Post-Conditionality Politics and Administrative Reform: Reflections on the Cases of Uganda and Tanzania

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ABSTRACT

This article contributes to the discussion of the nature of external intervention in the reform processes of indebted states. Looking at administrative reform in Uganda and Tanzania, it is argued that external involvement in sub-Saharan Africa is becoming increasingly differentiated. For some states — including the two cases dealt with here — a key set of continuities and changes allows us to conceptualize a regime of post-conditionality. Post-conditionality regimes exist where extreme external dependence and economic growth produce a set of political dynamics in which external–national distinctions become less useful, in which there emerge a set of unequal mutual dependencies, and in which donor/creditor involvement in reform becomes qualitatively more intimate, pervading the form and processes of the state. Details of this dispensation are provided in an analysis of key ministries and key interventions by donors/creditors. The article finishes by considering the contradictions of the post-conditionality regime, and its prospects.

INTRODUCTION: FROM CONDITIONALITY TO POST-CONDITIONALITY?

This article develops a notion of post-conditionality politics in order to capture the essential dynamics of external agency involvement in certain African states. As such, it moves beyond the general orthodoxy that sub-Saharan Africa is locked within a regime of conditionality. Three broad approaches have emerged in the analysis of conditionality and the relationship between donors/creditors and states.

- deriving from rational choice and principal–agent models, the model of the state and external institutions meeting as self interested individuals (Killick, 1997; Mosley et al., 1991);

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- deriving from radical International Political Economy (IPE) and African nationalist camps, the notion of IFI involvement as a new imperialism, creating a dichotomy between internal and external interests (Mengisteab and Logan, 1995; Onimode, 1989);
- deriving from the organic intellectuals of the World Bank, the idea that external involvement (not intervention) reflects the liberal nature of globalization, producing partnerships between states and donors, collectively charting a course of common sense and progress through policy-based lending (Bhatnagar and Williams, 1992; Picciotto, 1995; Rietbergen-McCracken, 1996).

It is clear that neither structural adjustment nor conditionality have gone away and, to some, it might seem politically dangerous to suggest otherwise. However, it remains the case that no 'international regime'[1] is static, nor are its effects homogeneous, even if they contain strong homogenizing tendencies. More broadly, the 'politics of adjustment' (van der Geest, 1994; Gibbon et al., 1992; Mkandawire and Olukoshi, 1995; Nelson, 1989) have involved significant changes, notably the elaboration of the governance agenda (Doornbos, 2001; Moore, 1999; Pauly, 1999). Since administrative reform is a key component in the translation of the ideals of governance into concrete donor-funded programmes, this article will touch upon governance issues as it unfolds. But the article makes two other important points about the changing politics of adjustment. In the first place, it stresses the extent, and repercussions, of a growing differentiation between African states with respect to the nature of donor involvement. Secondly, and following from the first point, some states embody a politics of donor intervention which cannot adequately be encapsulated by the general notions of conditionality politics, whichever one of the three clusters we take from the list above: hence the term 'post-conditionality'. The term is not defining a 'stage' through which all states must (should) pass, nor is it portraying a relation between external agencies and indebted states in which all conflict and contradiction is dissolved. In fact, as we shall see, much remains the same within the regime of post-conditionality, even if significant differences have emerged. This is why the article refers to post-conditionality as one aspect of the politics of adjustment, a more encompassing framework which is based on the ongoing power of the IFIs by virtue of the 'permanent crisis' of indebtedness. In other words, the concept is articulated to produce a more geographically and historically nuanced approach to adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa: post-conditionality is employed here as a useful characterization of a set of significant developments within donor–state relations, based on a group of states and forms of donor intervention which are not merely based on the threat of sanction which is at the heart of the conditionality mechanism.

1. For example, McMichael's (2000) analysis of the development and globalization regimes in development studies; or Ruggie's (1982) regime of 'embedded liberalism', often discussed in International Political Economy.

A SKETCH OF THE POST-CONDITIONALITY REGIME

Caveats and qualifications aside, one can discern a number of key features in the post-conditionality regime.

- Implementing structural adjustment measures is far less of a 'political' issue: IFIs no longer bring their considerable influence to bear on fundamental but routine economic policy. This is not to say, however, that monetarism is no longer the dominant ideology behind economic policy. In a sense, monetarism has made a transition from *doctrine* (openly colonizing the state terrain through the IFIs) to *ideology* (far less contested, integrated into the everyday language of policy-making).
- Donor–state relations within the post-conditionality regime are not defined by conditionality in its directly coercive sense: 'do what the IFIs say because the costs of doing so are not as great as the costs of not doing so'. Rather, IFIs employ the disbursement of funds to *promote* further changes — mainly to state institutions through administrative reform programmes. Post-conditionality politics requires more carrots than sticks. With respect to governance, this involves a movement away from threats to withdraw funds unless a country reduces its levels of corruption or opens up political space to the opposition, towards a desire to fund, say, a human rights watchdog institution or new anti-corruption agencies. This is clearly the case in Uganda which is criticized only mildly for its no-party democracy, even though the general political direction that this is taking is towards a single-party state (Carbone, 2000; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Kasfir, 1998; Mamdani, 1995). The situation in Uganda can be compared with the conditionality politics of its neighbour Kenya, where the governance agenda is constantly reinforced and invigilated through the threat or execution of the withdrawal of external funding.[2]
- Post-conditionality politics is *selective*; it is not a regime which has swept across all of sub-Saharan Africa. In effect, the Bank's engagement with different states is becoming more differentiated, as one would expect because donor–state relations are now historically embedded in each state over a period of decades. Joseph (1999: 69–70) identifies the current trend in which one can locate the selectivity of post-conditionality: 'The retreat [of interventionism] from Africa has been replaced by a selective international reengagement with the continent, especially to support strong economic reformers and governments able to contribute to order and stability in their subregions'. Joseph takes Uganda as his key exemplar throughout the text.

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2. Much to the chagrin of Kenyans, who find it unjust that Kenya has gone through the pains of the transition to multipartyism but is still less favoured than the 'no-party' state of Uganda.

The World Bank and others have developed a politics of 'cherry picking' in sub-Saharan Africa since *Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead* (World Bank, 1994),[3] in which debtor states are divided into 'good' and 'bad' adjusters. The reliability of these divisions is very poor (Mosley, Subasat and Weeks, 1995; Schatz, 1994), but the *political* effect of the division is powerful: it lays culpability for the general failure of adjustment on the states themselves, not on SAP, or the nature of global economic change. Tanzania and Uganda constitute cherries, along with a small group of other states including Ghana[4] and Mozambique.[5] These countries are showcased as examples of what a state can achieve if it 'gets the basics right' (the innovation on Berg's getting the prices right). The more that the IFIs invest capital (financial and political) in these states, the more committed they become to ensuring that they remain positive examples. This has repercussions for administrative reform, as will be discussed below.

- Within post-conditionality regimes, it becomes far less insightful to make distinctions between external and internal interests. As already mentioned, much of the neo-liberal logic close to the heart of the IFIs is also close to the hearts of Ministry of Finance technicians, auditors, and economists. This is not to argue that post-conditionality politics is a happy affair of dialogue and partnership — akin to the third understanding of conditionality outlined in the first section. Rather, contradictions and tensions still emerge and are central to post-conditionality politics, but they are not adequately explained by the notion of merely external intervention and coercion. We will explore some of these contradictions with respect to administrative reform below.
- Post-conditionality regimes are still based on the politics of donor dependency. In fact some have argued that Uganda is best understood as an 'international bantustan' (Himbara and Sultan, 1995; but see Doornbos, 1996).[6] The point here is that post-conditionality politics does not mean an end to donor intervention and the politics of adjustment; rather it is that intervention is not exercised solely through conditionality, but also to a significant degree through a closer involvement in state institutions and the employment of incentive finance. This constitutes a less visible but perhaps more powerful role for donors.

3. See also World Bank (1998).
4. A less obvious case nowadays, and with less spectacular rates of growth than Uganda and Tanzania: 1.2 per cent from 1985 to 1992.
5. Officially the fastest growing economy in the late 1990s, now trying to recover from devastating floods in 1999.
6. I do not find the bantustan metaphor helpful, but its use does serve to illustrate that academics need to understand Uganda's relations with donor/creditors in terms of high levels of financial dependency.

It is the argument of this article that these characteristics can be found in a number of sub-Saharan African states, and that this requires us to understand the politics of adjustment in a qualitatively different way, albeit within a set of pivotal structural continuities. If we accept that the post-conditionality regime exists (we will go on to look at Uganda and Tanzania in some detail later), we should ask what theoretical considerations are raised by the characteristics listed above.

Firstly, we need to question the extent to which the orthodox internal–external distinction is useful in understanding the politics of adjustment in post-conditionality regimes. The principal–agent and African nationalist approaches have often set up their analyses along this internal–external axis,[7] producing external agencies with one set of interests (efficient reform for the former, imperialist objectives for the latter) and an 'internal' state with another (political power and 'rent' for the former, the 'national interest' for the latter). Within the post-conditionality regime, this approach offers few insights because the national–international boundary has been rendered so much more porous by a historically embedded 'mutual assimilation' of donor and state power and ideas, consolidated within a context of economic growth. We will look at the more complex contours of donor–states relations in our two case studies.

Secondly, we need to ask what are the repercussions of an increasing differentiation in the donor–state relationship. For those states which appear to be successful in their adjustment reforms — certainly those within the post-conditionality category — we should consider the possibility of a mutual dependency emerging, in which donors identify certain states as important reformers precisely because they provide at least some proof that adjustment is worth the pain and disruption it inevitably causes. We can entertain the notion of mutual dependency without accepting the World Bank's discourse about partnership and debtor governments in the 'driving seat': mutual dependencies can be severely unequal.

Finally, we need to consider the extent to which post-conditionality constitutes a resolution of the problems of adjustment or a reconfiguration of adjustment more broadly, in which contradiction and struggle persist. In the penultimate section, we will outline how post-conditionality is best characterized as reconfiguration rather than resolution.

Post-Conditionality in Uganda and Tanzania

Post-conditionality regimes in sub-Saharan Africa might include Ghana,

7. Radical IPE has been more nuanced in approach, often conceptualizing national ruling classes as 'extroverted' or part of an international bloc. I thank Barry Gills for bringing this to my attention.

Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania, Côte d'Ivoire, and Cameroon. These are the best economic performers in sub-Saharan Africa, averaging a GDP growth rate of 4 to 5.5 per cent in 1999 (IMF, 2000).[8] We will take Uganda and Tanzania as case studies of the politics of post-conditionality. Post-conditionality regimes are historically generated, often on the back of a previous period of economic crisis (Uganda 1987–89; Tanzania 1979–86) or conflict and capitulation *vis-à-vis* the IMF and World Bank (Uganda 1987–89, Tanzania 1980–86).

A Brief History of State–IFI Relations in the Conditionality Period

In order to understand how Uganda and Tanzania's post-conditionality politics emerged, the following paragraphs will sketch the evolving relations between the state and donor/creditors in these two cases. Tanzania's relations with the IMF during the late 1980s were extremely unstable and occasionally hostile (Biermann and Campbell, 1989; Biermann and Wagao, 1986). As the contradictions of Tanzania's centralized modernization project conspired with a series of external factors (the war against Amin, the 1979 oil shock, and a drought), initial negotiations with the IMF began in 1979 but did not yield an agreement. Subsequently, Tanzania implemented its own adjustment programmes, most notably the National Economic Survival Programme (NESP). This programme included a number of liberalization measures, but an accord with the IMF was blocked by apparently fundamental disagreements over devaluation, which became a symbol of national sovereignty (Loxley, 1989; Malima, 1986; Singh, 1986). As Tanzania's home-grown reforms failed, the economy went further into crisis, and bilateral donors (as they have done elsewhere) conditioned their contributions on a reconciliation with the IMF (Stein, 1992: 70). In 1986 a standby agreement was signed, followed by the implementation of a Structural Adjustment Facility. It was only after Nyerere's departure that a full structural adjustment programme was implemented. Having implemented ESAP in 1989, with heavy World Bank, IMF, and bilateral support, Tanzania's economy began to produce positive rates of growth and by 1995 much of the 'logic' of economic policy-making under ESAP had become incontestable within the Tanzanian state.

In Uganda, after the NRM came to power in 1986, Museveni spoke very unfavourably of the IFIs, stressing their complicity with the Obote II regime and their role as agents for external intervention. By the late 1980s, after a period of economic instability and decline, the NRM implemented a SAP with IFI sponsorship, removing a hostile finance minister under advice from

8. The other country in this group is Sudan which, for reasons associated with the long-standing conflict, is excluded from this list.

the IMF[9] along the way (Brett, 1995: 320). Like Tanzania, Uganda's economy began to recover, averaging a GDP growth rate of 7.4 per cent from 1994/5 to 1998/9. By the mid-1990s the economic logic of adjustment was internalized within the state, especially the increasingly powerful Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. As Brett, writing in 1994, summarizes: '[c]ommitment to the political and economic discipline demanded by structural adjustment is probably more widely accepted by the leadership now than ever before, and thus [is] less dependent on continuing external... pressures' (Brett, 1994: 54). This tendency is likely to have increased from 1994 as Uganda's rate of economic growth has remained relatively high.[10]

Both states were involved in a period of tension and tussle with the IFIs as they compromised their crumbling economic nationalism for external funds. Both economies experienced a recovery, internalized neo-liberal reform, and as a result came to a 'post-conditionality' stage in their relations with external donors. Now, less pressure is put on these two states to ensure that inflation remains low because the respective finance ministries do this anyway: many of their higher-ranking personnel have received training based on monetarist economics; their accounting systems are based on fiscal prudence; their power over other ministries is considerable; and low rates of inflation maintain a post-conditionality stage in which donor funds are forthcoming. The best example of this state of affairs is the fact that Uganda and Tanzania are both receiving debt relief under the HIPC scheme after three to six years of concerted effort at structural adjustment reform. We will now look in more detail at the ways in which donor involvement in administrative reform has produced post-conditionality states in Tanzania and Uganda.

THE POST-CONDITIONALITY STATE I: 'NEW' MINISTRIES

What impact do administrative reform programmes have on the state, working as they do within a regime of post-conditionality? In the following sections I will trace some of the salient features of the post-conditionality state in Uganda and Tanzania.[11] This will involve less attention to the technical aspects of change, for example the extent to which a new personnel management system is working, and more attention to changes in political structures and processes. We will look first at the changing role of the two

9. There was also donor pressure to oust Kigoma Malima as Finance Minister in Tanzania (Bigsten et al., 1999: 31)
10. Although the fortunes of individual components of the reform programme have varied over time: one can see this most clearly in respect to anti-corruption reform. I am grateful to Martin Doornbos for highlighting this point.
11. Personal interviews with key actors in the two countries are used as additional evidence to support the characterization of post-conditionality states.

key ministries with respect to donor-funded administrative reform programmes, those involved in finance and public service. In Uganda, these are the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) and the Ministry of Public Service (MoPS) respectively; the equivalents in Tanzania are the Tanzanian Ministry of Finance (TMF) and the Civil Service Department (CSD) respectively.

Ministry of Finance

The Ministry of Finance has become the hegemonic ministry within both countries. This is a key feature of the post-conditionality state because it relates directly to the ascendance of monetarism within the state, that is, the overriding concern with budgetary expenditure and the more effective raising of taxes. It was the Ministry of Finance that became the agent to reduce the amount of fungible money running through the sinews of the state, to reduce money supply, to increase interest rates, to reduce the budget deficit and, of course, to arrange repayments on debt. The increasing importance of the Ministry of Finance reflects a similar global trend which results from the power of neo-liberalism on a planetary scale: all Ministers speak the same language, of reducing inflation above all else.[12] In many indebted states in sub-Saharan Africa, this global trend is sharpened by the implementation of structural adjustment, the mode through which Africa has been integrated into the global orthodoxy. In Tanzania in 1986, negotiations with the IMF were held in strict secrecy: even ministers and the Central Committee of the ruling party were kept out of the loop. Instead, the Party 'gave its consent to the Ministry of Finance to come to an agreement with the IMF' (Campbell and Stein, 1992: 15).

The Ministry of Finance's power does not just derive from its centrality to conditionality and structural adjustment. In the post-conditionality regime, it remains the central institution. In the first place, it is this ministry that serves as a conduit between the state and donor/creditors. In both Tanzania and Uganda, all agreements for project and programme funding are signed with the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, regardless of the 'target' ministry. In Uganda, 'all donor-funded projects — the only significant source of capital spending in the system — were managed centrally by the Ministry of Finance and Planning' (Brett, 1994: 68, 70). As a result, all donors, bilateral and multilateral, make real efforts to maintain good relations with the higher echelons of the finance ministries. This involves regular contacts with the ministry and a degree of information sharing not found in other parts of the state. It is also relevant that the Ministry of Finance and the

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12. More broadly, one might call this language a discourse of disciplinary neo-liberalism (Gill, 1995)

Ministry of Planning and Economic Development were merged in 1992, to create a 'super ministry' principally concerned with the tasks of financial management rather than planning and development.

In Tanzania, the implementing partner for the Public Service Reform Programme is not actually the Civil Service Department — although this is the institution that executes the programme — but the Tanzanian Ministry of Finance (TMF) (interview, economist, UNDP, July 2000). All bilateral donors negotiate their aid programmes with the Ministry of Finance, many referring to it as the 'point of entry', regardless of the nature of the aid programme. USAID in Tanzania shares early drafts of its programmes with the TMF. The Ugandan USAID counterpart summarized the situation there by saying that when Tumusiime-Mutebile (the Permanent Secretary and Secretary to the Treasury in MoFPED) leaves Kampala, all the donors panic because all of their projects go through him (interview, Democracy and Governance Advisor, USAID, July 2000). Thus, the Ministry of Finance maintains its paramount position as the conduit through which donors pump money into these two governments, part of the post-conditionality regime.

The Ugandan Ministry of Finance has received funding for its own administrative reform programmes. These have involved two components, generally known as 'soft' and 'hard' reforms, or those concerned with personnel and skill and those concerned with systems and technology. In terms of 'soft' reforms, the Ministry of Finance has received a disproportionate amount of training and technical assistance, that is externally-funded posts for experts (almost always expatriates). Donor assistance allowed MoFPED to establish an Economics Masters degree course at Makerere University, taking in twenty employees per year; donors have funded research groups within MoFPED with a view to improving the technical competence of economic planning and policy-making; and the World Bank and UNDP have introduced incentive schemes into MoFPED to enhance performance and motivation (Lamont, 1995: 16–19). In Uganda, 'the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development is the most powerful ministry and has a lot of technical assistance. Other weaker ministries have little technical assistance, for example the Ministry of the Interior has not got computerized systems, so it doesn't have reliable information' (interview, Commissioner, MoFPED, July 2000). Within other ministries, the perceived expertise within the Ministry of Finance gives it an image of power which is reinforced by the larger and better maintained premises and the high level of computerization of the ministry.

With respect to 'hard' reforms, both finance ministries have introduced new systems of budgetary management, with donor funding. In Uganda, MoFPED has introduced cash budgeting, which ties all ministries to a strict regime of expenditure based on cash subventions rather than deficit financing. Stronger budgeting systems are being implemented as part of the IDA-financed Economic and Financial Management Programme (I and II) within

MoFPED. In Tanzania, the Platinum System budgetary management software package is being introduced in order to give the TMF greater control over the requests for budgets from all other ministries (interview, Chief Secretary and Head of Public Service, August 2000). In effect, these are improved technologies of control, wielded by the Ministry of Finance to ensure budgetary adherence throughout most of the state. In 1999, the original budgets set by the Ugandan Ministry of Finance for all ministries, departments, and agencies were unilaterally reduced mid-term by the MoFPED (interview, Chair of Parliamentary Committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, July 2000), one effect of which is to reinforce the hegemony of this ministry. Additionally, MoFPED's relative technical competence has led it to dominate policy-making in all areas (Lamont, 1995: 22).

The hard and soft reforms, the centrality of the two Ministries of Finance to the donor groups, and the relatively high level of skilled personnel in their better-kept offices provide the Ministries of Finance with a certain ideological leadership. This leadership provides an important source for the dissemination of neo-liberal ideas within the state. Other ministries make requests for their budgets to the Ministry of Finance, and in Uganda each ministry's accounting officers (those who control budgets) are centrally appointed by the Secretary to the Treasury. This makes all ministries constantly aware of the power of the Ministry of Finance and its central concern — fiscal prudence.

Civil Service/Public Service

Administrative reform programmes in Uganda and Tanzania are executed by the MoPS and CSD respectively. What impact has the rise of administrative reform as a key element in the post-conditionality regime had on these institutions? In the first place, the profile of the two ministries has grown. The first component of administrative reform in both Tanzania and Uganda was retrenchment, and this involved the MoPS and CSD (along with the Public Service Commission) executing a programme of weeding out 'ghost' workers, updating employee lists, selecting employees to be retrenched, and administering a severance package. In similar fashion to the role played by the Ministries of Finance, donor money pumped into the public service ministries allowed them to project their own agendas onto the rest of the line ministries. Donors view the finance ministry and the public service ministry as the two central executing ministries with which they must deal — the former managing the money, the latter the personnel. In Uganda, as part of the first Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP, 1990–96), the Management Services Department of the MoPS carried out a restructuring report on the Ministry of Health; in 1993, a major seminar was held under the auspices of the MoPS, involving ministers and permanent secretaries, on the management of change with respect to civil service reform; and a functional staff review of all ministries was undertaken by the MoPS as part of the CSRP (MoPS, 1993: 30). Thus, the reform programmes and the donor resources that accompanied them, allowed the Ministry of Public Service and the CSD to rejuvenate themselves and effect changes in other ministries. Both Uganda and Tanzania have established Inter Ministerial Technical Committees, chaired by the MoPS and CSD respectively, which oversee civil service reform.

Changes in the two ministries have also been significantly contingent on each country's political history. In Uganda, under the CSRP, the role of the MoPS became notably more dynamic. Its main tasks were to implement a new system of personnel management which essentially involved reducing employee numbers, decompressing wages, and improving records management through computerization. There were considerable successes in these areas, and large amounts of donor money were involved in the early stages, mainly aimed at funding retrenchment packages. The MoPS also had the clear political support of President Museveni; the fact that the retrenchment process went fairly smoothly was at least partly due to the open and powerful support of the President for what would otherwise have been a difficult reform to implement (interview, Director of Administrative Reform, MoPS, July 2000):

> [During the Civil Service Reform Programme] Uganda has made considerable progress in its move towards a more effective public service. This has been largely due to the strong political support for the programme from the President and the highest level of government. Political support has been essential to implement some potentially very unpopular, but necessary, reforms particularly the downsizing of the service. (MoPS, 1997: 2)

After these reforms had been achieved, however, other aspects of the CSRP — notably those concerned with instituting a new Results Oriented Management (ROM) throughout the ministries — went into abeyance. This was one reason for the design and implementation of the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP), initiated in 1997, which aims to reactivate the administrative reform programme.[13]

If Uganda's trajectory of reform had an explosive and effective beginning, but then tailed off, Tanzania's trajectory is in many ways the reverse. Although civil service reform began with the same process of successful retrenchment, largely funded by donors, there has subsequently been a cautious build-up of preparations for the Public Service Reform Programme, initiated in 2000 and due to last until 2011. This will involve many of the same aspects as the Ugandan programme, principally ROM and a focus on customer service. Comparing the literature produced by the two ministries,

13. Although some fear that since administrative reform is no longer a political issue in the same way as HIPC (debt relief scheme), the Poverty Eradication Action Plan, or the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, it will be very difficult to get this project off the ground.

one gets the impression that the Tanzanian reform programme is more detailed and realistic in its time-frame.

There is clearly a less rigid set of associations between donor conditionality and reform in the civil service ministries, compared to the case of the finance ministries sketched above. This reflects the fact that there is no direct cause and effect between donor-funded civil service reform and economic growth. This worries some donors, who see civil service reform as a 'fuzzy' area to get involved in, or as not directly 'developmental'. More generally, there is evidence, gleaned from interviews by this writer and other researchers, that the World Bank is rather equivocal about its incremental involvement in issues of administrative reform and corruption. It remains to be seen whether external agencies have a sufficiently clear vision of successful administrative reform and/or the political will to pursue that vision in the same way that they have pursued the implementation of neo-liberal economic policies.

THE POST-CONDITIONALITY STATE II: DONORS/CREDITORS

One key feature of the post-conditionality state is thus the increased importance of certain ministries — finance ministries as powerful producers of neo-liberal orthodoxy, and public service ministries as the executors of administrative reform programmes. These institutional changes relate to characteristics of the post-conditionality regime: internalizing neo-liberalism and a concern with governance in the positive sense of programmes for administrative reform. A second aspect of the post-conditionality state that requires some elaboration is the relationship between state and donors.

The first point to stress is that conditionality is still a central aspect of the donor–state relationship. For example, in Uganda, the World Bank set out eighty-six specific policy reforms for the period 1991/92–1993/94 (Killick, 1997: 484). The coercive logic of conditionality remains, as it does for all of sub-Saharan Africa, but the direct threat of a withdrawal of finance is removed from the political scene. Current state–donor politics are far more collegial in Uganda and Tanzania than they were, for example, in Kenya and Zambia in the late 1980s and 1990s, Zimbabwe in the mid-1990s, or for that matter Tanzania during the early 1980s. Statements from Consultative Group meetings present a donor approach which is mainly concerned with consolidating an already accepted reform logic through the provision of further loans and grants. In understanding the post-conditionality state, therefore, seeing the relationship between donor and state in terms of opposition via the mechanism of conditionality is not sufficient.

It is equally important, however, to bear in mind that both Tanzania and Uganda are *extremely* aid-dependent. In the mid-1990s, NGOs contributed 64 per cent of the running costs of health services in Uganda (MoPS, 1995: 4), and some 90 per cent of funding for the Public Service Reform Programme is projected to have come from donors (MoPS, 1997: 85). In 1990, aid constituted 30 per cent of Tanzania's entire GDP (Bigsten et al., 1999: 2–3). In fact, rather than conceptualizing donor power as a strong external force on the state, it would be more useful to conceive of donors as *part of the state itself*. This is not just because so much of the budgeting process is contingent on the receipt of donor finance, but also because of the way programmes and even specific policies are designed and executed. In Tanzania and Uganda, donor sub-groups meet every fortnight or every month (depending on the group); there is a group for each major ministry which receives donor funding. Donors select a chair from within their own groups, most often a larger donor with a particular specialism. In Tanzania, the governance sub-group is chaired by the UNDP; in Uganda the same group is chaired by the World Bank. The permanent secretary of a particular ministry is invited to the sub-group meetings, the purposes of which are to discuss policy progress, monitor the disbursement of funds, and consider further funding options. These meetings have become a routine part of the way the government works, and the higher echelons of the civil service regularly produce information for donors — both within the sub-group meetings and in response to the donors' desire to maintain a closer monitoring of their money. In Uganda, the USAID governance advisor attends about five sub-group meetings per month (interview, July 2000).

Donor Ideological Hegemony: International Orthodoxies

Individual donors select aspects of country programmes which fit with their particular development ethos. Both Uganda and Tanzania produce Country Assistance Strategies and present these to donors in order to elicit support, and to assure donors that overall ownership rests with the government itself. The country strategies are clearly produced by African officials with an eye to the international orthodoxies within which donors work — currently an emphasis on pro-poor growth, based on basic social provision and market-friendly policies. This may also be the approach that officials themselves believe to be the most effective way to ensure progress, but it is certainly the case that a country strategy which effectively taps into international orthodoxies of development and governance stands a much better chance of being funded by donors. And, as we have seen, there is not a great deal that these states can do in the absence of donor funding. This has led to a degree of cynicism, with some calling country strategies 'shopping lists' to present to donors. Therkildsen (2000: 66) gives an account of this process with respect to Tanzania:

> The preparation of a policy paper is important for ministerial fund raising. Due regard to perceived donor preferences will therefore be taken by the ministry in question. It may even request technical assistance to draft the policy. This helps to explain the... observation that many senior officials and ministers do not take an active part in the policy making process.

> As principals assessing the quality of policy work, they need only ascertain that their subordinate agents help to produce policy papers and plans that attract donor funding. This is a key indicator of a job well done.

Thus it can be argued that it is no longer very instructive to try to separate external and national interests (if it ever was). Donor influence is certainly a reality, but it does not necessarily work against a state, and the state itself does not necessarily have any distinct opposition to the global hegemony of neo-liberalism and governance.

This is not to agree with the World Bank and others that the new donor politics is one of partnership and ownership, with states firmly in the driving seat. It is rather that the state is reflecting and internalizing a more complex state of affairs than a dichotomy of national–external opposition in post-conditionality regimes. As we shall see in the next section, this state of affairs produces its own significant contradictions, even if these cannot be understood in terms of just external intervention and the violation of some notion of sovereignty.

Methods of Governance

Donor influence does not just manifest itself through the power of money and the integration of donors into the routines of government. It is also important to recognize the influence of the *methodology* of reform. With donor funding comes a new set of regulations concerning the technique of the policy process. Donors look for and fund corporate plans within ministries, departments, and agencies, based on frameworks which set out specific policies, executing agencies, timeframes, and funding requirements. Projects and programmes have to be audited more intensely: until recently a programme which involved a number of donors would require the production of numerous audit reports on money spent, one for each donor.[14] Donor-funded technical assistance ensures that state cadres have the capacity to take on innovations in policy technique. In Uganda, some ministries have set up budget groups to ensure that new monitoring and accounting techniques are applied (interview, Governance Advisor, Department for International Development, July 2000).

Relatedly, the presence of expatriate personnel on donor-funded contracts reinforces both the international orthodoxy of reform and the new methodologies of donors. Both Uganda and Tanzania have received considerable amounts of expatriate technical assistance, although this author could not find any aggregate numbers for expatriate personnel within the state. In Uganda, the Danish governmental donor agency DANIDA had twenty-two

14. This is changing, as most donors (with the significant exception of the USA) have begun to pool their resources as part of the new Sector-Wide Approach (SWAP).

advisors of one kind or another within the state in 1998. An expatriate has headed the Uganda Revenue Authority. In Tanzania, World Bank and DfID funding has ensured a heavy expatriate presence within the CSD, including a Chief Technical Advisor, although the Government of Tanzania wishes to phase out medium-term contracts for expatriate technical advisors in favour of shorter and more specific contracts. One technical advisor within the CSD saw his job explicitly as acting as a conduit for new internationally-accepted management techniques.

In sum, the donor–state relation is too intimate and interrelated to be understood as a dichotomy. Donors do not just impose conditionalities; they also work in routinized fashion at the centre of policy-making. Donor-funded technical assistance introduces not new policies but new methodologies of policy design based on corporate plans, surveys, and closer budgeting and monitoring techniques.

Having sketched out some of its key characteristics and relationships, it now remains to critically analyse the post-conditionality regime.

THE CONTRADICTIONS OF POST-CONDITIONALITY POLITICS

Money is Power: The Role of the World Bank

This old aphorism is certainly not part of the donor lexicon, despite its obvious truth. As mentioned earlier, dependence on donor funds underpins the integration of donors into policy processes. Within the donor group, the resources that the World Bank controls gives it a (dis)proportionate influence within the post-conditionality state. This is a result of two factors: the sheer size of the Bank as a multilateral international finance institution; and the politics of the World Bank's country offices. Each country office has a resident representative who is evaluated largely according to the amount of programme funding he or she can arrange. Therefore, a principal aim of resident representatives is to spend money during their residency.

The size of the Bank and the politics of residency make the Bank a willing and able lender. One immediate result of this for our case study countries is that both Uganda and Tanzania contracted substantial new loans during the HIPC period, making a nonsense of the whole notion of HIPC as a 'solution' to severe indebtedness. Oloka-Onyango and Barya (1997: 129) sum up the situation with respect to Uganda, but it holds true for Tanzania as well: 'with the "fresh start" provided by the [HIPC debt] relief, Uganda — like a discharged bankrupt — will be game for a new round of borrowing'.

Another repercussion of the Bank's financial sway is that it can impose its own preferences for big-spending programmes on any existing smaller-scale incremental projects funded by other donors. In Uganda, DANIDA was funding a gradual capacity-building project as part of a decentralization programme, for example funding a Local Government Finance Commission in Rakia district and a Decentralization Secretariat. DANIDA's approach was to begin with three selected districts and to ensure that local funds constituted at least 50 per cent of project funding (part of the criterion of ownership). The World Bank subsequently created its own decentralization programme for all of Uganda, regardless of the institutional capacity of the district (a serious concern of donors and officials alike), and requiring a local contribution to the constituent projects of only 10 per cent. A DANIDA Programme Officer saw this as World Bank 'bulldozing', undermining the more cautious and modest approach (interview, July 2000; also interview UNDP Resident Representative, July 2000). The Government of Uganda accepted the Bank project, which involved far larger amounts of money than the Danish one, even though this meant that DANIDA's small grant project has been overrun by a large loan-based project (no matter how long term and concessional the loan might be). The same concerns about 'bulldozing' have been expressed in Tanzania. One repercussion of this has been that the Government of Tanzania sometimes has 'too much' money, that is, amounts beyond its capacity to absorb. Also in Tanzania, some donors involved in administrative reform resent the power of the World Bank, and the fact that this stems merely from the extent of its resources, rather than from any clear specialization or expertise in this area. It is of course possible that this resentment has more to do with donor rivalries than with substantive questions of competence, but it is noteworthy that the same concern was reported to me by a technical advisor on a World Bank contract.

'Cherries should not go Rotten': The Contradictions Between Governance and Showcases

As we have seen, the post-conditionality regime is selective: it exists in indebted states where the adjustment agenda has been internalized and where economic recovery is at least a statistical reality. In these cases, it appears that the World Bank can at last claim that SAP was worthwhile after all: 'One valuable and hopeful lesson for Africa is that spectacular increases in growth are indeed possible — if the right policies are in place' (World Bank, 1994: 200). Tanzania and Uganda are touted as a justification for the Bank's actions over the last twenty years or so. In fact, there remain serious reservations about the Bank's claims of recovery (Mosley and Weeks, 1993) and the extent to which GNP growth actually translates into an improvement in popular well-being, but these issues are beyond the scope of this paper. What is of interest here, are the repercussions of this state of affairs for governance in post-conditionality states.

Because the World Bank has invested so much political capital in Uganda and Tanzania, the costs of substantial decline in these states would be high indeed. It would then be incumbent on the Bank to try to extract itself from any culpability in whatever crisis faces the indebted state — which would be extremely difficult, given the closeness of World Bank involvement, as argued above. This political investment can undermine the Bank's concerns with governance, and especially corruption. In Uganda, one international consultant applied for a post in a government department and was told, explicitly in a fax, to submit a bribe to the permanent secretary of the ministry if he/she wanted the job. Refusing to pay the bribe, the consultant gave a copy of the fax to the World Bank's offices and asked what action the consultant should take. The response from the Bank officials was that it was not their responsibility, and that they 'didn't want to know about it' (confidential interview). In Tanzania, Raikes and Gibbon (1996: 227) note that the recent increase in corruption has been played down, as donors celebrate Tanzania as a good adjuster. There are similar indications for Mozambique, another post-conditionality case (Harrison, 1999).

Other donors, enjoying close and routinized working relations with debtor states, also fight shy of the sensitive issue of corruption. More candid interviewees said that donors knew about corrupt practices — such as officials with a row of luxury apartments which they could never have paid for from a public servant's salary — but demur from acting on these cases because of the repercussion this would have on the overall donor–state relationship.

This is not to say that donors are indifferent to corruption. In both Tanzania and Uganda, donors have financed anti-corruption agencies and raised the issue of corruption at Consultative Group meetings and elsewhere. But the anti-corruption agenda is made more complex by the mutual (albeit still unequal) dependence between donors and debtor state: to identify serious corruption at the highest echelons of the state would be to disrupt the post-conditionality regime, with its image of partnership, progress, and claims of showcase status. As a result, public statements of concern about corruption by donors, and funding for anti-corruption bodies, is accompanied by a certain reluctance by some[15] to engage with anti-corruption actions.

Institutional Imaginings

An important point, recognized by those involved in administrative reform, is that institutional innovations do not necessarily make the differences expected of them. Some institutions, which might appear to be taking significant steps in implementing reform, are in fact quite ineffective. In Tanzania, an Ethics Secretariat was created in the President's office in 1995 to ensure the appropriate ethical conduct of politicians and higher-ranking

15. But not all — in Uganda in 1998, DANIDA passed on the names of those suspected of corrupt practices in projects with Danish funding.

government officials ('leaders'). Leaders are supposed to submit a declaration of assets to the Secretariat each year, after which the latter ensures that no unexplained enrichment has taken place. The implementation of leadership codes of this kind is seen as a key reform in many indebted African states, and is welcomed by donors. However, the Ethics Secretariat is severely understaffed, and cannot possibly check the 5000 or so submissions that it is supposed to receive. The Secretariat does not have the power to initiate its own investigations, but passes on information to the President. Members of the public can make a complaint to the Secretariat, but only after paying a fee and giving their full names and address, thus compromising themselves in the process of making a complaint. By 1999, thirty-four cases had been considered by the Secretariat, and none had been passed to the President. To date, the Ethics Secretariat has made practically no difference to corrupt practice amongst leaders, although a new bill might increase its powers.

In other cases, reforms are as much subverted as ineffectual. The following quotation comes from an interview with a Technical Advisor with a remit to introduce staff appraisal techniques into the Tanzanian Ministries: 'Usually government departments see appraisal as an annual ritual to be got through... Departments can set convenient targets for themselves or modify criteria to engineer an improvement. New systems can be ignored or manipulated. There is a need for a change in the ethics. Do donors care if systems are being modified in any case?'.

In trying to answer this question, it is worth noting that donors heavily support workshops in both Tanzania and Uganda, with the purpose not only of improving the skills levels of officials, but also of inculcating new approaches to, or ethics of, administration. This is particularly the case with anti-corruption programmes. Workshops vary in their intent and their success, however. In many cases, there is no clear form of workshop evaluation, although those concerned with technical skills do have forms of monitoring, such as the training workshops in Uganda's Institutional Capacity Building Programme (interview, Training Manager, July 2000). Workshops are also a means to distribute 'perks' within a department: in some cases public employees vie to attend workshops because they involve an allowance, a stay in a prestigious venue (an international hotel or conference centre), and a good buffet or meal. If department heads try to reduce the costs of workshops by reducing allowances or holding the sessions within their own buildings, it is far more difficult to get people to attend. Workshops funded out of World Bank money can be expensive affairs because Bank accounting methods do not include the criteria of value for money at local costs. A workshop in an international hotel at perhaps US$300 per person is not exceptional for the Bank — as long as all the money is accounted for (interview, civil service Technical Advisor, July 2000). Thus, workshops are only partly about capacity building and a new administrative ethos; they are also about perks and patronage.

Structured Limits to Reform

Interviewees in both Uganda and Tanzania stated that some of the highest level bureaucrats, including those directly involved with donors and governance-related reforms, were accumulating substantial amounts of wealth in opaque ways. Dan Wandera Ogalo, MP and Chair of the Ugandan Parliamentary Committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, which reviews reports from the Inspector General of Government, states that 'the real corruption involves millions of dollars and goes on at the highest levels' (interview, July 2000). Perhaps one aspect of high level corruption which has been underemphasized is the centrality of violence to accumulation. Interviewees who spoke of high-level corruption sometimes remarked that to mention the names of the worst offenders (it seems that the scams of these people were no secret within certain boundaries) would be to risk threats, violence, and perhaps even death.

Accumulation and class formation in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa has relied on extra-economic coercion, that is, the direct use of state violence. Often, state power and accumulation are unified in a single process (Bayart, 1993). In the era of governance, donor-funded programmes, and post-conditionality politics, some still use these 'old fashioned' methods to enrich themselves, employing the threat of violence to ensure that they remain 'untouchable' in the face of new governance agendas. If a 'big fish' is brought to court, it is possible that both the velvet glove of bribery and the iron fist of violence will be used to ensure that justice is not done (interview, Tanzania, August 2000).

CONCLUSION: EVALUATING POST-CONDITIONALITY ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

The previous section has set out a series of contradictions within the post-conditionality regimes, mainly associated with administrative reform. These contradictions do not correspond to any internal–external dichotomy, but rather sit within the complex internal politics of extreme donor dependence. In spite of these contradictions, it would be wrong to argue that nothing has changed for the better as a result of post-conditionality administrative reform. In Uganda, the occasional permanent secretary and even minister has faced dismissal or trial. In Tanzania, the CSD has brought together a group of technically competent and motivated personnel who have designed a detailed planning and monitoring mechanism which should allow for a cautious and well-monitored process of administrative reform. There remain the more pedestrian problems of reform — such as how administrative innovations interact with the processes of decentralization that both countries are going through, or the dependence of both programmes on the goodwill of their country's presidents — but one must afford administrative reform its due of limited but significant progress.

Clearly, the actions of some donors and civil servants are also well-motivated. The new language of reform is based on notions of citizen empowerment and participation, and the overall vision is of a state administration that facilitates market-friendly growth. The fact that capitalist development in sub-Saharan Africa has been brutal, contradictory, and crisis-riven means that we should not only stress the limits of reform or the problematic relations with broader social change, but should also recognize that *any* improvements in the efficiency of state action are significant in a generally difficult environment.

Despite this recognition, however, the contradictions of post-conditionality reform are considerable: reform dominated by monetary enticements; an unequal but mutual dependence between donors and creditors in showcase states which might generate compromises in the name of good political relations; an aspect of 'theatre' to institutional innovations; and a failure to address the deeper tectonics of accumulation in Africa's post-colonial states. This reminds us that any successful set of administrative reforms must reconcile itself with a broader political economy. It is difficult to see how even these quite limited improvements to administration are going to survive or expand in the absence of economic growth, but economic growth in Uganda and Tanzania is far from assured, and high growth rates so far have not pulled either country out of the lowest ranks of global economic indicators — both have a GNP per capita below the average for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (World Bank, 2000: 35). The post-conditionality period might constitute something of a 'honeymoon' period, before the considerable problems of neo-liberal reform generate new political contradictions.

At the beginning of this article, the threefold categorization of donor–state relations was outlined. If we return to that categorization now, we can see that the critical stance of this paper is similar to that of the radical IPE approach, with the important difference that it rejects the internal–external dichotomy. This has significant repercussions: it means that post-conditionality reforms might be partly progressive in circumstances of economic growth rather than solely manifestations of dependency-like imperialism. It also means that, in the absence of a clear and progressive nationalism, alternatives to the neo-liberal agenda will necessarily be more complex — perhaps stemming from unions, from professional organizations, or from some factions of capital (Kiondo, 1992). If states can embody and reflect the contradictions of the post-conditionality regime, they can also reflect struggles to move beyond this state of affairs.

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