territories "should bear an increasing part of the cost of their own development."³¹ Imperial obligations were terminal.

Great Britain too moved toward a dispassionate assessment of the costs and benefits of continued imperial rule. As early as 1951, doubts were surfacing about the contribution that development in Africa could make to the imperial economy, and as Great Britain's economic troubles continued, officials looked inward as well as toward growing exchange with continental Europe.³² As David Fieldhouse (1986: 23) puts it, the British

polity, no longer offered "empire on the cheap," was not so sure it wanted the "expensive reformist empire" of the postwar era. Prime Minister Macmillan asked in January 1957

to see something like a profit and loss account for each of our Colonial possessions, so that we may be better able to gauge whether, from the financial and economic point of view we are likely to gain or to lose by its departure. This would need, of course, to be weighed against the political and strategic considerations involved in each case.³³

When the Official Committee on Colonial Policy, gave the cabinet its reply to Macmillan's request in September 1957, it concluded that

the economic considerations tend to be evenly matched and the economic interests of the United Kingdom are unlikely in themselves to be decisive in determining whether or not a territory should become independent. Although damage could certainly be done by the premature grant of independence, the economic dangers to the United Kingdom of deferring the grant of independence for her own selfish interests after the country is politically and economically ripe for independence would be far greater than any dangers resulting from an act of independence negotiated in an atmosphere of goodwill such as has been the case with Ghana and the Federation of Malaya. Meanwhile, during the period when we can still exercise control in any territory, it is most important to take every step open to us to ensure, as far as we can, that British standards and methods of business and administration permeate the whole life of the territory.³⁴

Here is what the calculation of interest had come down to: Great Britain could in most cases get little more economically out of a colonial rule than out of a cooperative postcolonial relationship; the once great empire could not, in these circumstances, risk offending the sensibilities of its one-time subjects.

Officials' best hope was that British discourse and practice had framed the question of governance, and that ex-colonies would become western-style nations. But they were not optimistic. In the next colony in line after the Gold Coast, Nigeria, officials decided that "we are unlikely to have long enough to complete our civilising and unifying mission." Uganda's politics were too divisive for decolonization to proceed favorably; Tanganyika was too "backward"; and Kenya needed British rule "for an indefinite period" even though such a position was "very difficult to maintain." Macmillan told a high-level advisory committee, "the long-term future of the African continent presented a sombre picture."³⁵

By then Great Britain had already worked out in the case of the Gold Coast how this decolonization would be managed. There, Great Britain had found itself politically trapped, committed to an orderly transition to self-government but convinced that the one group with a claim to a pop-

ular mandate, the Conventional People's Party of Kwame Nkrumah, consisted of dangerous demagogues. Unable to find its mythic moderate alternative, officials finally accepted that Nkrumah's advent was inevitable, and their rhetoric underwent a remarkable transposition. The demagogue became the responsible leader, and his left-wing critics, particularly in the labor unions, became the dangerous demagogues.³⁶ Now, the transition had to be made successful, and the key concept in managing the transition was the "development" idea which had once been intended to make the state impervious to Nkrumah's kind. Andrew Cohen wrote from his high perch in the Colonial Office:

Politically the object of the new constitution was to create a state of affairs in which representative Africans and European officials could co-operate in the process of social, economic and political development. But if development does not in fact take place, one of the main purposes of the new constitution fails to be achieved. Moreover once a stable African Government is established it is essential that Government should be able to show results in the sphere of economic and social development. Otherwise it was bound to disappoint the people and likely to lead . . . to the transfer of power to irresponsible extremists.³⁷

The British and Nkrumah—with development as their shared goal—guided the Gold Coast toward independence in 1957. Nkrumah, it turned out, could do some things that the British could not. Nkrumah had tried to use cocoa farmers' hostility toward programs to control plant disease against the colonial government; in power he sought tight control over cocoa producers and advocated disease-eradication programs, winning the grudging admission that he was "not altogether incapable of acting with responsibility and a certain amount of courage."³⁸ Nkrumah proved equally able to use means—both of co-optation and repression—to outflank and contain the labor movement in ways his white predecessors had not (Jeffries 1978).

The argument of the Official Committee on Colonial Policy in 1957 for getting "British standards and methods" to "permeate" the life of the colony represented the best of what authorities could hope for in the late 1950s. And they did not expect to get it: being "ready" for independence was no longer a relevant criterion, and dictatorial tendencies or corruption were no longer an obstacle.³⁹ But a relationship would continue: trade, aid, and capital transfer—as well as continued evocation of development—would mark the hope that the model Great Britain or France had set would stay in place, no longer requiring European officials to implement it.

The bitter pessimism of the cabinet reports from 1957-1959 over-looked clear evidence of growth in exports and marketed output, of im-

proved infrastructure and much expanded school systems, of better paid workers and newly functioning systems of industrial relations in at least some sectors of some colonies—all of which British officials boasted of in other contexts. But the sense of failure has much to do with the way the problem was framed in the first place: a single idea of "development" bringing together the raising of African standards of living and the reconstruction of the British economy, of "responsible" trade unions and respectable politicians, of "scientific" ideas applied by knowledgeable experts. When questioned by Macmillan in 1957, his officials could not demonstrate that colonial development produced any clear economic benefits for Great Britain itself, while it was equally unclear that colonies were emerging from their economic and political malaise. At the same time, officials—focusing on the end point of modernization—interpreted its absence as chaos and danger.

MODERNIZATION, DUALISM, AND ANALYSIS OF THE POSTWAR WORLD

The modernizing discourse of the bureaucrats predates the rise in the academy of what came to be known as modernization theory. The officials, like the scholars, needed a sense of where they were going, even as events were shattering their sense of control. They could read European history as a process of finding rational solutions to complex social problems. In shifting from one form of colonial authority to another, they were rejecting what was "traditional" in their own authority structures—the right to command, the assertion that the good ruler "knew his natives." In holding before themselves a vision of an Africa transformed by European techniques, institutions, and models, British and French planners were saying that while Africans, like anyone else, could become actors in labor unions and legislatures, officials themselves had the essential knowledge to build the stage and write the script. Modernizers were asserting the right to govern Africa for a time, and they did so on the basis that they knew what Africa should be like, even if it eventually governed itself.

My intent in these pages is not to chart the intellectual roots or the varieties of theories of development and modernization (see Arndt 1987 on economic development), but to point to the shared discursive terrain in which officials and scholars operated. Modernization theory, notably in its American variants, went further than most in posing a dichotomy of "tradition" and "modernity" and discussing the modernization process in terms of the end toward which it was moving. Modernization entailed a package, a series of co-varying changes, from subsistence to market economies, from subject to participant political culture, from ascriptive status systems to achievement status systems, from extended to nuclear kinship,

from religious to secular ideology. For some leading exponents, this conception of change was an explicit alternative to communist progressivism.⁴⁰ The central tension between modernization as a project directed by those who understood it and modernization as a metahistorical process, driven by deeply seated forces, is evident in the scholarly literature as well as in official discourse.

I have analyzed elsewhere (Cooper 1996) the modernizers' vision of labor and industrialization: industrialism as a "way of life" extending itself around the world, providing imperatives for rational decision-making and hierarchical organization to which all must conform. Not all modernizers thought that every "traditional" society would be swept into a homogeneous modernity, but they warned that resistance would not preserve an alternative way of life but would condemn the resisters to the bottom of the labor market. Here, I wish to look briefly at the way in which the dichotomy of traditional and modern shaped the emerging field of development economics. The dual economy—divided between traditional and modern sectors—became a hallmark of 1950s development economics.⁴¹

The most rigorous dualistic theory was W. Arthur Lewis's "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour," published in 1954. Lewis divided the economy of a less developed country in two, a traditional sector and a capitalist sector, and he argued that the central dynamic of development was moving people from one sector to the other. In the traditional sector, the marginal product of labor was often negligible, zero, or negative; in any case labor could be released from it at a wage determined by subsistence needs or by the average product of labor, rather than by the marginal product of labor as in a developed economy. Maintaining wages at that level would keep the surplus generated by the newly employed workers in the hands of capitalists, who would invest their profits in further production and job-creation, until the traditional sector was drained of its surplus labor. At that point, wages, agricultural productivity, and employment demand would assume a relationship characteristic of developed economies.⁴²

Lewis's dual economy is strikingly parallel to dualistic industrial sociology: an economist who argues that a society exhibits a zero marginal product of labor is saying something very similar to an industrial sociologist calling a culture "traditional" or "primitive." Lewis himself contrasted the "economic darkness" of the traditional sector with the "trification" that occurred when capital was applied to labor in the capitalist sector; the two sectors were "other worlds."⁴³

The dynamic in Lewis's model was the movement of people from one sector to another—each sector had its characteristics which Lewis treated as given. Yet Lewis had long been (and remained) critical of plantation

owners and imperialism generally, for deliberately keeping agricultural revenues down in order to lower wages. He separated the inequality generated by rent seeking and power—which he condemned—from the inequality generated by capitalist profits—which he argued was the key to economic development.⁴⁴

His attack on old-style imperialism and his acceptance of state planning and intervention was consistent with Colonial Office thinking since 1940. He did not elide growth with raising workers' standard of living as British officials had been doing since the war. He argued on the contrary that wages had to be kept constant until surplus labor was absorbed, and economic development would over time have beneficial effects both for workers in the capitalist sector and the traditional sector; he discussed the factors that might or might not allow particular groups to benefit.⁴⁵ Lewis helped shape an emerging mainstream of development economics, looking toward a long-term reduction of global inequalities based on a mix of market mechanisms and state planning, both amenable to economic analysis.⁴⁶

Lewis's argument is particularly interesting because of who he was: a West Indian intellectual, born in St. Lucia, educated at the London School of Economics, a man of two continents but not willing to think of himself as of two cultures:

A low cultural level is one of the associates of poverty; much is made in nationalist circles of African art and music, but Africans are conscious that their music is not so great an artistic achievement as that of Beethoven, that they are without a literature, that their religions are on rather a low level, and that their kinship and other social patterns, which are such a joy to the anthropologist, are too frail to withstand the ferments of the twentieth century.⁴⁷

He, as an economist and as a colonial intellectual, believed in the route he had taken: through education and wholehearted espousal of the social and cultural forms of modern society. Ruthless in his dissection of unproductive privilege, he was simultaneously a theorist of the end of empire and the rise of a universalistic development economics in which the elites of the former colonies and the former metropole could share a common ground.

CONCLUSION

How does one read what this colonial intellectual and social scientist was saying? At first glance, it looks like a parable of neocolonialism: the emergence of an international discourse that reproduces the dualism of the colonial relationship without its explicit racism and without its reliance

on the direct exercise of political power by an imperial government. It was more complicated than that. Development ideology was originally supposed to sustain empire, not facilitate the transfer of power. Yet developmentalist arguments—about labor policy as much as economic planning—were something trade union and political leaders in Africa could engage with, appropriate, and turn back. This framework allowed them to pose demands in forms that could be understood in London or Paris, that could not be dismissed as “primitive.” Political parties could assert that true development required sovereign control over a development apparatus, and colonial officials—committed now to social and economic progress as the markers of their success—needed to believe enough that Africans really aspired to a recognizable vision of modernity that this language had to be taken seriously, as indeed it was. Much as one can read the universalism of development discourse as a form of European particularism imposed abroad, it could also be read—as it was by Lewis—as a rejection of the fundamental premises of colonial rule, a firm assertion of people of all races to participate in global politics and lay claim to a globally defined standard of living.

One can see how a Lewis model of the dual economy could slip into the kind of orthodoxy that was a tendency within development economics for some years, with its homogenizing categories for the social and cultural trajectories it sought to modify (“LDC,” “target population”) and its narrow vision of growth. But development discourse did not fit neatly in such a box. An orthodoxy had not even been established when Latin American economists—in the late 1940s—were articulating a version of structuralist economics that denied the smug assumption of mutual benefit between “center” and “periphery” and insisted that less global exchange rather than more was the key to autonomous development (Economic Commission for Latin America 1951, Sikkink, this volume). Structuralism was to give birth to a radical critique of global capitalism—dependency theory—but also to policies of import substitution industrialism that worked their way into orthodoxy; theoretical engagement was far more complex than a dichotomy of neocolonial and anti-imperialist approaches. Within Africa, the developmentalist paradigm took various forms. In Senegal (Diouf, this volume), the first independent government looked away from the acultural dualism of Anglo-American theory toward French corporatist theorists who stressed the harmony of each social group. The Senegalese planning apparatus did the opposite of what French and British experts had done: it compiled a multivolume survey of each of Senegal’s regions, emphasizing the ongoing dynamics of economic organization, the possibilities for change within them, and the ways in which local structures could be animated and empowered. This approach—like many “orthodox” projects—eventually failed, a victim of the continued power of

French firms and the ability of Senegalese elites to appropriate new structures for their rent-seeking activities.⁴⁸

But the fact that an approach to development focused on local conditions and community mobilization was tried in Senegal suggests the openings as well as the closures around the elusive and multivalent concept of development. The issue is not simply the intrinsic merits or the intrinsic arrogance of a universalistic discourse. In the last half century, the political significance of development has shifted fundamentally. It did not simply spring from the brow of colonial leaders, but was to a significant extent forced upon them, by the collective actions of workers located within hundreds of local contexts as much as in an imperial economy. Development was supposed to reestablish imperial control over the agenda of government in the postwar era, but the vision of a reformed Africa was seized by African trade unionists, African political movements, and other social movements to insist—often in conflicting ways—that directed change must take into account the social and political needs of the people most concerned. Even as the evolution of national and international development apparatuses and development theories channeled aspirations in specific ways, the underlying belief that people of all origins should aspire to a better world inspired new challenges. In the 1940s and 1950s—and perhaps in the future—the meanings of development reflected the engagement of local mobilization with global discourses, and of local discourses with the global structure of power.

NOTES

1. The recommendations of this commission were published as a Parliamentary Paper in 1940 (Cmd 6174), the report itself in 1945 (Cmd 6607). See also Constantine (1984).
2. “Colonial Development: Note for the Chancellor of the Exchequer,” incl. MacDonald to Simon, 11 October 1939, CO 859/19/7475, Public Record Office (hereafter PRO). When the cabinet appointed the Royal Commission, it was warned by MacDonald that if it recommended increased spending on the West Indies, “It would be disastrous to send a Royal Commission and then reject its proposals purely on financial grounds.” Extract from Conclusions of Cabinet meeting, 15 June 1938, CAB 28 (38), in CO 318/433/1/71168, PRO.
3. George Creasy, Minute, 30 November 1939, to Draft Outline of Statement of Policy, and MacDonald, Minute, 14 January 1940, CO 859/19/7475, PRO.
4. Minute, H. M. Moore, 12 January 1940, CO 859/19/7475, PRO.
5. Within the Colonial Office, the Economics Department (headed by Sydney Caine) argued that raising the standard of living was impossible except from productivity gains, while political officials insisted that raising the standard of living was a necessity. In Nigeria and Kenya, Africans settled the dispute: strike waves made wage concessions imperative. Caine, Minute, 30 March 1940, CO 859/40/

12901/Part II; Orde Browne to Caine, 13 November 1941, and Caine to Orde Browne, 16 November 1941, Caine, Minute, 20 December 1941, CO 852/506/15; Governor Bouldillon to Moyné, 24 January 1942, and George Gator, Minute, 21 November 1942, CO 583/262/30519, PRO.

6. W. Arthur Lewis, Resignation minute, 30 November 1944, CO 852/586/9, PRO.

7. Minutes of Colonial Economic Advisory Committee, 19 December 1944, CO 852/588/2; *House of Commons Debates* (13 July 1943): cc. 48-64.

8. These comments come from meetings of the Groupements Professionnels Coloniaux, Comité Centrale, 10 March 1943, Commission des Questions Sociales, 5 February 1943, AE 51, Comité Centrale, 7 April 1943, AE 61, Archives Nationales, Section Outre-Mer (hereafter ANSOM); Mounier (1942: 75, 161-67).

9. Transcript of sessions of 2, 3 February 1944, and report of Commission de l'Economie Impériale, session of 1 February 1944, AP 2295/2, "Role et place des européens dans la colonisation," report to Brazzaville conference, 20 January 1944, AP 2201/7, Direction Générale des Affaires Politiques, Administratives et Sociales, "Programme général de la Conférence de Brazzaville," 28 December 1943, AP 2201/7, Mahé; *Rapport sur l'industrialisation des Colonies*, and transcript of session of 7 February 1944, AE 101/5, all in ANSOM; conference recommendations in *La conférence africaine française. Brazzaville 30 janvier-3 février 1944* (Brazzaville: Editions du Baobab, 1944), 60-61. On the continuities from the Popular Front through Vichy to Brazzaville, see Cotte (1981: 58-63).

10. The need to coordinate development efforts became an argument for political centralization. "Commission chargée de l'étude des mesures propres à assurer aux colonies leur juste place dans la nouvelle constitution française," sessions of 30 May and 27 June 1944, AP 214, ANSOM.

11. Assemblée Nationale Constituante, *Annales* 4 (12 April 1946): cc. 1736-58; Inspecteur Général des Travaux Publics des Colonies, "Plan d'équipement décennal des Territoires d'Outre-Mer. Afrique Occidentale Française, Section I. Dépenses d'intérêt social et dépenses diverses. Notice justificative," 8 February 1945, 1Q 162 (74), Archives du Sénégal (hereafter AS).

12. Transcript of *African Governors' Conference*, 12 November 1947, 40. Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, turned this hope into a developmental fantasy world, envisioning "great mountains of manganese" and other raw materials in Africa and asserting, "If only we pushed on & developed Africa, we could have U.S. dependent on us, & eating out of our hand in four or five years." Bevin quoted in Hugh Dalton diaries, 15 October 1948, cited in Pearce (1982: 95-96). For the *version française* of the we-absolutely-need-Africa argument, see Governor Roland Pré, speech to Conseil Général de Guinée, 22 October 1949, Agence FOM 393/5bis, ANSOM.

13. Arthur Creech Jones and Sir Stafford Cripps, speeches to *African Governors' Conference*, 1947; Creech Jones, Memorandum on "Development of Colonial Resources," CM (47)/75, 6 June 1947, CAB 129/12; Report of the Colonial Development Working Party, 1948, 4-5, CO 852/868/5; Colonial Development Working Party, Interim Report, 19 April 1948, PREM 8/923, PRO; Creech Jones to Stafford Cripps, 19 November 1949, Creech Jones Papers, Rhodes House, Oxford.

44/1, folios 133-36. "The Future Work of the Colonial Development Working Party," EPC(48)35, 27 April 1948, PREM 8/923, Creech Jones, speech, "Development of Backward Areas," 1949, and "Some Practical Achievements in the Colonies since the War," Colonial Office paper, 7 December 1948, Creech Jones Papers, 44/1 and 44/2, Rhodes House, Oxford University. Anxious officials thus were eager to join in the obsession with economic growth that was emerging among economists (Arnold 1978). See also Cowen (1984) and Cowen and Shenton (1991).

14. Creech Jones, speech to Governors' Conference, 1947, 22; Governor Mitchell of Kenya to Creech Jones, 30 May 1947, CO 847/35/47234/1/47; Sydney Caine, Minute, 23 April 1946, CO 852/1003/3; Creech Jones, Circular Dispatch, 13 July 1948, CO 852/1003/4, PRO.

15. Report of the Committee on the Conference of African Governors, 22 May 1947, appendix 6; "The Economic Development of Agricultural Production in the African Colonies," CO 847/36/47238, PRO.

16. AOF, Inspection du Travail, Annual Report, 1951; Senegal, *Rapport Economique*, 1947.

17. Governor General Bernard Cornu-Gentile, "Mémoire sur l'exécution du plan d'équipement en Afrique Equatoriale Française pendant les exercices 1947-48 et 1948-49" (Brazzaville: Imprimerie Officielle); M. Moreau, from Togo, to Conférence d'Etudes des Plans, 29 November 1950, *Compte Rendu*, AE 169; "Observations et conclusions personnelles du Gouverneur Roland Pré, Président de la Commission d'Etude et de Coordination des Plans de Modernisation et d'Equipement des Territoires d'Outre-Mer," May 1954, mimeograph in library of ANSOM, emphasis in original.

18. H. de la Bruchollette, "Note sur la situation économique de la Côte d'Ivoire au 1^{er} janvier 1954," 1Q 656 (171), AS; Ivory Coast, *Rapport Economique*, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953. There was a prewar "pro-peasant" literature, notably by Robert Delavignette and Henri Labouret. This was not renewed or superseded in the years after the war.

19. Oliver Lyttelton, Circular Letter, 2 June 1954, CO 859/810, PRO.

20. A coherent vision of an entire class structure imprinted on Africa—African urban property owners and a stable working class in cities, African landowners and rural wage earners in the countryside—appears in the *Report of the East Africa Royal Commission*, 1953-55. The report is notable for the absence of actually existing people in its orderly categories.

21. It is striking how quickly discussion of racial superiority was banned from colonial vocabularies in the 1940s, but arguments about culture took much the same form as earlier arguments about race. The difference was that cultural change seemed open to the individual, but Africans who chose not to make the transition were seen as willfully obstructionist rather than quaintly backward.

22. Monguillot, Report, 13/D 28 May 1952, AP 2306/10, ANSOM. For scholarly assessment of the development era, see Coquery-Vidrovitch (1988).

23. High Commissioner (Governor General) to Monguillot, 5 May 1952, AP 2306/7; Directeur Général des Finances de l'A.O.F., to Monguillot, 5 May 1952, AP 2306/7; Directeur Général des Finances, marginal note on "Rapport concernant

l'évolution des dépenses de personnel depuis 1938 . . . " 22 July 1952, AP 2306/8; High Commissioner, marginal comment on Monguillot, "Situation financière du Budget Général de l'A.O.F.," 20 August 1952, AP 2306/16; High Commissioner to Monguillot, 5 August 1952, AP 2306/10, ANSOM.

24. "Allocution prononcée par Bernard Cornut-Gentille," opening of first session of the Grand Conseil de l'Afrique Occidentale Française, 7 May 1953; *Marchés Coloniaux* 416 (31 October 1953): 3053 and 426 (9 January 1954): 65-66.

25. Conférence des Etudes des Plans, 28 November-1 December 1950, AE 169; M. Huet, "Bilan du Premier Plan du Développement Economique et Sociale des Territoires d'Oure-Mer," nd [1952], AE 749, ANSOM; Roland Pré, "Observations et conclusions personnelles . . ."

26. This idea, based on work of P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan in the 1940s, was prominent among development economists of the early 1950s (Arndt 1987: 58). 27. Commission de modernisation et d'équipement des Territoires d'Oure-Mer, "Rapport général de la sous-commission de l'intégration métropole-Oure-Mer," nd [1953], PA 19/3/38, ANSOM.

28. Raymond Cartier, "En France Noire avec Raymond Cartier," *Paris-Match* 383 (11 August 1956): 38-41 (41 quoted), and 386 (1 September 1956): 39-41, (41 quoted); emphasis added. The importance of this debate is stressed in Marcellé (1984: 11, 359, 373).

29. On the connection of the French government's inability to control personnel expenses and the "territorialization" effort of the *Loi Cadre*, see Cooper (1996: chapter 11).

30. Secretary of State Alan Lennox-Boyd, Circular, 21 February 1953, CO 852/1305, PRO; Cabinet Office, Agreed Minute of Commonwealth Economic Conference, 11 December 1952, *ibid.*; and Lennox-Boyd, *House of Commons Debates* 536 (2 February 1953), cc. 1117-18, 1123. On the disappointing record of development initiatives, see Havinden and Meredith (1993: 276-83, 295, 801-817).

31. Henry Hopkinson, *House of Commons Debates* 536 (7 February 1953): c. 1609; Chancellor of the Exchequer, remarks at Cabinet Meeting, CM (56) 64th Conclusions, 11 September 1956, CAB 128/30, PRO.

32. "Production of Raw Materials in the Colonial Empire," Cabinet Economic Policy Committee Minutes, 9 March 1951, EPC 5 (51)3, CAB 134/228, reprinted in Hyam (1992: Part 2, 187-88). See also Goldsworthy (1994: Part 1, liv-lviii).

33. Prime Minister's Minute, 28 January 1957, CAB 134/155, PRO.

34. "Future Constitutional Development in the Colonies," Report by the Chairman of the Official Committee on Colonial Policy (Norman Brook), 6 September 1957, CPC (57) 30, CAB 134/155, PRO, 5-6.

35. "Future Constitutional Development in the Colonies," Note by the Secretaries, 30 May 1957, CP (O) 5, CAB 134/1551; Memorandum by Secretary of State, "Nigeria," C 57 (120), 14 May 1957, CAB 129/87; Memorandum by Secretary of State, "Future Policy in East Africa," CPC (59) 2, 10 April 1959, CAB 134/1558; Minutes of Colonial Policy Committee, CPC (59) 1st meeting, 17 April 1959, *ibid.*, PRO.

36. These rhetorical shifts can be traced in the Political Intelligence Reports in the late 1940s through the 1951 election, in CO 537, PRO.

37. Minute by Andrew Cohen, 14 April 1951, CO 96/826/31596, PRO.
38. W. L. Gorrell Barnes, "Some Notes on a Visit to the Gold Coast March 30th-April 5th 1951," 13 April 1951, CO 96/826/31596, PRO. See also Beckman (1976).

39. Minute by R. J. Vile on Gold Coast readiness for independence, 23 September 1954, CO 554/805, reprinted in Goldsworthy (1994: Part 2, 204-205).
40. Tipps (1973: 204). The best known example of anticommunist modernization theory is Rostow (1960). For an interpretation stressing the Cold War, see Gendzier (1985).

41. The dualism of the 1950s drew on, but was fundamentally different from that of J. H. Boeke (originally published 1942, revised in 1953). Boeke saw dualism as the result of "the clashing of an imported social system with an indigenous social system of another style" following colonial conquest (p. 4). Boeke's concept was part of a critique of colonialism, but economists of the 1950s were concerned with the relationships of two sectors and what brought about their relationship was not their concern. Dualism thus became a seemingly natural characteristic of the underdeveloped economy, and the critical edge of earlier theories was lost. The dual economy concept was given the imprimatur of the United Nations (1951: 9; 1959: 12) as well as that of leading scholars.

42. Lewis (1954). Some of Lewis's ideas about surplus labor—although not the rigorous sectoral dualism—had antecedents in the work of P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, particularly 1943. Wartime thinking about the postwar era was important to opening questions of planned investment within the economics profession and among policy advisors. See Arndt (1987: 43-48).

43. Lewis (1954: 141, 147-48). The traditional sector could include urban casual workers and petty traders, from whom siphoning off people would not mean loss of labor time collectively expended in doing their previous activities. Lewis (1953a: 193) favored labor stabilization policies, consistent with his desire to build a modern sector labor force.

44. Lewis (1954: 149, 159; 1939). For another view of Lewis's assumptions about the traditional sector—in particular whether repression is needed to maintain a constant wage rate—see Weeks (1971).

45. While locating the motor of development in the modern sector, Lewis (1954: 183-84; 1951; 1979) favored raising productivity and hence wages in the food-producing sectors.

46. See Arndt (1987), and for a study of how some of these ideas were applied in the late 1950s and 1960s to Africa's first independent state, Killick (1978).

47. Lewis (1955b: 97-98). Earlier, Lewis wrote, "The colonies are poor because the colonial peoples have not learnt how to master their environment. Their techniques and their tools are primitive; their hygiene deplorable; and their attitudes too frequently a fatalistic acceptance of their condition as inevitable." He advocated education, but one can read his 1954 theory as accepting that traditional people could not be so modified, and change could come about only by bringing people out of its embrace and into a modern sector. W. A. Lewis, "Principles of Development Planning," memorandum for Colonial Economic and Development Council, 11 April 1948, Fabian Colonial Bureau papers, Rhodes House, Oxford University, 67/1, item 1.

48. See also Sorum (1977) on the range of French thinking on decolonization and development, and for related arguments Bose and Gupta (this volume).

REFERENCES

- Anderson, David, and Richard Grove, eds. 1987. *Conservation in Africa: People, Politics, and Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Arnold, H. W. 1978. *The Rise and Fall of Economic Growth: A Study in Contemporary Thought*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 1987. *Economic Development: The History of an Idea*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Beckman, Björn. 1976. *Organizing the Farmers: Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana*. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.
- Beinart, William. 1984. "Soil Erosion, Conservationism and Ideas about Development: A Southern African Exploration, 1900-1960". *Journal of Southern African Studies* 11: 52-89.
- Boeke, J. H. 1953. *Economics and Economic Policies of Dual Societies as Exemplified by Indonesia*. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations.
- Boisson, Paul. 1942. *Contribution à l'Œuvre Africaine*. Rufisque: Imprimerie du Haut Commissariat de l'Afrique Française.
- Constantine, Stephen. 1984. *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy 1914-1940*. London: Cass.
- Cooper, Frederick. 1996. *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine. 1988. "Transfer of Economic Power in French-Speaking West Africa". In *Decolonization and African Independence: The Transfers of Power 1960-1980*, edited by Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis, 105-134. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine, Daniel Hémery, and Jean Piel, eds. 1988. *Pour une histoire du développement: États, sociétés, développement*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Cotte, Claudine. 1981. "La politique économique de la France en Afrique Noire (1936-1946)". Thèse de troisième cycle, Université de Paris VII.
- Cowen, Michael. 1984. "Early Years of the Colonial Development Corporation: British State Enterprise Overseas during Late Colonialism". *African Affairs* 83: 63-75.
- Cowen, Michael, and Robert Shenton. 1991. "The Origin and Course of Fabian Colonialism in Africa". *Journal of Historical Sociology* 4: 143-73.
- Economic Commission for Latin America. 1951. *Economic Survey of Latin America 1949*. New York: United Nations Department of Economic Affairs.
- Fall, Babacar. 1993. *Le travail forcé en Afrique Occidentale Française*. Paris: Karthala.
- Feterman, Steven. 1990. *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Fieldhouse, D. K. 1986. *Black Africa 1945-1980: Economic Decolonization and Arrested Development*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986.
- Gendzier, Irene. 1985. *Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World*. Boulder, Co.: Westview.
- Goldsworthy, David. 1994. "Introduction". *The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1951-1957*. London: HMSO.
- Havinden, Michael, and David Meredith. 1993. *Colonialism and Development: Britain and Its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960*. London: Routledge.
- Hyam, Ronald, ed. 1992. *The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945-1951*. London: HMSO, 1992.
- Jeffries, Richard. 1978. *Class, Power and Ideology in Ghana: The Railwaymen of Sekondi*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Killick, Tony. 1978. *Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Lewis, W. Arthur. 1939. *Labour in the West Indies*. London: Fabian Society.
- . 1951. "A Policy for Colonial Agriculture". In *Attitude to Africa*, by W. Arthur Lewis, Michael Scott, Martin Wright, and Colin Legum, 70-104. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- . 1954. "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour". *The Manchester School* 22: 139-91.
- . 1955a. "The Economic Development of Africa". In *Africa in the Modern World*, edited by Calvin W. Silliman, 97-112. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 1955b. *The Theory of Economic Growth*. Holmwood, Ill: Richard Irwin.
- . 1979. "The Dual Economy Revisited". *The Manchester School* 47: 211-29.
- Low, D. A., and John Lonsdale. 1976. "Introduction". In *The Oxford History of East Africa* Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Marselle, Jacques. 1984. *Empire colonial et capitalisme français: Histoire d'un divorce*. Paris: Albin Michel.
- Métra, Louis. 1936. *L'heure de l'économie dirigée d'intérêt général aux colonies*. Paris: Sirey.
- Moore, Henrietta L., and Megan Vaughan. 1994. *Cutting Down Trees: Gender, Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in the Northern Province of Zambia, 1890-1990*. Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann.
- Mounier, Bernard. 1942. *L'organisation de l'économie impériale par les comités coloniaux*. Paris: Editions Pedone.
- Pearce, R. D. 1982. *The Turning Point in Africa: British Colonial Policy 1938-1948*. London: Cass.
- Rosenstein-Rodan, P. H. 1943. "Problems of Industrialisation of Eastern and South-eastern Europe". *The Economic Journal* 53: 202-211.
- Rostow, Walter W. 1960. *The Stages of Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sorum, Paul Clay. 1977. *Intellectuals and Decolonization in France*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Thrupp, David. 1987. *The Social and Economic Origins of Mau Mau*. London: Currey.
- Tips, Dean C. 1973. "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective". *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15: 199-226.
- United Nations. Department of Economic Affairs. 1951. *Review of Economic Conditions in Africa, 1949-50*. New York: United Nations.

- _____. 1959. *Economic Survey of Africa Since 1950*. New York: United Nations.
- Vaughan, Megan. 1991. *Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and Africa Illness*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Weeks, John. 1971. "The Political Economy of Labor Transfer". *Science and Society* 35: 463-80.

THREE

Visions of Postwar Health and Development and Their Impact on Public Health Interventions in the Developing World

Randall Packard

The period immediately following World War II initiated a new phase in Europe and America's relationship to its colonial and former colonial dependencies. Under the banner of "development," the rationale for western intervention into the social and economic life of emerging nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America was transformed and depoliticized. Despite this change in rhetoric, the nature and purposes of post-colonial "development" remained remarkably similar to those of colonial interventions. Political and economic self-interest remained a key component in defining the desire of western industrial nations to transform the so-called "third world." Even the leaders of emerging nations used "development" to rationalize policies and programs that served narrow sets of interests. At the same time, the "partnership for progress" remained a very unequal one, with flows of information, knowledge, technology, and expertise, moving predominantly outward from the "developed" to the "underdeveloped" world.

The contradictions embedded in postwar development were shared by the field of international health. In rhetoric as well as in practice, interventions designed to improve the health of peoples in developing countries underwent a significant shift following World War II. Underlying this transformation, however, one can detect a number of continuities in both perspective and practice. These underlying continuities played a significant role in undermining the effectiveness of efforts to improve the health of developing nations.

HEALTH AND COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT

Prewar efforts to deal with the health of developing regions of the globe from the end of the nineteenth century to the late 1920s shared certain