11. How nonprofit governance studies can be enriched by the commons framework: towards a cross-fertilization agenda of research

Philippe Eynaud and Jean-Louis Laville

In the field of governance research, civil society organizations (CSOs) have a unique place. More than any other organizations, they invite researchers to engage in cross-disciplinary research by bridging organization studies with other literatures (Steen-Johnsen et al., 2011) and to renew the thinking about relationships between the economy and society (Laville, 2016). In this context, many literatures can be mobilized. In this chapter, we claim that one of them is of particular interest: the governance of the commons (Ostrom, 1990). Based from the outset on a political economy approach, Ostrom's work offers indeed the opportunity to open the landscape concerning the market–state dualism and to enlarge our vision of CSO governance. We posit that the literature of the commons is also a relevant perspective with which to revisit the issues about governance in the third sector, the social economy and the solidarity economy and to highlight alternative conceptions of collective action and social transformation.

This proposition is based on the fact that studies of the commons have developed different concepts according to the assumptions of the following three theoretical frameworks:

1. The governance of nonprofit organizations (NPOs) in the third sector and the governance of common-pool resources exemplify the diversity of organizations inside a neoclassical perspective where there is an institutional choice (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977).
2. The governance of social economy organizations (SEOs) and the common property regime are more insistent on a key criterion: the governance of collective property rights. The involvement of stakeholders calls for new forms of collective action which are not solely interest-oriented but also democratically based (Ostrom, 1990; Nyssens and Petrella, 2015).
3. The field of CSOs and the field of the new commons enrich the thematic of governance by deepening the conceptualization of economy beyond the market and the conceptualization of politics beyond the state (Hess and Ostrom 2006; Hess, 2008).

To explain this argument and to outline a preliminary approach to a future programme of interconnected research, this chapter is divided into four sections. To begin, the first section shows how the third sector and common-pool resources serve from the outset to overcome the prevailing tension between the market and the state. Theoretical work up to now has extensively explored all these issues but is still based mainly on orthodox economic assumptions and classic governance models.

The next section then examines how this first stage was followed by the development of frameworks emphasizing the aspect of governance of common property, a concept inherent to the social economy and the commons. For over a century, experience has shown that the social economy has been important because it has been focused on collectively owned enterprise, but it has not been sufficient to generate change on a large scale. The same limits concern the commons when they have been concentrated in some 'niches' without influencing societal regulations.

Therefore, the third section identifies how solidarity economy theory proposes a complementary perspective encompassing the plurality of economic principles in Polanyi's terms and a public dimension as understood by Habermas or Fraser. This economic and political plurality seems to be very close to the idea of collective action as shown by the latest developments in the governance of the commons theory, including the 'new commons' literature. This approach opens up brand new models of CSO governance.

Initially proposed by Francophone and Hispanophone traditions, a new area of public policy has been defined through the concept of social and solidarity economy (SSE), shaping an alliance between the social economy and the solidarity economy and partly eroding, for policy-makers and practitioners, their conceptual differences in contrast with the third sector residual perspective. In the meantime, the concept of the commons has been reframed as a tool for enforcing institutional diversity, going further than common-pool resources and the common property regime. Along with the SSE concept, the idea of the commons opens a new field leading to another theoretical and political discussion dedicated to sociodiversity in the economy. That is why the fourth section of the chapter explores what is at stake in this debate. The SSE and the commons are anchor points for withstanding the neoliberal agenda and pressures. By focusing on the specificity of the SSE as well as the commons, it is possible to rethink the history of the last two centuries and to propose new patterns for the century to come. Another political economy thus emerges as a springboard for renewed critical thinking in governance studies.

THE GOVERNANCE OF NPOs, THE THIRD SECTOR AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES

Mainstream economics relies on market principles for structuring economic life and activity. It is crucial in this market-based economics that a preference should be given to private actors producing goods and services in competitive markets. However, even orthodox economists agree that some markets are imperfect and require the

presence of other actors. Moreover, some goods cannot be exchanged within regular markets because their nature entails market failures. This is rather the case for the provision of social services with a high relational dimension such as child care or elderly care. Due to an inequality between the provider and the recipient of the services, these markets are characterized by informational asymmetries. Therefore, regular private actors in these markets are not completely able to offer buyers a balanced and fair price, and third sector organizations—alongside social enterprises that have philanthropic goals—have their place because they can create a climate of trust and confidence for the recipients of such services.

Neoclassical economists also admit that there are not only private but public goods that individuals cannot buy. Public goods are non-rival because they can be enjoyed by many consumers simultaneously, and non-excludable because they are accessible to everyone; these include, for example, national defence and public education. Minority groups are not satisfied with the public goods on offer because, according to public choice theorists, these goods target only median voters. Therefore, minority groups may organize themselves in a specific way, and some of them create third sector organizations.

Emphasizing the differences between goods, Ostrom and Ostrom (1977) propose a matrix showing that in addition to public and private goods two other options exist: club goods, such as toll roads and cable television, and common-pool resources. Unlike club goods (only accessible to a limited set of members), a common-pool resource is one in which 'one person's use subtracts from another's and where it is difficult to exclude others from using the resource' (Hess and Meinzen-Dick, 2006, p. 2).

The existence of the third sector and common-pool resources highlight the situation that standard economics does not focus solely on regular markets in its conceptual frameworks. Ostrom and Ostrom (1977) posit three main points:

1. Even if the market is the main answer for all economic matters, it is not the only one. Therefore, the third sector and common-pool resources have residual roles to play.
2. Institutions are the result of cost–benefit analyses; their continuity is conditioned on their efficiency and their perpetually adapted responses to a changing environment.
3. The assumption of individual rationality is not disputed. Even though the organizational choices are diverse, they are all motivated in this conceptual framework by self-interest. The paradigm is aggregative, and the logic is atomistic in the sense that each actor interacts with other actors in a rational way, which does not include any collective deliberation or communication.

Strategic (and instrumental) rationality, which characterizes human action within this paradigm, cannot take into account the political dimension. Classification by kinds of goods and services suggests to us that the difference between state, market and third sector as well as the difference between private goods, public goods, club goods

and common-pool resources can be found in each one's intrinsic qualities. It means that this conceptual framework distinguishes between private activities and others by adopting a sectoral approach.

In this framework, the purpose of governance is to offer a structure that is able to reduce informational asymmetries. The governance model of third sector organizations is not very different from the market-based model. Both models tend to focus primarily on the board, which is seen as the main governance body to help organizations to better share information and to support rational choice. Governance in this case aims to increase the representativeness of the boards and to renew scrutiny inside the organization (McNulty, 2015). In this perspective, governance is understood as a variety of mechanisms to better align the interests of shareholders and managers (Rediker and Seth, 1995). Thus, governance is mainly approached as an internal matter which does not intend to target social transformation.

THE GOVERNANCE OF SEOs, THE SOCIAL ECONOMY AND THE COMMON PROPERTY REGIME

The social economy model rejects the residual vision suggested by third sector theory. Some authors argue that the economic field can be enlarged to include cooperative activities (Desroche, 1976; Vienney, 1994). They also observe that most social care systems implemented by welfare regimes were not initially conceived by the state but through self-help and reciprocity, later opening the way to public redistribution (Laville, 2016).

Their historical perspective demonstrates the role played by non-capitalist enterprises and opens new perspectives. First, social economy calls for limitation of shareholders' power in the enterprise. With the motto 'one man, one vote', early SEOs empowered employees and wove the democratic principle of their internal operations into the fibre of their legal status and in their governance (Vienney, 1994). Second, the question of collective property is decisive for social economy because it allows stakeholders to be involved in decision-making. By virtue of the legal status, stakeholders act as the organization's owners. Third, the social economy model does not reduce the third sector to NPOs. Alongside NPOs, other organizational forms such as cooperatives and mutuals exist and are reinforced.

Although these specific organizations have been able to survive up to now, they have unfortunately failed to transform and democratize the economy from the inside. The equality written into the status of the relationship between members was not enough to induce important changes in capitalism. On the contrary, the market economy has indeed been able to contain them to begin with and then to transform them by the extension of standardization, professionalization and regulatory compliance. The well-known phenomenon of institutional isomorphism is a recurrent tendency in the social economy.

In this regard, the theory of the commons has also evolved in order to identify and to protect common-pool resources. It has argued that commons are supported by

a bundle of rights which can be combined in multiple ways: the right of access to the resource, the right to appropriate the products of the resource, the right to manage the resource, the right to determine who will have a right to access and how that right may be transferred, and finally the right to sell these last two rights. Ostrom (2010) stresses this separability of rights as a way to preserve the plurality of institutional forms. The bundle of rights allows indeed for diversity among property regimes (Nyssens and Petrella, 2015) and gives Ostrom the ability to distance herself from an orthodox vision. Common-pool resources also have their weaknesses, in particular the risk of free-riders intruding in the community and having a negative impact on shared resources. Common-pool resources assume the existence of common property rules to prevent such free-riders from exhausting scarce resources (Ostrom, 1990).

So, Ostrom's work has initiated a major research stream focused on the commons, beyond the rival and non-excludable common-pool resources. But the bundle of rights reaches certain limits within the scope of subsequent societal changes (Ostrom, 1990). Ostrom mainly worked on the commons dealing with physical resources. Her studies were first focused on traditional common-pool resources: fisheries, grazing land, water and irrigation, forests and the like. She analyzed how self-organized communities could produce collective rules around shared and scarce resources for efficient and sustainable management. From this perspective, she chooses to follow Olson's (1965) approach by emphasizing the importance of working within small communities. She shows that the small size of a community is an advantage when trying to generate a capacity to escape the private for-profit and public types of property. Some authors notice in this assumption a way for her to extol the virtues of localism and her intent to develop an institutional analysis at the most granular level (Orsi, 2015).

In summary, in contrast to the assumption of mainstream economics that efficiency in production is ensured by profit-minded investors' monopolization of property rights, the concepts of the social economy and the commons converge under the assumption that other actors involved in economic activity have a legitimate claim to collective property rights. Such rights are for this reason divisible and can be distributed in different components. But such an original approach to property rights is not sufficient to launch a large process of transformation; it is limited to nooks or local situations. These micro-specificities do not influence meso and macro regulations.

In this second case, the approach to governance aims to be democratic and deliberative. The governance model seeks to distinguish itself from the market-based one. This difference is a means to offer an alternative and to open the door to institutional diversity. Thus, the governance process is able to build its own bundles of rights and to explore the diversity of property regimes through specific charters and legal statuses. By taking a step sideways, this governance model is endangered by its confrontation with the dominant market-based environment and to institutional isomorphism.

THE GOVERNANCE OF CSOs, THE SOLIDARITY ECONOMY AND THE NEW COMMONS

If the social economy is dedicated to the diversity of organizational forms, the solidarity economy extends this concern with ecological diversity by also identifying the diversity of economic principles. Solidarity economy theory is distinguished from social economy theory in that the former highlights economic and political pluralities. But the solidarity economy also emphasizes that collective actions have not only an organizational side but an institutional one as well. The founding members do not necessarily join together in order to deliver services; rather, they voluntarily engage in forms of public action (Laville and Salmon, 2015a). This leads to the articulation of two lines of research, one opened by Polanyi, the other by Habermas.

The first line of research examines the 'economistic fallacy' underscored by Polanyi, which states that the human economy is erroneously reduced to a mere market economy. By proposing the concept of substantive economics, Polanyi enlarges the scope by including redistribution and reciprocity in addition to exchange as forms of integration (Polanyi, 1957, 2011). By doing so, Polanyi gives researchers new lenses through which to study and analyze social enterprise and solidarity-based organizations (Eynaud et al., 2019; Roy and Grant, 2020). Markets have to be balanced by recourse to the principles of redistribution and reciprocity. Redistribution needs to be revalued as a resource-allocation system for everything that involves the public good. Exchange in the private sphere has to be converted into an impulse for equalitarian reciprocity in the public sphere. Thus, reciprocity for its part should be regarded as taking the commons into account: in a largely intangible and relational economy, trust based on mutual understanding can allow co-elaboration for creative and productive purposes. It is important in this regard to rehabilitate fully the collective power flowing from equality and reciprocity, which is learned and experienced in collective mobilizations (Cefaï, 2007), but also has an economic potentiality. The affirmation of a reciprocity that combines the 'spirit of the gift' (Godbout, 2000) with the concern for equality is moreover an antidote to philanthropy employed as the conscience of liberalism offering the idea of the 'gift without reciprocity' (Ranci, 1990).

Underlying the second line of research is the proposition that, while the deliberative spaces needed for implementing solid democratic mechanisms in solidarity-based organizations refer to their internal functioning, they should not be confined within the perimeter of these organizations. As Cumbers (2020) and Nyssens and Petrella (2015) have shown, social utility is usually multidimensional because it is a project embedded in organizational practices. Collective benefits are not produced only by economic activities, and democracy cannot be thought of as a positive externality. Furthermore, when democracy is explicitly claimed by solidarity-based organizations as being in the inner part of their project (Laville and Nyssens, 2001), it must not be considered as an extra component, but should be seen as an intrinsic dimension. Habermas's concept of the critical public sphere helps us to envision this (Habermas, 1991), but Habermas is too rigid when he refers economy exclusively to systems. As Fraser (1997) argues, like in the bourgeois public sphere, in popular

public spaces socioeconomic questions are at the centre of most of the debates. So, by connecting deliberative spaces to solidarity-based organizations communicative action can be included in a solidarity project and in an autonomous public sphere (Laville, 2011). Such local public spheres have to be complemented by intermediary public spheres that enable some of them to unite and to confront the dominant rules, in order to generate debate about the existing institutional framework and to promote a process of institutional change.

In parallel, Ostrom gradually moved away from Williamson's neoinstitutionalism to get closer to Commons' and Veblen's historical institutionalism (Laville and Salmon, 2015b, p. 182). This is reflected in her work when she acknowledges the existence of non-self-interested action, the effective role of institutions in the valuing process and the genealogical construction of the economy (Chanteau and Labrousse, 2013).

Ostrom moves from property to governance by carefully studying how to foster collective agreement, to allow the making of collective rules and to adopt control mechanisms. She assumes that free interaction between actors at the local level, spaces for open discussion and conflict resolution can foster the emergence of self-organization. Her approach is pragmatic. Her work draws on field observation, and she has analyzed a broad diversity of collective action forms and institutional arrangements (Ostrom, 2005). Her basic hypothesis is that if the members of a community have the opportunity to self-organize, they will gradually build an efficient and adaptive governance system. She details the procedures used by communities to produce practical rules and then experiment with, assess and modify them (Ostrom, 1990). She shows concretely that self-organized forms prove to be more effective for governing the commons than market- or state-based forms.

According to Ostrom (2005), the commons are characterized by a long adaptive process of trial and error. This process offers the conditions required to foster public expression and, by doing so, to protect the commons from individual interests. Ostrom and her colleague Hess introduce the knowledge commons as another example (Hess and Ostrom, 2006), as they analyze how free software can be considered as commons. They point out that such commons are not rival and that the question of size of the community is differently expressed. Along the way, knowledge commons develop specific collaborative tools.

In addition to traditional and knowledge commons, other commons have been identified: cultural commons, medical and health commons, neighbourhood commons, infrastructure commons, global commons and urban commons. Hess proposes to use the same label to name them all: 'new commons' (Hess, 2008). This label has the advantage of drawing attention to their respective virtues and to the need to define them more precisely. According to Hess, the growing number of new commons identified in the literature acknowledges our societies' high expectations for shaping responses to the challenges raised by globalization, commodification and privatization. Bollier (2014) posits that to face these challenges we need to liberate ourselves from market-based principles and promote a new epistemology for knowledge.

According to Ostrom (1990), specific conditions and particular goods drive the building of the commons. Dardot and Laval (2014) think that the standardization system is always at stake and that conflicts can arise because rules and laws are fields of struggle and mobilization. Therefore, these two authors suggest that Ostrom has to be questioned, and they propose a more conceptual discussion about the principle of the commons to think about its political constitution and about an alternative and widely feasible rationality.

For the 'new commons' literature, there is today an emphasis on 'collective action, voluntary associations, and collaboration in general' (Hess and Meinzen-Dick, 2006, p. 3). Even if property rights and the nature of the goods are still important, research conducted in the early twenty-first century also goes 'beyond property rights to address questions of governance, the participatory process, trust and assurance' (Hess and Meinzen-Dick, 2006, p. 3). Contributions written since Hess and Meinzen-Dick wrote their overview plead in favour of this convergence between solidarity economy and commons. Bauwens, for example, suggests creating 'global and open cooperatives' based on a new property model and multistakeholder governance. The goal of such cooperatives could be to co-produce commons (Bauwens, 2015; Bauwens and Lievens, 2016). The initiatives of citizens around the commons are designing new solidarity practices (Dardot and Laval, 2014). It is clear that discovering and combining different experiences is needed in order to preserve diversity and to open dialogue. As the solidarity economy theory does, the new commons framework shifts the discussion from an aggregative paradigm (based on individual preferences) to a deliberative paradigm.

Solidarity economy offers to the commons a relevant vantage point for rethinking economics and analyzing the pluralities of public action and democratic forms. The solidarity economy conceptual framework is indeed more oriented towards public action, political dimensions and interaction between CSOs and public authorities. As pragmatic approaches, both the solidarity economy and the new commons endeavour to enrich institutional diversity by promoting hybrid forms (Nyssens and Petrella, 2015). In this sense, the solidarity economy is very close to the commons initiatives.

At the same time, the solidarity economy has its own features. For one, a mix of resources—monetary, non-monetary and non-market resources—supports the solidarity economy. This allows many creative strategies towards hybridization of those resources. In addition, the solidarity economy acknowledges the crucial role of the public authority in defending the public interest and promotes strategies in which civil society and public authorities can co-create and co-produce public actions beyond statism.

For their part, commons are identified based on three main criteria: common-pool resources, a bundle of rights and a large variety of governance forms (Coriat, 2015). Thus, the commons theory is well suited to examine in detail the systems of rules chosen by self-organized communities at the local level, such as the peer-to-peer structures which characterize the digital space. The commons literature has gone more deeply into governance issues, which are relatively new to solidarity economy thinkers motivated by the need to better understand how hybrid and multistakeholder

Table 11.1 Three conceptual perspectives for governance models

	Third sector (or NPOs)	Social economy (or SEOs)	Solidarity economy (or CSOs)
Model of economy and society (or economic and social assumptions)	Private property and market principles	Collective property and equality in status (one person, one vote)	Substantive economy and emancipation
Theory of the commons	Residual role for common-pool resources	Focus on the bundles of rights	Emergence of new commons
Conceptualization of the third sector	Information asymmetries	Institutional approach	Pluralism and social transformation
Model of governance	Philanthropic governance	Democratic governance	Democratic governance with intermediary public spaces

organizations work (Borzaga and Depredi, 2015). Clearly, each approach can enrich the other. Solidarity economy theory and the new commons theory can be considered as two ways to get to the same destination.

By broadening the spectrum of governance models, this literature explores the interaction between pluralism and social transformation. The discovery of the new commons invites research into the diversity of governance models emerging through trial-and-error processes (see Mair and Wolf, Chapter 16 in this *Handbook*).

Table 11.1 summarizes key features of the three perspectives we have examined up to now.

COMBINING APPROACHES LEADS TO OPPORTUNITIES

When combining the solidarity economy and commons approaches, opportunities arise to renew critical thinking and open up the field of possibilities regarding CSO governance. These opportunities can be summarized in three points. First, they help to revisit history and especially to understand, using Hobsbawm's (1988) terms, how the late nineteenth century incorrectly reinterpreted the experiments of associationalism typical of the early nineteenth century. Second, this retrospective paves the way for escaping the dilemma between reform and revolution emblematic of the twentieth century through a renewed interaction between CSOs, social movements and the state. Third, these opportunities open a new path for a democratization process able to face the great challenges of the twenty-first century and engage in social and environmental transformation.

In terms of history, the convergence of the two theoretical approaches is more akin to a revival than the emergence of something new. To fully explain this, we need to go back in history. In the second part of the nineteenth century the theory identifying itself as scientific socialism was marked by economic determinism and obsessed with the role of the state; its political strategy was to take control of that state. As Mauss (1997) showed, scientific socialism mixed positivism and political fetishism. Therefore, it encouraged dismissing earlier forms of worker organization, pejora-

tively reframed as utopian socialism. According to Thompson (1966), this Marxism reduced to Bolshevism distorted the vision of reality. If utopian authors did inspire the labour movement, workers were also concerned with social experimentation and driven by the quest for a better life. The labour movement invented democratic solidarity, a social link based on voluntary actions of free and equal citizens. The former 'associationalism' is nothing more than workers' commons. The rediscovery of this forgotten history (Riot-Sarcey, 2016) shifts our perspective for analyzing current social changes. We need to get rid of the controversy between revolution and reform that grew large during the twentieth century. Regarding CSO governance, this attention to history validates governance models that refer back to the associationalism period during which democracy is intertwined with action, self-organization is driven into daily activities, and economy and politics are not separated (Laville et al., 2015; Eynaud et al., 2019). By going back into forgotten history, an opportunity appears to explore differently the concept of evolution and to escape from the reform–revolution dilemma.

Because revolution was designed through political fetishism, it vanished into totalitarianism, while reform was frozen by market domination. To prevent the threat of authoritarian regression, we now have to opt for one reform that is able to support strong transformative measures or one revolution that can be distanced from the metaphor of breakage. Following Mauss (1997, p. 265), it is important to acknowledge that a deep democratization process can be brought about not by disruptive change, but by building communities and new institutions alongside (and onto) the old ones. The reappropriation of history entails a new point of view. Unlike Bolshevism, associationalism was not built up on the idea of a 'new man' but on sociability forms, mutual help and cooperation. All these dimensions emerged from popular customs and were renewed through institutional inventions. Such a combination of the old and the new warrants our attention today.

Reevaluating associationalism eschews its elimination by proposing simply to moralize capitalism and to realize the full implications of a large number of initiatives which could stimulate society to self-transformation. In this perspective, the solidarity economy and the new commons exemplify the new pattern of citizen involvement. As Pleyers and Capitaine (2016) write:

> The distinction established in the 1970s and 1980s between classical movements, centred on mass organizations and demands of redistribution, and "new social movements" mobilized around questions of recognition is no longer relevant. The revolts of the 2010s are no longer "new social movements". They deeply mix economic, social, political and cultural claims, combined with a strong ethical dimension [generating] a renewal of solidarity, collective action and democracy. (p. 8)

It is astounding to see that public policies still do not interact enough with such initiatives. Two elements can explain this circumstance. On the one hand, some civil initiative promoters are refusing political mediation because they prefer autarky. As proven by all the examples, this stance leads definitively to a dead end. On the other hand, some political leaders are trapped in political reshuffling because they

lack popular support and are unaware of the impact of civil society initiatives. As shown by Gadrey (2010), civic engagement has to be channelled by large existing institutions. In rejecting the romanticism of social uprising, which idealizes political rupture, and in refusing the false realism of social democracy reduced to social liberalism, it is crucial to pursue democratic change through institutional change. This assumes a twofold recognition of the need to create new institutions as well as modifying the pre-existing institutional framework. These new institutions must work together and build a common ground.

Thus, CSO governance has to be open to multiagent arrangements where CSO governance bodies bring together public actors, social movements, private organizations and citizens in order to renew public action (Laville and Salmon, 2015a). In this process, CSO governance can foster new complementarities. Cross-enrichment can be explored through cooperation and autonomy. As the actors interact in these new forms of governance, another opportunity appears through a dual process: social movements can find a path towards more cooperation with public actors while the latter learn how to get out of their usual routines to match the expectations of social movements and to welcome and take up the novelty of their initiatives (Neveu, 2011). In this case, multistakeholder governance offers the opportunity for collective work and the possibility of social transformation.

Moreover, neither the SSE nor the commons can be a trustworthy alternative if it is contained in a sector left on the sidelines. It is only by claiming a political dimension that such propositions can foster social innovation around well-being for everybody (*buen vivir*) and support the reframing of public policies in order to engage in social and environmental transition.

What is interesting in the commons framework is the expansion of the institutional diversity of the initiatives. By emphasizing situational analysis, commons literature helps us to think of governance as a means to support the autonomy of the experiences. What is relevant for solidarity economy literature is that Ostrom's work spans both natural commons (irrigation systems, community forests, fisheries and the like) and knowledge commons (free software communities, open access movements and the like). Thus, it is a great opportunity to bridge sustainability studies with plural economy studies. But this is not an easy task. It requires a clarification about the commons and their facilities (Hess and Ostrom, 2003).

It raises also different questions about the type of social and technical infrastructures for such commons, their financial models and eventually their governance that is required to ensure that voices from the global South are included (Chan and Mounier, 2019). To take those important achievements into consideration, it is indeed crucial to overcome Western-centred habits and to accept that new avenues of change emerge from a dialogue between the global South and North (Eynaud et al., 2019). As recommended in the epistemology of the South (Sousa Santos, 2014), it is also important to build a comprehensive approach regarding the emerging social movements to work around the concrete potentials they engender.

TOWARDS CROSS-FERTILIZATION AND PLURALISM

The mainly market-driven economic model of the late twentieth century has provoked major social, ecological and cultural difficulties because it has generated a consensus around competitive principles advanced by theorists like Hayek (1983). We need now to increase our knowledge and to create connections between the different conceptual fields working in the avenues opened by the idea of the human economy (Hart et al., 2010), an economy dedicated to human needs and social relations. It can be done through a cross-cutting reflection around the SSE and the commons (Hess, 2015) and perspectives about CSO governance opening onto emancipatory pluralism (Laville et al., 2015).

With regard to history, we have seen that the theory of the commons can fit with the different conceptual and historical perspectives of the SSE. Therefore, this theory can both contribute to the rediscovery of the forgotten history, as we mentioned earlier, and look forward, especially in the new commons experiences, to the governance models referring to the associationalism period.

When it comes to reform and revolution, the theory of the commons is useful because it emphasizes the questioning of rules and the need to analyze the change of rules at the different levels where conflicts can occur. Thus, polycentric governance is relevant for exploring the different issues in conflictual areas and for trying to address them. Because this theoretical model is global but also takes into account the local level, it offers a new way to deal with the reform–revolution dilemma.

With respect to a better social and environmental balance, the theory of the commons is also valuable. Ostrom's seminal work was indeed dedicated to the natural commons and the issues surrounding their safeguarding. It showed the ability of self-organized communities to protect common-pool resources and the great diversity of their practices. The results of her work, based on observation of community-based organizations, can be extended to the SSE field. By considering the diversity of logics suggested by Polanyi (2011), economic pluralism can be pursued. Like biodiversity, economic diversity is of prime importance to the future of democracies. Democratic pluralism can be enriched by allowing a diversity of deliberative forms and a myriad of critical public spheres (Habermas, 1991; Fraser 1989, 2013). Governance pluralism can be the key to fostering self-organized communities and to consolidating multistakeholder organizations. Therefore, we should continue to explore CSO governance literature as a way to deepen democratic practices and open the path to the essential social and environmental transition.

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