7

Anti-popery: the structure of a prejudice

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I

Religion is back in fashion as an explanation for the English Civil War. This might seem unsurprising given the currency, until relatively recently, of the notion of the 'Puritan Revolution'. We are surely dealing here only with another revolution of the wheel of historiographical fortune of the sort produced by the institutionalized need for novelty of interpretation amongst professional historians. However, the interpretation now in vogue does not focus on the purposive, radical, even revolutionary ideology which earlier commentators liked to ascribe to the 'Puritans', but rather on the irrational passions and prejudices stirred up by the threat of 'popery'.

To take a few examples; Anthony Fletcher has written of two myths clouding contemporaries' perceptions and effectively concealing the enormous areas of common ideological ground still shared by the king and his opponents. The most pervasive and persuasive of these myths, according to Fletcher, was that of a popish plot to subvert the civil and religious liberties of England and it was the prevalence of this view that enabled parliament to mobilize support so effectively against the king. William Lamont has emphasized the sheer oddness and irrationality of anti-popery. Kevin Sharpe can only explain the extreme reaction of many Englishmen to the activities of William Laud (who, for Sharpe, was a simple Whitgiftian disciple of order and uniformity) by seeing it as a function of the irrational anti-popery of the period. John Morrill, too, locates the roots of conflict in the fanaticism of two relatively small group of religious engagés. His account can, at least, accommodate a positive role for the Puritan drive

for further reformation; Michael Finlayson has, however, effectively col-
lapsed Puritanism into anti-popery. For Finlayson Puritanism is a mere
chimera, produced by modern historians fixated on the so-called 'English
revolution' and consequently in desperate search for an appropriately
revolutionary ideology. As for anti-popery, it was a cloud of unknowing
through which contemporaries blundered into civil war. As such it can be
considered as a wholly irrational and unitary 'thing' which merely has to
be identified rather than analysed or explained.[1]

This emphasis on religious passion and anti-popish fear fits very neatly
within recent trends in 'revisionist' writing on the causes of the civil war.
For, if everyone wanted accommodation, if there were no major differences
of secular ideology dividing contemporaries, if radical Puritanism was an
illusion and religious innovation was a preserve of the Arminian right
rather than the Puritan left, and if the majority of even the ruling class
were more concerned with local than national issues, then the revisionists'
greatest need was for a positive explanation of conflict.[2]

I want here to provide a framework for re-evaluating the religious
component in the political crisis of the early seventeenth century, not by
resurrecting a view of Puritanism as a revolutionary ideology (although, as
Conrad Russell observed in 1973,[3] it was fulfilling that role by the early
1640s), but rather by examining the phenomenon of anti-popery. I want to
see it as, at least in England, the most obvious and important example of
that process of binary opposition, inversion or the argument from contra-
ries which, we are increasingly being told, played so central a part in both
the learned and popular culture of early modern Europe.[4] Certainly to
many, if not most, educated Protestant English people of the period popery
was an anti-religion, a perfectly symmetrical negative image of true Chris-
tianity. Anti-Christ was an agent of Satan, sent in to the Church to corrupt
and take it over from within. He was not an overt enemy like the Turk, but
rather rose by stealth and deception, pretending piety and reverence while
in fact inverting and perverting the values of true religion. For the Cam-
bridge Puritan divine William Fulke popery was tantamount to devil
worship, while for the conformist John Bridges it represented a more
serious threat to the true Church than the pagans, the Jews or the Turk.[5]

Since the Protestant analysis of popish anti-Christianity proceeded
through a series of binary oppositions, every negative characteristic
imputed to Rome implied a positive cultural, political or religious value
which Protestants claimed as their own exclusive property. Thus the Pro-
testants' negative image of popery can tell us a great deal about their
positive image of themselves. What follows is an attempt to read off from
their negative image of Rome the Protestants' own self image and then to
present anti-popery as a 'rational response' to situations in which values
central to that self image came under threat.[6] Whether the Protestant
image of popery was accurate is therefore a question of no significance

for the present enquiry. Clearly anti-popery was not an early exercise in the study of comparative religion. It was, however, a way of dividing up the world between positive and negative characteristics, a symbolic means of labelling and expelling trends and tendencies which seemed to those doing the labelling, at least, to threaten the integrity of a Protestant England.

II

The Protestant rejection of Rome was based fundamentally on a brutal dichotomy between the authority of man and the authority of God, the claims of the Church and the dictates of scripture, the creature and the creator. For Protestants popery had allowed merely human authorities, traditions and practices to take over the Church. The most obvious of these was the pope's usurpation of Christ's role as head of the Church.

Once established, the authority of the pope was used to set up and confirm in the Church a whole series of ceremonies, forms of worship and beliefs which were of entirely human origin. Crucial to the Protestant analysis of the falseness of these practices and beliefs was the concept of idolatry. That the worship of the one true God had been supplanted and subverted by the worship of his creatures was evident in the papists' reverence for the worship of idols and images, their use of the saints as intercessors and their virtual deification of the Virgin Mary. Perhaps the central example of this tendency toward idolatry was the doctrine of transubstantiation which sanctioned what Protestants contemptuously referred to as the 'bread worship' associated with the Catholic mass.[7]

Christ's sacrifice on the cross was no longer at the centre of popish belief and practice; the papists had substituted the doctrine of justification by works for one of justification by faith. Their insistence on the importance of religious works of human devising as a means to achieve salvation established hypocrisy as a central characteristic of popery. The guilt of virtually any sin could be assuaged and salvation attained through some form of external religious observance or act of clerical absolution.[8] Here Protestant treatments of popish attitudes to sex provide a useful encapsulation of the inverted, hall-of-mirrors quality that pervaded much anti-popish writing. For William Perkins the Catholic attempt to confer on celibacy a peculiarly exalted religious significance was a prime example of the pope's usurped and tyrannical claim to be able to set aside and alter at will the laws of God and nature, which had, after all, established marriage as an honourable estate. By so doing, of course, the papists forced many men and women into chaste lives for which they had no calling, with predictable results. Indeed, for many Protestants buggery became an archetypically popish sin, not only because of its proverbially monastic provenance but also because, since it involved the abuse of natural faculties and impulses for unnatural ends, it perfectly symbolized the wider idolatry at

the heart of popish religion. Again the Protestants made great play with the papists' notorious laxity towards heterosexual promiscuity, citing here the stews of Rome and the papal revenues produced by licensing them.[9]

The capacity of the clergy to extract a profit from the vicious cycle of hypocrisy and guilt which such beliefs produced provided the Protestants with a convincing sociological explanation for the rise of Popery. But if the prevalence of popery was based on the greed and vainglory of the clergy it was also founded on the ignorance and credulity of the laity. The surface glitter of popish ceremonies and images were all intended to appeal to 'the heart of carnal man, bewitching it with great glistering of the painted harlot'. Popery was a religion based on illusion and trickery. The mass itself was compared to conjuring or magic, as were the false miracles and powers of exorcism claimed for saints and the priesthood respectively. Crucial popish doctrines were also designed expressly to appeal to the corrupt common sense and self love of the natural man. Justification by works was 'an opinion settled in nature'; human self-love and presumption were fostered by the doctrine of free will and merit.[10]

Popery was, therefore, an anti-religion, whose rise in the Church and popular appeal the Protestants explained by the accuracy with which it reflected and played upon the weaknesses and corruptions of man's fallen nature. The differences between this anti-religion and true religion were described by Protestants in terms of a whole series of opposites or contraries; one was carnal, the other spiritual, one inward, the other outward and so on. Here I want to concentrate on the contrasts they drew between tyranny and liberty and light and darkness. The tyranny of popery consisted most obviously in the pope's usurped claim to be the head of the Church. Through the exercise of that claim he trampled on the rights and liberties not only of other bishops and patriarchs but also those of Christian princes.[11] However, the tyranny of the pope was not limited to the 'high politics' of Church government. It consisted also in the spiritual oppression inherent in popish religion, whereby the spiritual rights and liberties of ordinary believers were subverted and destroyed. Their sense of a full and free redemption in Christ was undercut by the popish stress on works; in consequence their consciences were oppressed by the vain human traditions and laws laid upon them by the pope and his clergy.[12]

Of course, this tyranny could not exist without the ignorance of the laity. The papists realized that their hold over the laity would not survive exposure to the clear light of the gospel and had in consequence always opposed the spread of 'good letters' amongst the learned and scriptural knowledge amongst the people. According to Perkins and others the papists really did believe that ignorance was the mother of devotion. Thus the division between popish tyranny and Christian liberty led straight into that between popish darkness and the light of the gospel.[13] For Protestants the Reformation was a gradual process of enlightenment

which, started by the likes of Wycliffe and Huss, culminated in the activities of the reformers of the sixteenth century and, in England, in the establishment of the gospel under Elizabeth. Protestants assumed that once the clear light of the gospel had been revealed to the people via the press and the pulpit it would inevitably cut a swathe through the clouds of ignorance and superstition left behind by popery.[14]

Thus Protestants claimed that while popery, through magic, symbols, false miracles and seeming common sense, appealed to the lower, carnal and corrupt side of human nature, their own religion sought to free all Christians from this world of illusion and inversion through the propagation of the unvarnished word. Obviously Protestant confidence in the power of the word was based primarily on the status of scripture as the divinely inspired word of God (and on God's promise that the action of the spirit would attend upon the exposition of his word from the pulpit). But there was also a sense in which Protestants regarded their faith as more rational, more internally coherent than popery. William Perkins, for one, was quite happy to prove that popery was self-contradictory. Transubstantiation was a nonsense, he wrote, involving as it did the simultaneous presence of Christ's body in heaven and in the bread and wine. Also contradictory were claims that man was saved by grace and then works and that sin was remitted by Christ only to be punished subsequently in purgatory.[15] The mindless acceptance of beliefs and practices merely because they had been held for centuries was also seen by Thomas Scott (the author of *Vox Populi*) and others as a defining mark of popish darkness. Faced with popish appeals to custom and tradition, Matthew Hutton, the future archbishop of York, replied that 'custom without truth is but old error'. In a culture which, we are often told, was dominated by the claims of custom and tradition the reformation of the Church gave contemporaries at least one prominent example of the reordering of established institutions and value systems according to the dictates of abstract criteria, rationally applied.[16]

Thus the whole Protestant view of popery not only associated it with a ritual-based vision of ignorance, superstition and unthinking traditionalism but it also appropriated for Protestantism an essentially word-based vision of rationality, enlightenment and knowledge. This opinion combined with the repudiation of popish tyranny both secular and spiritual revealed a strain of populism running through the centre of the Protestant image of Rome. Since true reformation could only be brought about as each individual came to a proper understanding and possession of his spiritual liberties and duties as a Christian, Protestant enlightenment was, almost by definition, popular enlightenment. In John Foxe's account of the struggle between the true and false Churches, underground groups of humble believers had kept the true Church alive while the ecclesiastical

hierarchy of priests and bishops, aided by the princes of this world, had proved the leading agents of persecution.[17]

The logical culmination of this populist strand was reached in Presbyterianism. Presbyterians saw the rule of one minister over another as a direct emanation of the pope's tyrannical rule over the Church; popery had removed not only the spiritual liberties of ordinary believers but also their civil liberties as Church members. For Thomas Cartwright the right to a say in the election of Church governors and in the conduct of Church government was one of the liberties bought on the cross by Christ for all Christians and subsequently removed by the rise of Antichrist.[18]

Despite such trends and tendencies it would be absurd to see the political legacy of anti-popery as unequivocally populist. After all Foxe himself had made it clear that a central element in the supposed tyranny of Antichrist was his usurpation of the just rights of Christian princes. Moreover, the resumption of those rights had a crucial role to play in the expulsion of Antichrist from the Church. While John Bridges denounced the power of the pope as absolute and therefore tyrannical he did not understand that tyranny to flow from denial of the rights of ordinary believers or ministers to a consent-giving say in ecclesiastical government. Rather it resided, firstly, in the pope's denial of Christian princes' just and God-given powers over the church and secondly in his claim to be able to dissolve and alter the dictates of both natural and divine law.

According to Bridges the powers lawfully exercised by sovereign Christian princes were limited, but only by the dictates of natural and divine law not by the consent of their lay or clerical subjects. In this way conformist writers like Bridges were able to denounce the pope's power as absolute and therefore tyrannical without at the same time committing themselves to a view of political power inherently limited by the ruler's obligation to seek the consent of the ruled. Rather for them tyranny was to be avoided by the subjection of the ruler's will to the laws of God and nature; a subjection to which the pope would not submit.

In part in reaction to the papists' claim about the power of the pope to depose princes and in part in reaction against Presbyterian opinions that had similar implications for religious and secular authority, conformist divines came more and more to emphasize the sovereign powers of Christian princes. Popish tyranny was thus to be avoided not by the retrieval of any popular liberties but by the vindication of the rights of sovereign Christian princes as ecclesiastical governors. In so far as such writers retained any vision of the Reformation as an open-ended process of change, a genuinely popular movement, they limited that vision to the spiritual sphere of individual conversion and collective growth in grace. For them the institutional consequences of the Reformation consisted solely of the prince's resumption of his or her powers over the Church and the use

of those powers to re-establish right doctrine. Of course, consent by both the laity and the clergy was presented even by the most drily conformist writers as a good thing. In practice, they claimed, English monarchs did govern the Church with the consent and co-operation of their (orthodox) subjects. However, the real difference between monarchic and papal power lay not in the consent of either the clergy or the laity but rather in the monarch's submission to natural and divine law.[19]

For these writers the extra-human origins of popery conferred an aura of eschatological significance on any régime that successfully contrived to resist it. The success of Elizabeth and James in expelling the pope, restoring the gospel, resisting the assaults of foreign princes and preserving England from the confessional strife which engulfed so many other countries all seemed to prove God's providential care for the English. They certainly provided many conformist defenders of the status quo with powerful arguments against Puritan attacks on the popish remnants within the English Church.[20]

To this can be added another central characteristic of popery in the eyes of English Protestants – it was foreign, involving allegiance to a foreign ruler (the pope) and acceptance of his right to excommunicate and depose Christian princes. The experiences of Elizabeth's reign served to associate popery indelibly with the aggression of foreign popish powers, particularly Spain. Precisely the same process of inversion and name-calling was applied by Protestants to the Spanish as had been used against the papists, a process which culminated, by the second half of Elizabeth's reign, in the so-called 'black legend' of Spanish cruelty and tyranny. Associated as it was with foreign powers, popery appeared to Protestants to be a solvent of the ties of political loyalty. In making that point Protestants tended to emphasize the populist theories of power which Catholic authors advanced to vindicate the rights of subjects to resist and remove heretical rulers. Politically, therefore, the legacy of anti-popery was decidedly ambiguous. Concern with the popish threat could prompt the development of authoritarian as well as of populist readings of the powers of the English crown and of the nature of authority in the English church.[21]

The legacy of anti-popery was also polemically ambiguous. In the debates between different strands of English Protestant opinion, Presbyterians used popery to emphasize the need to extend the process of reformation from the sphere of doctrine to that of discipline. Conformists invoked it to underwrite the essential soundness of the régime which had stood so long in the breach against Rome. Moderate Puritans and conformists both used it to play down the significance of the internal divisions among English Protestants in the face of the 'common adversary' and to stress the value, as a bulwark of order and obedience, of evangelical Calvinist preaching, even by nonconformists and erstwhile presbyterians.[22]

However, the ambiguity of anti-popery operated at deeper levels than the conscious polemical and political manipulations of contemporaries. Arguably the power of anti-popery as a source of ideological leverage and explanatory power was based on the capacity of the image of popery to express, contain and, to an extent, control the anxieties and tensions at the very centre of the experience and outlook of English Protestants. In part, the roots of those anxieties were obvious enough. There really was a popish threat to the autonomy of Protestant England for much of Elizabeth's reign. Under James the war with Spain ended, but as Tom Cogswell has pointed out, if the alarm over the Spanish Match is added to the traditional list which stretches from the Armada, through the gunpowder plot, the various invasion scares of the 1620s and the Irish revolt, then every generation of English people between the 1580s and the 1640s had personal experience of a popish assault on English independence.[23]

However, the anxieties which lay behind anti-popery had other, less obvious cultural roots. Kai Ericson in his seminal study of the witch craze in New England has argued that the production of such threatening ideal types of deviance and 'otherness' should be located within moments when the moral and cultural boundaries of groups or societies shift or are placed under threat. Clearly the reformation itself was just such a major shift. John Bossy has recently written of the sixteenth century as a period dominated by the emergence of an austerely word-and-doctrine-based view of true religion. In the English context the Protestant image of popery was perhaps the most important ideological means produced for explaining and controlling the strains associated with the transition to that word-based vision of true religion.[24] The image of popery as the natural religion for the fallen man drew on at least three elements within the situation of English Protestants. Firstly it explained and labelled as popish and undesirable the continuing appeal of ritual and symbol and visual imagery in a society still drenched in all three. Secondly it spoke to and helped to account for the pronounced religious conservatism of the English provinces;[25] and thirdly it keyed in with the Protestants' own very pessimistic view of human nature after the fall.

It has become increasingly obvious of late that the cultural struggles upon which English Protestants embarked at the Reformation lasted well into the seventeenth century.[26] This ensured that many of the anxieties about the potential popularity of 'popery', characterized in terms of what had become the inherently popish attributes of sin, sexual licence, superstition and the mindless acceptance of custom, retained their relevance for committed Protestants well into the seventeenth century. That relevance could only be heightened by the continued political threat from foreign popish powers and, increasingly under James and Charles, from popish influence at court. Insofar as this situation might rationally be taken to induce anxiety in Protestants, anti-popery allowed them to label,

externalize and hence to act upon that anxiety and, to an extent, therefore, to quell it.

Another parallel explanation for the prevalence and appeal of anti-popery in this period may be found in the political system and its ideology of consensus decision-making. The early seventeenth century was a period of increasing political conflict in parliament. While revisionist scholars like Conrad Russell have demonstrated that the parties to that conflict are not best seen as a monolithic government and opposition it remains the case that the parliamentary history of the early seventeenth century was hardly a story of untroubled agreement and co-operation between crown and parliament. And yet revisionists like Russell and Mark Kishlansky have convincingly argued that despite these difficulties the practical and ideological assumptions of contemporaries remained dominated by the need for agreement between the king and his subjects. Parliament, it seems, drew its prominence in the world view of contemporaries from its supposed capacity to bring about such unanimity and harmony. In view of all this the political history of the period must have come as something of a shock and a disappointment to contemporary observers.[27] Such a basic failure on the part of the political system to produce the goods for which it was supposedly designed called not only for disappointment, it called also for explanation.

Whether the failure of the ruling class assembled in parliament to meet the financial needs of the crown was due to ideological principle or penny-pinching localism or some mixture of the two, the fact remains that as the crown resorted to new and unparliamentary sources of revenue what Dr Sommerville has revealed as two mutually exclusive views of political authority were brought increasingly into conflict. It is perhaps worth reminding ourselves that there was an ideological as well as a financial logic which led from impositions to the forced loan and then to ship-money. Given the relationship in contemporary thought between liberty and property it was inevitable that, however great the impulse towards ideological agreement, the functional breakdown delineated by Professor Russell would bring with it ideological conflict. At the level of theoretical argument, as Johann Sommerville has shown, there was precious little room for compromise and yet the workings of the political system and the assumptions of contemporaries were still predicated on the need for agreement and the existence of ideological consensus.[28]

At this point the spectre of popery and popish conspiracy came to the rescue. For the popish threat provided an unimpeachably 'other', foreign and corrupt origin and explanation for conflict, to which those elements in the political system deemed noisome or divisive could be assimilated, while yet leaving the basic structure of the English political system and Church pure and unsullied. As the political crisis of the period deepened during the 1620s the extent of the ideological differences dividing contemporaries

came to be reflected in the development of an alternative conspiracy theory, this time centring on the threat of Puritanism.

We will return to that development below. For the present it is sufficient to note the way in which the Protestant image of popery allowed a number of disparate phenomena to be associated to form a unitary thing or force. That force could then be located within a certain eschatological framework, which, by explaining where popery came from, accounted for its awful more-than-human power, but did so in a way that made it quite clear that in the end Antichrist would fall and the gospel triumph. Viewed in this way, the world took on the shape of a progressive and therefore ultimately predictable struggle between Christ and Antichrist, and thus became the ground for the collective action of Protestants, who had been called together positively by their common apprehension of the truths of right doctrine and negatively by their common opposition to the threat of Rome. Popery thus became a unifying 'other' in the presence of which all those not directly implicated in the problem (popery) became part of the solution (non-popery).[29] In this way Protestants, who had started Elizabeth's reign as a minority (probably a small minority) had been able to produce an image of England as inherently Protestant because Protestantism's opposite, popery, was inherently foreign.

Until recently that image of England was associated with the notion of 'the elect nation', but as a number of scholars have recently pointed out, the whole idea of an elect nation was a theological nonsense for Protestants. While it was certain that ultimately Antichrist would lose and Christ would win, it was still an open question whether England would triumph with Christ or be destroyed with Antichrist. The answer depended on whether the English responded to God's commands expounded to them from the pulpit. If they did, God would protect them from the papists; if they did not he would surely use the papists as a stick with which to chastise his erring flock. Both here and in their vision of popery as appealing to those elements in human nature and contemporary society of which they most disapproved, committed Protestants were in grave danger of producing a perfectly circular argument. Elements in their objective situation were taken up and interpreted by Protestants as confirming central strands in their own view of the world, and in the process they produced an ideal type of deviance and evil against which all true Protestants should unite. This image was then employed as an ideological tool with which to label and repress the very impulses from which it was supposed to draw its strength and appeal. Thus what was an inherently purposive and dynamic vision of popery could be employed to underwrite an equally purposive and dynamic vision of further reformation, since only an active campaign against those things upon which popery fed could keep popery at bay.[30]

Whether the notion of further reformation thus canvassed was limited to the active propagation of the gospel and the repression of sin, or whether it was taken to include broader political and ecclesiastical initiatives, either way it is tempting to observe, paraphrasing Sartre's remark about anti-semitism, that if popery had not existed Protestants and, in particular Puritans, would have had to invent it.[31] Indeed, in one sense in the various images of popery that was precisely what they were doing. And yet popery did exist and intermittently throughout the period seemed to call into question the very existence of a Protestant England.

Among the committed minority the continuous cultural threats to Protestant values (compounded by the activities of recusants and missionary priests) were enough to keep the anti-popish pot boiling. However, at the popular level, as the researches of Dr Clifton have shown, anti-popery was crisis-related,[32] representing a symbolic means of dealing with an inherently foreign popish threat and latterly of expressing and controlling worries about internal divisions in terms of such a threat. While the anti-popish spasm lasted, the most committed Protestants were offered an opportunity to lead bodies of opinion far broader than those normally deemed Puritan. That, of course, was one of the things that happened between 1640 and 1642. In order to understand a little more of how and why that happened we need to turn to a more detailed analysis of the relationship between religious ideology and politics in early-seventeenth-century England.

III

From fairly early on in James' reign there were those about the king, including relative moderates like Ellesmere, who saw the crown's parliamentary difficulties as stemming from 'popular spirits' in the Commons who sought to reduce the power of the crown by playing up to the people. After the collapse of the 1610 parliament James blamed the Commons in the most acrimonious terms. By 1621 he was complaining of various 'firey and popular spirits' who had debated 'publicly of matters far above their reach and capacity tending to the high dishonour and breach of prerogative royal'.[33]

Conformist writers under Elizabeth had habitually associated a populist threat to monarchy with Puritanism. It was, however, possible to be worried about popularity and not to equate it with Puritanism. Ellesmere, for one, was a Calvinist with many moderate Puritan clients. However, it seems clear that for James the two concepts were integrally linked. Certainly in 1621 his complaints were centred on parliament's treatment of the Spanish match and the issue of the marriage of his son, the motivations for which were largely religious.[34] By 1626 an anonymous author was explaining the assault on Buckingham in parliament as the work of popular spirits

in the Commons who sought 'the debasing of this free monarchy'. Amongst the malcontents likely to support such a conspiracy the author numbered Puritans and sectaries. Moreover, he located the origins of this movement in the Presbyterian programme first canvassed in 1584. Here he was consciously keying into a rhetoric of anti-Puritanism which had been established in the 1590s during the campaign against Presbyterianism when it had been argued that, since the Presbyterian platform gave the people a considerable role in the election of ministers and the government of the Church, Puritanism was an inherently populist and thus subversive movement.

William Laud in his sermon before the 1626 parliament made this connection newly explicit, in the course of an assault on what he took to be a Presbyterian plot against authority in Church and state. Such sentiments bulked large in the printed works of Richard Montague in which he repeatedly attempted to persuade King James of the evils of English Calvinism and of the need formally to realign the theological position of the Church of England *vis à vis* the church of Rome.[35]

The agitation over the Spanish match reactivated James' fears of a Puritan plot against monarchy. A similar concern about a populist threat influenced Charles' decision to dissolve the 1626 parliament as Richard Cust has shown. Such fears, felt by both James and Charles, clearly presented the Arminians, with their vision of a populist Puritan conspiracy against all constituted authority, with a window of polemical opportunity. This they exploited to good effect at the end of one reign and the beginning of the next. However, men like Montague and Laud were moved by more than a desire to curry favour with the king; their vision of Puritan popularity was integrally related to their own positive image of what constituted true religion. According to Howson, Laud and Buckeridge the errors of Calvinism (labelled by the Arminians as distinctively and definitively Puritan) were contrary to all civil government in the commonwealth as well as 'preaching and external ministry in the church'.[36]

Why was Calvinism taken to be incompatible with good government? As a religion of the word it was thought to stir up the lower orders by giving them a spurious interest in matters above and beyond them. In particular the Arminians took the doctrine of predestination, so central to Puritan practical divinity and the spiritual experience of the godly, to lead either to desperation or still worse to presumption. The habitual division between the godly and the ungodly, and the equation of those two groups with the elect and the reprobate, which was taken to typify Puritan piety was regarded by Arminians as inherently divisive and likely to lead to all sorts of anti-nomian excess and political disorder on the part of the godly, whose spurious claims to a status based on 'grace' undercut existing hierarchies of political office, birth or property. To shut up all the worship of God in the hearing of sermons was fatally to underestimate the

value of outward ceremony, public prayer and the sacraments in the life of the Church. To this almost idolatrous addiction to sermons could be attributed the appallingly disordered state of many English parishes. Here, as elsewhere, the misguided enthusiasms of the Puritans fitted all too closely with the natural parsimony and anti-clericalism of the laity. The resulting chaos produced an irreverence not only towards God but also towards all constituted authority and where there was irreverence overt disobedience could not be far behind. Over against the Calvinist or Puritan emphasis on preaching the Arminians sought to elevate the role of worship – the solemn administration of the sacraments and public prayer – in the life of the Church. It was this predilection which prompted the liturgical experiments and innovations, the changes in the internal arrangements and decorations of many churches, to which their opponents objected so strongly in the late 1620s and 1630s. Not only did the Arminians take all this to be conducive to the beauty of holiness in the Church, they also believed that it would lead to greater respect for authority and obedience in secular affairs. Beliefs such as these underlay Laud's sermon to parliament in 1626 and his speeches at the show trials of the 1630s.[37]

Many commentators have got this far in their analysis of Laudian rhetoric, but of late they have tended to cut their argument short, to observe how misguided, even irrational, were Laudian fears of Puritan Calvinism.[38] Certainly Presbyterianism, either as a movement or even an expressed preference, was conspicuous by its absence from the Jacobean Church. This presented few difficulties for the Laudians, who, more convinced than recent historians of the existence of a distinctively Puritan strain of divinity, were quite happy to see in it the cunning of a subversive movement driven underground, waiting its chance under a thin veneer of formal and totally insincere conformity. In response to this view modern scholars have been quick to point out that Calvinism was little short of the received orthodoxy of the high Elizabethan and Jacobean Churches and that its carriers among both laity and clergy were essentially conservative pillars of the establishment in Church, state and locality. Certainly, it would be absurd, with the Laudian avant garde, to see men like George Abbot as crypto-Presbyterian or Puritan incendiaries or semi-republican enemies of monarchy. And yet there was a kernel of truth in the Laudian case. The whole cult of the godly prince and magistrate, to which nearly all Calvinists subscribed, was deeply ambiguous. Certainly it involved the exaltation of royal power but only within an eschatological schema predicated on the pope's identity as Antichrist and the Prince's opposition to popery. Thus when Sir Richard Grosvenor sang the praises of the English king as 'the immediate vice-gerent of God', subject to no rival or superior jurisdication in this world, he did so in the context of the struggle with Rome.[39]

What happened, however, if the Prince failed to live up to his divinely appointed role as the champion of the gospel and the hammer of the

papists? As doubts about the religious reliability of Charles I grew during the 1620s even relatively radical spirits like Henry Burton responded by simply increasing the stakes and assuring Charles that, of course, he must and would fulfil his role as a godly prince in the final struggle between Christ and Antichrist, which Burton felt sure would arrive during Charles I's reign. Yet by 1628 Burton was warning Charles not to slide from godly rule into its opposite, tyranny, and by 1636 he was expressing the sarcastic hope that the people would not conclude from Charles' actions that 'this king hath no regard to his sacred vows'. The logical culmination of this train of thought was reached in 1641 when Richard Baxter, convinced that Charles was implicated in the Irish rebellion, concluded that in effect the king had abdicated and thus become subject to legitimate resistance.[40] Of course in the second and third decades of the century such ultimate decisions were a long way off. Yet, given the tightly defined view of what constituted popery to which men like Archbishop Abbot subscribed,[41] and the context of confessional strife within which European diplomacy was increasingly being conducted, the role of the godly prince, at least as defined by many of his subjects, placed very considerable constraints on James' freedom of manoeuvre.

As Conrad Russell and a number of foreign ambassadors of the 1630s have all pointed out, during the sixteenth century various English monarchs had changed the religion of the nation more or less at will. James I was, however, unable even to arrange the marriage of his son to the Infanta without rousing a storm of protest from his subjects. Orchestrated by Calvinist bishops like Abbot and moderate and not so moderate Puritans like John Preston and Thomas Scott, the rise of a stolidly Protestant and rabidly anti-papal public opinion thus represented a real limitation on the crown's autonomy.[42] No monarch, who was not a Calvinist zealot, could be expected to welcome this intrusion on his or her traditional prerogatives. From that perspective the Laudian rhetoric which equated Calvinism with Puritanism and Puritanism with popularity and subversion must have taken on a new credibility.

IV

Of course from the outside looking in things appeared rather different. From the outset James's ecclesiastical policy had involved the representation at court of a wider range of religious opinions than had ever made it into the inner circles of the Elizabethan régime. In particular James admitted crypto-Catholics like the earl of Northampton to positions of real influence. Even amongst members of the establishment the activities of those men caused dismay; Archbishops Bancroft and Abbot both complained about the presence of papists and crypto-papists on the privy council. Nor was this alarm limited to the court; in 1614 Sir Peter Bucke

was hauled before Star Chamber for claiming that Northampton and other court Catholics had petitioned the king for a formal toleration for their co-religionists. Dark hints about Northampton's religious opinions appeared in some satirical poems by Thomas Scott, published in 1616. Commenting on news of the Overbury murder the Cheshire gentleman William Davenport noted that 'it is plain that my Lord of Northampton had he now been living would have had his head in shrewd hazard for he was a most dangerous traitor'. If Dr Peck is right that Northampton was innocent of any plot to addle the addled parliament then the fact that he was immediately blamed by the populace for its failure takes on renewed significance. Clearly by 1614 popular perceptions of politics cast Northampton in the role of evil counsellor; a role rendered concep-tually necessary by the need to account for parliament's failure – of which the addled parliament provides so spectacular an example – to bring the king and his subjects together. It was a role for which Northampton's known crypto-popery fitted him all too well.[43]

Of course it was the Spanish match that really sparked widespread worry about undue popish influence at court and that associated the notion of evil counsel with popery. Davenport passed smoothly from an interest in the spectacular scandal of the Overbury murder to concern over Spanish schemes to undermine English religion through a match with the prince.[44]

Some observers, perhaps more politically sophisticated than Davenport, developed a dichotomy between court and country of the classic sort. The court, argued Thomas Scott, as the ultimate source of power and wealth could not but attract ambitious, self-seeking men as well as foreign papists and ambassadors like Gondomar. The country, however, being relatively free from such influences remained uncorrupt, Protestant, patriotic. In order, therefore, to keep things within bounds, the virtue of the country had to be brought into contact with the actual or potential corruption of the court. The obvious way to do that was through parliament.

Parliament's importance thus rested on its status as a genuinely repre-sentative institution. For pamphleteers such as Scott and country gentle-men such as Sir Richard Grosvenor that status could best be guaranteed if each freeholder stood up and cast his vote according to the dictates of conscience, true religion and the common good. Since such strictures applied even to uncontested elections their significance would appear to have been as much symbolic as practical. Nevertheless, they represented the direct application to politics of the evangelical Protestant or Puritan view that if England were to stand before God as a genuinely godly commonwealth each individual believer had to internalize fully and act on the ground of his or her salvation. This applied with particular force to the need to oppose the mystifications and spiritual tyranny of Antichrist. Such notions must, therefore, have seemed particularly apposite to both

Scott and Grosvenor, whose crucial concern was indeed the need to counteract the influence of foreigners and papists at the centre of power.[45]

In all this we can see central elements in contemporary moderate Puritan or evangelical Calvinist thought becoming enmeshed with native traditions of representative government, centred on parliament, and concepts of active citizenship based on essentially classical models which members of the ruling class had encountered during their years at university. Again, it is not going too far to see the basic paradigm for all the lesser oppositions between good and evil counsel, the public and the private good, through which many contemporaries looked at politics, in the master opposition between Christ and Antichrist, popery and true religion. For, as we have seen, the Protestant image of popery contained within itself all those other oppositions and inversions, and popery as the ultimate model of false order was an awful warning of what would happen if the process of decay and corruption were not halted and the pursuit of the public good and true religion not placed above merely private concerns and gratifications. There was, of course, a basic structural similarity between the Protestant view of the effects of popery on the Church and, say, Sir Edward Coke's view of the effects of corruption on the commonwealth. In both cases a sinister force, based on the corruption of human nature, spread gradually through what had started out as a perfectly stable and sound institutional structure, until it was utterly subverted and undermined.[46]

Of course, it might be possible to write off the likes of Scott, if not of Grosvenor, as unrepresentative firebrands but for the fact that nearly all the central elements in Scott's religio-political outlook were shared by as central a member of the establishment as George Abbot. With Scott, Abbot saw popery as a genuinely international threat. He was consistently worried by the influence of papists and crypto-papists at court and passionately opposed to the Spanish match. Again like Scott, Abbot saw parliament as a crucial means to bridle the influence of popery at court, enforce the recusancy laws at home and provide money for war abroad. In moments of crisis, again like Scott, although not so openly, Abbot was quite capable of appealing to wider bodies of Protestant opinion in order to put pressure on the king.

There were, of course, differences between the two men, differences summed up by their diametrically opposed estimations of the United Provinces. Where for Scott the Low Countries were the epitome of the godly commonwealth and England's natural allies against popish Spain, Abbot was more suspicious. He particularly disliked the popular structure of their government in Church and state and blamed it, along with the Low Countries' venal tolerance of other religions, for the prevalence of Arminianism there. This seemingly small difference of opinion shows two very different attitudes towards popularity and hierarchy in Church and state in

general, and episcopacy in particular.[47] Twenty years later such nuances often made the difference between siding with the king or parliament. In the 1620s however, such definitive choices were a long way off and Scott and Abbot remained on essentially the same side, particularly as the rise of Arminianism raised the spectre of a crypto-popish fifth column taking over the Church from within.[48]

To committed Calvinists that was precisely what Arminianism looked like and not without reason. Arminian rejection of the central Calvinist doctrines of assurance and perseverance opened the way to what the godly regarded as a popish doubtfulness on the issue of personal salvation and an equally popish reliance on human works to merit salvation. Arminian deprecation of the sermon and revaluation of the role of ritual and outward reverence in the life of the Church also raised the spectre of popery, as did their agnosticism on the hitherto axiomatic identification of the pope as Antichrist. Add to that the undoubted prominence of Laud and Neile in the counsels of the King when the decision to resort to the forced loan was taken and their continuance in royal favour after the Parliament of 1628 and the grounds for implicating the Arminians in a popish plot against the secular and religious liberties of England become clear.

Whether one dates the emergence of Arminianism as a major issue in parliament relatively early in the 1620s or, with Professor Russell, somewhat later, it remains the case that by the end of the decade innovation in religion had become associated with an assault on the subjects' liberties.[49] That was no mere accident, a product of the contingent adoption by Charles I of an Arminian ecclesiastical policy, but rather the culmination of a longstanding ideological tension between the populist aspects of the English Protestant tradition and the desire in some circles to control and, indeed, even to suppress such tendencies. Thus Arminian religious opinions came to be associated with a jaundiced view of parliament and strongly absolutist accounts of royal power. This association was based on more than the politique consideration that parliament, left to its own devices, would have impeached the likes of Richard Montague or Roger Mainwaring. The link between the two positions, while scarcely rooted in the logical structure of Arminian theology itself, was founded on the polemical situation within which English Arminianism was formed and thus on the populist Puritan threat against which the Arminians felt themselves to be in reaction and the political values of hierarchy and obedience inscribed within Arminian piety itself.

On the other side, central elements in the Protestant image of popery rendered it an ideal polemical tool against a régime widely held to be adopting 'new counsels', antipathetic to the rights and liberties of the English. Men like Archbishop Abbot had long assumed that parliament could be relied upon to oppose popery and that in the struggle against crypto-popish influence at court an appeal both through and outside

parliament to wider bodies of opinion was a useful card to play.[50] Thus it was natural to assume that papists would oppose parliament and equally natural, if there seemed to be a move afoot to suppress parliaments, to look for popish involvement. Here practical politics intersected with Pro-testant theory, since, as we have seen, the arbitrary, unlimited and thus tyrannical power of the pope was seen as the result of a gradual erosion of the liberties of all Christians – an erosion parallel to that supposedly taking place in Church and state in England during the 1620s and 1630s.

Thus by the end of the 1620s there were two structurally similar but mutually exclusive conspiracy theories, both of which purported to explain the political difficulties of the period. The one was centred on a populist Puritan plot to undermine monarchy, the other on a popish plot to over-throw English religion and law. Both theories offered a way out of the political impasse of 1629 by providing an explanation of conflict in terms of the activities of relatively small groups of ideologically motivated men. Thus the integrity of the political system as a whole was left untouched and each side, by labelling the other as intrusive and un-English subverters of a settled system of government, was able automatically to legitimate its own position as the guardian of English good government. As Professor Russell has suggested, the failure to achieve or maintain political and religious unity could push contemporaries into a sort of collective anxiety fit, for which the conspiracy theory might provide a very effective placebo. And yet, as Dr Sommerville has shown, there were two mutually exclusive visions of the English political system current among contemporaries. By adopting either the popish or the Puritan conspiracy as an explanation for conflict contemporaries were hence doing more than deciding between more or less interchangeable models of deviance; they were choosing between two very different sets of political, cultural and religious values.[51]

V

These two parallel but mutually exclusive conspiracy theories provided the conceptual framework through which many contemporaries viewed the events of the 1630s and early 1640s. It was precisely in terms of an international Calvinist conspiracy against monarchy that the papal agent George Con and Archbishop Laud described the Scots revolt to Charles I. Both Dr Hibbard and more recently Richard Cust have concluded that Charles himself viewed events through these same ideological spectacles. Conversely, the researches of John Fielding have revealed fears of a popish plot centred on the court current in the provinces as early as 1637. It was precisely on such fears that Pym and the other leaders of the Long Parliament intended their propaganda to play.[52]

Of course, the whole notion of a popish conspiracy offered considerable advantages to the parliamentary leadership. It provided a compelling

explanation of the course of events from the 1620s until the outbreak of the war; an explanation which allowed them to put the blame for the political crisis squarely on the court and to excoriate the king's policies and advisers without directly attacking his person. A variant of the evil-counsellor argument, it had the advantage of not being limited to any one adviser or faction. Since popery was a principle of evil, with roots in foreign conspiracy and papal influence, it was infinitely extendable, retaining its explanatory force long after the fall of individual favourites like Laud or Strafford.[53]

Popery was not only able to perform this function within the political élite, it also struck a sympathetic chord among the populace. Riots, anti-popish panics and petitioning campaigns testified to popular concern over the issue, as the researches of Manning, Clifton and Hunt have all shown.[54] But how were these popular feelings related to the coherent ideological positions outlined in the first half of this essay? Of late we may have been seduced into taking too adversarial a view of the relation-ship between Puritanism and popular culture. It is certainly true that, when it suited them, Puritan ministers could use a brutally clear-cut division between the godly and the ungodly. Yet, as Eamonn Duffy has recently pointed out, they did so within a set of practical assumptions that left room for far more subtle distinctions between the different types or degrees of Christian profession. The ministers' use of the simple godly/ungodly dichotomy might best be understood, therefore, as a rhetorical device, designed to convince all those in some sense within the Church of how stark the choice that lay before them was and how seriously their duties as Christians had to be taken if they were to make good their membership of Christ's body and be saved. Many of the structures of thought and feeling employed by the ministers in this process may not have been so very different from those of their parishioners. Michael McDonald has suggested that popular views of illness and affliction as products of a cosmic struggle between light and darkness had much in common with the Puritan view of a world caught in struggle between God and Satan, Christ and Antichrist. Clive Holmes has made a related point, seeing Puritan and educated Protestant views of witchcraft as feeding off and attempting to control and organize more popular manichaean, even animist ways of looking at the world.[55]

As we have seen, anti-popery operated through precisely the same sort of binary oppositions and inversions as those underlying the attitudes to healing and witchcraft analysed by McDonald and Holmes. In particular, popish religious practices – the mass, miracles, exorcisms – were assimi-lated, via the pope's identity with Antichrist, to Satan. Like witches' maleficium, popish miracles and exorcisms were either simple tricks and illusions, or else, if they had any substance in reality, they were a product of Satan's complete mastery over second causes and natural forces,

employed to deceive the human eye and lead the simple or the unwary to spiritual destruction. Perhaps, therefore, popular anti-popery was the product of Puritan or educated Protestant attempts to organize and enlist for their own purposes deep-rooted popular traditions and ways of looking at the world.[56]

Certainly Dr Clifton's analysis of the structure of the normal anti-popish scare indicates similarities and parallels between these popular 'performances' and the élite 'scripts' analysed above. Panics were normally started by the suspicious antics, often reported by children, of strangers and outsiders, whose actions were seen as part of a popish, often an Irish popish, plot. Clifton attributes to the intense localism of the period this suspicion of people from outside the immediate community or neighbourhood boundary, but then goes on to note that such panics were clustered around the political crises between 1640 and 1642. That the panics and national political crises coincided so closely might be used for purposes other than the demonstration of the strength of localism. Rather it surely provides further evidence of provincial and popular sensitivity to national political events and the intense worry such crises could generate. Richard Cust's recent findings on the circulation of political news and rumour among the classes beneath the gentry would seem to substantiate this view and further to illustrate the way in which the passage of news and rumour at a number of social levels was gradually creating a genuinely national political consciousness in this period.[57]

In fact the role of strangers in many anti-popish panics fits rather well with what we know of anti-popery at higher social levels and in the propaganda of the Long Parliament. There popery worked as a unifying 'other', an inherently un-English or alien force whose intrusive influence within the English Church and political system brought disagreement and conflict in its wake. The role of strangers, often taken to be Irish, in popular panics, dramatized that otherness and the resulting panic expressed, directed and thus helped to control anxiety generated by political events at the centre. The result was cathartically unifying local action, the structures of thought and feeling underlying which were essentially the same as those that underlay the polemics of the most educated and sophisticated of contemporaries.

The popular violence and iconoclasm which accompanied some of these panics, as they have been described by Professor Manning and Dr Hunt, were scarcely the products of indiscriminate hooliganism. Rather, they were directed at what were taken to be ritually impure or threatening objects – either the possessions of known papists or the altar rails and images introduced into parish churches under Laudian rule and commonly associated with popery. As Hunt has shown, men and ministers who surely deserve the appellation Puritan were centrally involved in identifying those targets as popish and therefore objectionable. Nonetheless, it remains (at

least) questionable whether all those involved in these disturbances would, under normal circumstances, have numbered themselves or been numbered by others among the godly. John Ayly, who, as Jim Sharpe has shown, played a central role in the destruction of the altar-rails at Kelvedon, was a persistent offender in the local courts of a sort unlikely to have found a welcome in Puritan circles.[58]

That popular disturbances included both Puritan leadership and non-Puritan support illustrates rather neatly the relationship between Puritanism and anti-popery. For while anti-popery had never been anything like a Puritan monopoly, Puritanism had always enjoyed a peculiarly symbiotic relationship with popery. Popery, with its alleged preference for human as against divine authority in the Church, had always had a special part to play in the Puritan campaign to base the government and structure of the Church directly on the warrant of scripture and the divine authority it embodied. If Puritans were peculiarly sensitive to popish backsliding in matters of doctrine and ceremony, then the obverse side of that sensitivity had always been a rigorous concern for the personal and collective godliness and orthodoxy of the Christian community. The positive side of the rhetoric of Antichristian corruption was thus the rhetoric of edification and spiritual building. Moderate Puritans had always held that edification could take place within the rather imperfect structures of the national Church. But as the Laudian dominance of the Church, which Puritans regarded as the vanguard for popery, reduced those structures from morally neutral products of human reason and authority to corrupt, popish remnants (or innovations) Puritans came once again to associate edification with the total restructuring of church government, along austerely scriptural lines. That position had, of course, underlain Elizabethan Presbyterianism and by the late 1620s the process of regression to that earlier position had already started amongst the real radicals. Alexander Leighton in 1628, and then, through the 1630s, Burton, Bastwick and Prynne, all turned their backs on episcopacy and espoused the cause of ecclesiastical reform. By the early 1640s others were joining them in droves.[59]

How far such avant-garde notions of further reformation commanded a genuinely popular following is open to question. While the example of the London artisan Nehemiah Wallington shows that relatively humble men could and did espouse that cause with vigour, we can hardly assume that the likes of John Ayly and his friends were proto-Presbyterians.[60] Yet the fact remains that the political and polemical circumstances of the late 1630s and early 1640s conspired to allow Puritans to lead bodies of opinion which in normal times could scarcely be called Puritan. In short, the 'fused group' of the godly, whose unity was based on a common apprehension of the truths of right doctrine and on a recognition of one another as properly godly saints of God, had been placed at the head of the 'serial group' of

the non-popish, whose unity derived only from a common opposition to popery.[61] Since the grounds for and intensity of their opposition to popery might vary considerably from group to group and individual to individual this community of the non-popish was inherently likely to be short-lived. Any attempt to convert it into a politico-religious force over the long term would surely founder on those differences. And yet, as Anthony Fletcher has pointed out, in 1642 it was the short term which counted.

Once the war had started, both sides erected structures of command and coercion that were able to withstand the reduction, if not the disappearance of the popular passions of 1642.[62] They needed to, for during the 1640s and 1650s the coalition which had been created by applying the rhetoric of Antichrist to the Laudian church and the Caroline court gradually fell apart. Its popular support was eaten away, on the right, by the austerities of Puritan worship, the impact of civil war and the reformation of manners. On the left, the coalition fell victim to the inherently fissiparous nature of the Puritan search for first a scriptural and then a spiritual authenticity of belief and practice. This first disrupted the unity of the godly and then, by enlisting some of the hitherto unregenerate populace to the cause of spiritual enthusiasm, created a brand new cause for moral panic in the sects and the Quakers.[63] In the process, contemporaries, like Prynne, alarmed by the drift of events, developed new ideal types of deviance and spiritual degeneracy to control the forces and anxieties unleashed by these changes. It should not surprise us, in these circumstances, to find the old anti-type of popery put to new uses; as phenomena as disparate as the regicide and the rise of the Quakers were attributed to some Jesuit plot to divide and rule.[64] Along with many other fixed points on the polemical map of pre-war politics, anti-popery was transformed by the turmoil of the interregnum and thus made available as a free-floating term of opprobrium. Even so, that should not blind us to the fact that before 1642 popery had a limited meaning to contemporaries as a polemical signifier or label, defined by its place in a longstanding ideological code.

It has been argued here that that code was itself a product of a dialectical process. Populist elements in the conventional Protestant image of true religion and the struggle against popish tyranny and ignorance prompted a political, theological and cultural reaction which reached its apogee in the Laudian church and the Caroline court. The seemingly popish nature of that reaction in turn strengthened the radical populist strain in English protestantism which it was designed to suppress. In the resulting turmoil anti-popery did not simply determine political attitudes, still less allegiances in the civil war. It was and always had been more than possible, with Archbishop Abbot or Lord Montague, to oppose both popery and popularity.[65] During the 1630s, however, to many outside the court the threat from the former must have seemed rather greater than that

from the latter. But once the many-headed monster was loosed in massed demonstrations and petitions, once the principles of hierarchy and degree, enshrined in episcopacy, were called into question, things might look very different. For many, the choice between the king and parliament may have devolved into a choice between popery or a populist Puritanism as the greater threat to order. Certainly much of the propaganda put out by the king and parliament seems to have been predicated on that assumption.[66] And yet in that choice we have travelled a long way from an irrational panic or knee-jerk response to a non-existent popish threat. Rather, we are confronted with a choice between two competing sets of social and political, as well as religious, priorities and values.

That choice may not often have been approached in a spirit of rational detachment, but that need not surprise us given what was at stake. Certainly anti-popery appealed to people's emotions. It did so because it incorporated deeply held beliefs and values and it helped to dramatize and exorcize the fears and anxieties produced when those values came under threat. But that, surely, is what political ideologies do, and it is from their capacity to do it that they derive their ability to motivate and mobilize large numbers of people. It is, of course, always tempting to overestimate the 'rational' element in our own choices and to write off the ideologies of others as irrational. It is particularly easy when, as in the case of anti-popery, most of the carriers of that ideology are either dead or in Northern Ireland. If, however, we wish to understand a central strand in the political and religious history of seventeenth-century England it is a temptation we must resist.

Notes

1 A.J. Fletcher, *The Outbreak of the English Civil War* (London, 1981), pp. 407–19; K. Sharpe, 'Archbishop Laud', *HT*, 33 (1983) pp. 26–30; M. Finlayson, *Historians, Puritanism and the English Revolution* (Toronto, 1983), *passim*; J.S. Morrill, 'The Religious Context of the English Civil War', see above chapter 6; for Professor Lamont's opinion see his review of Caroline Hibbard's *Charles I and the Popish Plot* (Chapel Hill, 1983) in the *London Review of Books* (21 July–3 Aug. 1983).

2 This paragraph represents a perhaps rather crude pastiche of the views put forward in C.S.R. Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics, 1621–9* (Oxford, 1979) and J.S. Morrill, *The Revolt of the Provinces* (London, 1976).

3 C.S.R. Russell, *The Origins of the English Civil War* (London, 1973), pp. 24–6.

4 See S. Clark, 'Inversion, Misrule and the Meaning of Witchcraft', *P&P*, 87 (1980). Also see P. Burke, *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe* (London, 1978), esp. pp. 185–91. For the use of inversion in popular religious propaganda see R.W. Scribner, *For the Sake of the Simple Folk* (Cambridge, 1981).

5 On the currency of the belief that the pope was Antichrist see C. Hill, *Antichrist in the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 1971). By far the best discussion of the

theological issues involved is R.J. Bauckham, *Tudor Apocalypse* (Abingdon, 1978). For popery as devil worship see W. Fulke, *The Text of the New Testament* (Cambridge, 1589), p. 881; 'they that worship Antichrist worship the devil not in their intent (for Antichrist boasteth himself to be God) but because they worship him who hath the power of the devil and serveth the devil in deceiving the world'. On popery as worse than paganism, Islam or Judaism see J. Bridges, *The Supremacy of Christian Princes* (London, 1573), pp. 952–3; on Antichrist's gradual rise to power in the church see W. Whitaker, *An Answer to the Ten Reasons of Campion the Jesuit*, translated from the original Latin by Richard Stock (London, 1606), p. 172. On the deceit involved, see Whitaker, *A Disputation of Holy Scripture* (Cambridge, 1849), pp. 20–1.

6 What follows is based on a variety of sources, but especial attention has been paid to one particular genre – the true confessions of Catholic renegades, converted or reconverted to Protestantism. Designed for a fairly low-brow audience, these pamphlets represent rather crude exercises in inversion and thus afford a view of the stock Protestant attitudes to Rome. This procedure has been borrowed from Dr Robin Clifton. See his article in Russell (ed.), *Origins of the English Civil War*, pp. 148–9. The renegade tracts used here are J. Gee, *The Foot out of the Snare* (London, 1624); Thomas Abernathy *Abjuration of Popery* (Edinburgh, 1638); J. Wadsworth, *The English Spanish Pilgrim* (London, 1630); R. Sheldon, *The Motives of Richard Sheldon Priest for his Just, Voluntary and Free Renunciation of Communion with the Bishop of Rome* (London, 1612) and *A Survey of the Miracles of the Church of Rome* (London, 1616).

7 Idolatry was central to the Protestant vision of popish corruption. Perhaps the basic text is the homily on idolatry in *Certain Sermons Appointed by the Queen's Majesty* (Cambridge, 1850), pp. 167–272. Also see Bridges, *Supremacy*, pp. 476–495; Sheldon, *A Survey*, p. 76, for the notion of 'bread worship', pp. 91–3; Sheldon, *The Motives of Richard Sheldon*, pp. 80–1, 85. On papists as idolators, *Works of Richard Sibbes*, ed. A.B. Grosart, 7 vols (1862–4), II, pp. 379–81; W. Perkins, *Works* (Cambridge, 1626) I, pp. 400, 676–94.

8 W. Whitaker, *Ad Nicolai Sanderi Demonstrationes* . . . (London, 1538), pp. 112–14; for Bridges the papists' doctrines of salvation by works not faith infringed the liberty and glory of God and led to popish doubtfulness; it stood, in fact, as a type for their wider preference for human rather than divine authority. See his *A Sermon Preached at Paul's Cross on the Monday in Whitsun Week, 1571* (London, 1573), pp. 36–7; also see Perkins, *Works*, I, 397–8. On hypocrisy based on the priestly power of absolution, see Gee, *Snare*, pp. 9–10; Wadsworth, *The English Spanish Pilgrim*, p. 28; Sheldon, *A Survey*, pp. 51–3.

9 Perkins, *Works*, I, p. 401; on sexual looseness as a peculiarly popish trait particularly in 'monkish cells' see Bridges, *Supremacy*, pp. 302–3; Sheldon, *A Survey*, pp. 17, 51–3, 134–7, 141, 192; Sheldon, *The Motives of Richard Sheldon*, pp. 85, 151, 155–6, 159.

10 According to Bridges in his Paul's Cross sermon (9), the papists had invented purgatory 'for lucre'; Gee, *Snare*, pp. 49–53; Sheldon, *A Survey*, pp. 51–2; Sheldon, *The Motives of Richard Sheldon*, pp. 77–83; Perkins, *Works*, I, p. 401. For the quotation about the carnal man, see W. Clarke, *An Answer to a Jesuit* (London, 1580), sig, B8; see also Sibbes, *Works*, IV, p. 357; on popish magic and enchantment, see Gee, *Snare*, pp. 41, 49–53, 62, 72; Wadsworth, *The English/Spanish Pilgrim*, pp. 76–7; see also Reginald Scott, *The Discovery of Witchcraft* (Wakefield, 1973), pp. 365–80; on the fit between popish doctrine

and corrupt human nature, see Perkins, *Works*, I, pp. 398–9; T. Scott, *The Highways of God and the King* (London, 1623), pp. 13–15; John Bridges agreed that the papists' rejection of the orthodox Calvinist doctrine of predestination showed typical popish presumption in making the will of God (expressed in election) subject to the will of man (expressed in the presence or absence of human merit) and thus appealed to human vainglory. *A Sermon*, 30–1, 36–7, 76–7, 81. See also Bridges, *Supremacy*, p. 517.

11 Bridges saw the presumption inherent in popish attitudes to justification and election as typical of a wider presumption which expressed itself in the usurpation of God's power over the Church and an aspiration 'to be equal to kings'. *A Sermon*, pp. 37, 127–30. For the pope's tyranny, defined as the denial or usurpation of the prince's powers, see Bridges, *Supremacy*, pp. 65, 228, 592, 765; see also T. Bilson, *The True Difference between Christian Subjection and UnChristian Rebellion* (Oxford, 1585), pp. 68, 349, 437; Perkins, *Works*, I, p. 399; Sheldon, *A Survey*, p. 186; Sheldon, *The Motives of Richard Sheldon*, 'To the Christian Reader'. The pope's claim to supremacy and infallibility in the church and his power to depose princes were at the centre of Sheldon's reasons for turning against Rome.

12 Bridges, *Supremacy*, pp. 455–7, where the papists' oppression of the church with superstitious ceremonies is compared to that of the pharisees. Also see p. 476 and Sheldon, *The Motives of Richard Sheldon*, p. 140; the tyranny of the pope is here defined in terms of the deprivation of the people of a saving knowledge of scripture.

13 Bridges, *Supremacy*, pp. 160–70, describes popery as a clerical conspiracy to keep the prince and people in ignorance; p. 396 notes the refusal of the papists to explain the sacrament to the people through the reading of scripture. Perkins, *Works*, I, p. 399; Gee, *Snare*, p. 84, describes the papists as 'blind guides and lovers of darkness more than the light' who (pp. 36–7, 41) used a 'foreign idol gull composed of palpable fiction and diabolical fascination, whose enchanted chalice of heathenish drugs and Lamian superstition hath the power of . . . Medea's cup to metamorpise men into bayards and asses' in order to 'gull, terrify and amaze the simple, ignorant people' into 'admiration of their priesthood, the sanctity of their attire and the divine potency of their sacrifice'. Richard Sheldon likewise saw the papists' reliance on false miracles to convert the people as rooted in the paucity of scriptural backing for their faith (*A Survey*, preface to the reader). They were 'children of darkness' who deal 'covertly and will not come to the light because they fear reproving'. The glory of the mass in particular was based on popular ignorance, as was the rise to power of the pope. See Sheldon, *The Motives of Richard Sheldon*, pp. 65–6, 129–31, 140.

14 For John Foxe see N.V. Olsen, *John Foxe and the Elizabethan Church*, (Berkeley, 1973) and for the eschatological framework within which these attitudes were developed, see Bauckham, *Tudor Apocalypse*. For the belief that 'as ice melteth at the rays of the clear sun' so popish error would be dispelled by the gospel, see Bridges, *Supremacy*, p. 459. Such optimism was not confined to conformists; a group of puritan ministers gathered together in 1589 concluded that the downfall of Antichrist, prophesied in scripture, was already taking place 'in the hearts and consciences of men' through the preaching of the word. (See Cambridge University Library, MSS Hh. VI 10, fo. 21 f.) Even Josias Nichols who, as a parish minister of long standing, knew the difficulties of converting ignorant papists and atheists, was convinced that where a learned minister was assiduous in 'preaching and private conferring' with the people

the gospel would triumph; a point he made by comparing the progress of the relatively well-taught south with the ignorance and popery of the untutored north. See J. Nichols, *The Plea of the Innocent* (1602), pp. 219–25. As I have observed elsewhere, the Protestant attitude to popery contained a nice balance between optimism and pessimism. Isolated quotation of the pessimistic statements of Protestants about the prospects of the gospel cannot be used to 'prove' the 'failure' of protestant evangelism.

15 Thus Protestant criticisms of popery revolved around the juxtaposition of the merely human authority of the Church and the divine authority of scripture. For a very clear statement of that position, see Whitaker, *Disputation of Holy Scripture*, pp. 415, 440–50; for popery as contradictory see Perkins, *Works*, I, pp. 402–4; to this can be added the constant Protestant allegations that the appeal of popery consisted in magic, enchantment, illusion, all of which contributed to a vision of popery as 'irrational'. See note 13 above for references.

16 Matthew Hutton, *A Sermon Preached at York before Henry Huntingdon* (London, 1579), fos. 4^r–6^r; Thomas Scott, *The Highways of God and the King*, p. 13.

17 This summarizes the argument of Jane Facey, 'John Foxe and the defence of the English church' in M. Dowling and P. Lake (eds), *Protestantism and the National Church* (London, 1987).

18 J. Whitgift, *The Works of John Whitgift* (Cambridge, Parker Society, 1851–53), I, pp. 405–6.

19 See Facey, 'John Foxe' and J. Bridges, *Supremacy*, pp. 657, 784, 806.

20 J. Bridges, *A defence of the government established in the church of England for ecclesiastical matters* (London, 1587), pp. 763, 765. Such arguments were not limited to conformists and anti-Presbyterian polemicists like Bridges. Robert Some, an erstwhile puritan, made the same points against the separatists. See R. Some, *A godly treatise containing and deciding certain questions moved of late in London and other places touching the ministry, sacraments* . . . (London, 1588), pp. 17–18 and *A defence of such points in Robert Some's last treatise as Mr Penry hath dealt against* (London, 1588), pp. 58–9.

21 On popish disloyalty, see Bridges, *Supremacy*, pp. 70–1, 74; Bilson, *The True Difference*, pp. 101, 109; Thomas Scott (the elder), *Christ's Politician and Saloman's Puritan* (London, 1616), pp. 24–5; Wadsworth, *The English-Spanish Pilgrim*, pp. 72–3; Sheldon, *A Survey*, p. 267 for the 'abominable regicides, rebellions, treasons, civil commotions, prophanations of churches, ruin of kingdoms' produced by popery; for the identification of Spanish monarchy and tyranny as the equivalent and concomitant of the tyranny in the Church of the pope, see Thomas Scott, *Vox populi or news from Spain*, sig. A3–B3; for the black legend, see W. Maltby, *The Black Legend in England* (Durham, NC, 1971), *passim*. For popish theories of resistance, see P. Holmes, *Resistance and Compromise* (Cambridge, 1982); for the increasingly absolutist response of English polemicists to this challenge, see J. Sommerville 'Jacobean political thought and the controversy over the oath of allegiance' (Ph.D thesis, University of Cambridge, 1981).

22 For moderate puritans, see P. Lake, *Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 55–76; also see Nichols, *The Plea of the Innocent*, pp. 148–87; for moderate conformists, see P. Lake, 'Matthew Hutton: a Puritan Bishop?', *Hist.* 64 (1979) and Bridges, *A Defence*, pp. 172, 1336. Hard line conformists, however, sought to assimilate Presbyterian clericalism to that of the papists, see R. Bancroft, *Dangerous Positions* (London, 1593), pp. 2–3.

For the Presbyterian use of the popish threat and the notion of the discipline as the natural culmination in the realm of outward government of a reformation already complete in terms of doctrine see, for instance, *An humble motion with submission unto the right honourable lords of her majesty's privy council* (1590) sig. C4ᵛ and F3ᵗ. On the argument that Protestant preaching, even by Puritans, was a bastion of order in the face of popular irreligion and popery, see D. Zaret, *The Heavenly Contract* (Chicago, 1985), pp. 81–9.

23 See T.E. Cogswell, 'England and the Spanish Match', in R.P. Cust and A.L. Hughes (eds), *Conflict in Early Stuart England* (1989), pp. 107–33 and C. Hibbard, *Charles I and the Popish Plot* (Chapel Hill, 1983).

24 K. Erikson, *Wayward Puritans* (New York, 1966); J. Bossy, *Christianity in the West, 1400–1700* (Oxford, 1985); for another anti-type, developed to express and control anxiety about certain types of belief and behaviour, see M.C.W. Hunter, 'The Problem of Atheism in Early Modern England', *TRHS*, 5th ser., 35 (1985). Interestingly some contemporaries lumped papists and atheists together as threats to the cause of true religion, see, for instance, Nichols, *The Plea of the Innocent*, pp. 218–22.

25 On popular conservatism, see C. Haigh, 'The Continuity of Catholicism in the English Reformation', *P&P*, 93, (1981); see also C. Hill, 'Puritans and the Dark Corners of the Land', *TRHS*, 5th ser., 13 (1962).

26 For the introduction of the 'reformation of manners' as an organizing concept in the study of English Protestantism and society, see C. Hill, *Society and Puritanism in Pre-revolutionary England* (London, 1964); for more recent repetitions and refinements of Hill's position, see K. Wrightson, *English Society, 1580–1680* (London, 1982), esp. chs 6 and 7, and D. Underdown, *Revel, Riot and Rebellion* (Oxford, 1985).

27 Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics*, esp. ch. 1; see also M. Kishlansky, 'The Emergence of Adversary Politics in the Long Parliament', (chapter 2 above); see also his *Parliamentary Selection* (Cambridge, 1986).

28 J.P. Sommerville, *Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–40* (London, 1985); Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics*, pp. 49–53, 64–84.

29 P. Lake, 'The Significance of the Elizabethan Identification of the Pope as Antichrist', *JEH*, 31 (1980); 'William Bradshaw, Antichrist and the Community of the Godly', *JEH*, 36 (1985).

30 On the 'elect nation', see Bauckham, *Tudor Apocalypse*, pp. 70–3, 86–8.

31 J-P. Sartre, *Anti-semite and Jew*, transl. G.J. Becker (New York, 1948).

32 R. Clifton, 'Fear of Popery', in Russell (ed.), *The Origins of the English Civil War*; and 'The Popular Fear of Catholics during the English Revolution', *P&P*, 52 (1971).

33 L.A. Knafla, *Law and Politics in Jacobean England* (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 186, 254–62; HMC, *Report on the Mss of the Marquess of Salisbury (at Hatfield House)*, vol. 21 (1970), p. 266; J.R. Tanner, *Constitutional Documents of the Reign of James I* (London, 1930), p. 279. I owe these last two references to the kindness of Richard Cust.

34 Knafla, *Law and Politics*, pp. 54–5; K.C. Fincham and P. Lake, 'The Ecclesiastical Policy of James I', *JBS*, 24 (1985).

35 'To his sacred majesty ab ignoto' in *Cabala sive scrinia sacra* 3rd edn (London, 1691) pp. 255–7; Laud, I, pp. 63–89, esp. pp. 82–3; R. Montague, *A Gagg for the New Gospel? No: a New Gagg for an Old Goose* (London, 1624) and *Appello Caesarem* (London, 1625). For detailed reference see note 37 below. For Elizabethan anti-Puritan and anti-Presbyterian polemic see my *Puritans*

and Anglicans? Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker (London, 1987).

36 Laud, VI, pp. 244–6, Laud, John Howson and John Buckeridge to Buckingham, 2 Aug. 1625; see also Laud, VI, p. 249, Montaigne, Neile, Andrewes, Buckeridge and Laud to Buckingham, 16 Jan. 1626; on the role of the fear of popularity in the genesis of the forced loan, see Richard Cust, *The Forced Loan and English Politics, 1626–1628* (Oxford, 1987), pp. 13–30, 39–51.

37 For the identification of the doctrine of predestination with Puritanism and of Puritanism with popularity and Presbyterianism, see Montague, *Appello Caesarem*, pp. 7, 23, 39, 42, 43, 60, 72, 111, 114, 118, 182, 213, 320; for the equation of order and reverence in the Church with order and reverence in the state and the argument that the word-based Puritan style of religion was inherently irreverent and disordered, see M. Wren, *A sermon preached before the king's majesty on Sunday 17 February last at Whitehall*, (Cambridge, 1627); see also Isaac Bargrave, *A sermon preached before King Charles March 27, 1627* (London, 1627) *passim* and esp. pp. 4–5, 14; Laud, I, pp. 63–89; for Laud's conviction that there was a populist Puritan plot on foot during the 1630s, see S. Foster, *Notes from the Caroline Underground* (Hamden, Conn., 1978), and for the same assumptions applied on the local level by Robert Sibthorpe, see V. Stater, 'The Lord Lieutenancy on the Eve of the Civil Wars: The Impressment of George Plowright' *HJ*, 29 (1986). For Laudian changes in the internal arrangements of churches in Cambridge and the opposition it aroused, see D. Hoyle, 'A Commons Investigation of Arminianism and Popery in Cambridge on the Eve of the Civil War', *HJ*, 29 (1986).

38 See, for instance, Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics*, pp. 26–34 or P. Collinson, *The Religion of Protestants* (Oxford, 1982), *passim*. Such claims are, of course, in many ways quite justified and certainly to be preferred to the assumption of an inherent Puritan radicalism.

39 R. Cust and P. Lake, 'Sir Richard Grosvenor and the Rhetoric of Magistracy', *BIHR*, 54 (1981).

40 For Burton, see B.S. Capp, 'The Political Dimension of Apocalyptic Thought', in C.A. Patrides (ed.), *The Apocalypse in English Renaissance Thought and Literature* (Manchester, 1984). For Baxter, see W. Lamont, *Richard Baxter and the Millenium* (London, 1979), pp. 76–119.

41 K.C. Fincham, 'Archbishop Abbot and the Defence of Protestant Orthodoxy', *HR* 61 (1988), pp. 36–64. I should like to thank Dr Fincham for letting me see this article in advance of publication.

42 Fincham, 'Archbishop Abbot'; P. Lake, 'Constitutional Consensus and Puritan Opposition in the 1620s: Thomas Scott and the Spanish Match', *HJ*, 25 (1982); for John Preston, see C. Hill, 'The Political Sermons of John Preston', in *Puritanism and Revolution* (London, 1958) and I. Morgan, *Prince Charles' Puritan Chaplain* (London, 1957). See Cogswell, 'England and the Spanish Match'.

43 Fincham and Lake, 'Ecclesiastical Policy of James I'; P. Clark, *English Provincial Society from the Reformation to the Revolution: Religion, Politics and Society in Kent, 1500–1640* (London, 1977), p. 316; T. Scott, *Philomythologie* (London, 1622); CCRO, CR 63/2/19, fo. 9^r; L.L. Peck, *Northampton* (London, 1982), p. 210.

44 R.P. Cust, 'News and Politics in Early Seventeenth Century England' (chapter 9 below); CCRO, CR 63/2/19, fos. 2^r–14^v for the Overbury scandal; fos. 14^v–18^r, on the fate of Raleigh; fos. 24^r–25^v, 27^v–28^r, 35^r for the Spanish match; fos. 43^r–59^v

for the impeachment of Buckingham. Throughout, Davenport associated evil counsel with popish plotting.

45 Lake, 'Thomas Scott' and Cust and Lake, 'Sir Richard Grosvenor'. See also R.P. Cust, 'Politics and the Electorate in the 1620s', in Cust and Hughes (eds), *Conflict in Early Stuart England*.

46 S. White, *Sir Edward Coke and the Grievances of the Commonweal*, (Manchester, 1979), pp. 38-9; Lake, 'Thomas Scott'.

47 Lake, 'Thomas Scott'; Fincham, 'George Abbot'; for Abbot's dislike of the Low Countries, see PRO, SP 105/95, fos. 4^v-5^r, Abbot to Dudley Carleton, March 22, 1617/18; for Scott's very different estimation of the Dutch, see in particular his *The Belgic Pismire* (1622).

48 It is perhaps worth noting that there was a conceptually necessary vacancy in the attitudes of many contemporaries for crypto-popish evil counsellors, a vacancy which the Arminians were exceptionally well qualified to fill. See note 44 above. As early as 1616 Richard Sheldon had complained of the activities of 'hypocrite clergy . . . which being neither hot nor cold God doth cast out of his mouth and would God this church had or could spew them out'. (See Sheldon, *A Survey*, 'Preface to the reader').

49 Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics*, pp. 406-8; N.R.N. Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinists* (Oxford, 1987). See also Dr. Tyacke's review of Caroline Hibbard's *Charles I and the Popish Plot* in *Albion*, 16 (1984), pp. 49-50.

50 Fincham, 'George Abbot'.

51 Russell, 'Arguments for Religious Unity in England, 1530-1650', *JEH*, 28 (1967); 'The Parliamentary Career of John Pym, 1621-29', in P. Clark, A.G.R. Smith and N.R.N. Tyacke (eds), *The English Commonwealth* (Leicester, 1979); Sommerville, *Politics and Ideology*.

52 Hibbard, *Charles I and the Popish Plot*, p. 95; Cust, *The Forced Loan*, ch. i, conclusion. John Fielding, 'Opposition to the Personal Rule of Charles I: the Diary of Robert Woodford', *HJ*, 31 (1988), pp. 769-88. I should like to thank John Fielding for letting me read and cite his paper on Woodford and Richard Cust for showing me an unpublished paper on the role of the fear of popularity in Charles' relations with parliament both in the 1620s and in 1640.

53 S.R. Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution* (Oxford, 1951), pp. 206-7, 216.

54 B. Manning, *The English People and the English Revolution* (London, 1976), pp. 33-59; W. Hunt, *The Puritan Moment* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), ch. 11; R. Clifton, 'Fear of Popery' and 'The Popular Fear of Popery'.

55 M. McDonald, 'Religion, Social Change and Psychological Healing in England, 1600-1800', in W.J. Sheils (ed.), *Studies in Church History*, vol. 19, 1982; C. Holmes, 'Popular Culture? Witches, Magistrates and Divines in Early Modern England', in S. Kaplan (ed.), *Understanding Popular Culture* (New York, 1985); E. Duffy, 'The Godly and the Multitude in Stuart England', *Seventeenth Century*, 1 (1986).

56 Sheldon, *Survey*, pp. 39-40; see also W. Whitaker, *Praelectiones . . . de ecclesia* (Cambridge, 1599), p. 348 and *Ad Nicolai Sanderi demonstrationes*, pp. 168-171.

57 R. Clifton, 'Fear of Popery' and 'The Popular Fear of Popery'; Cust, 'News and Politics'.

58 Manning, *English People*, pp. 189-96; and Hunt, *Puritan Moment*, ch. 11; J. Sharpe, 'Crime and Delinquency in an Essex Parish', in J.S. Cockburn, *Crime in England, 1550-1800* (London, 1977).

59 P. Lake, 'Identification of the Pope as Antichrist'; P. Christianson, *Reformers*

and Babylon (Toronto, 1977), chs 4 and 5; see also Capp, 'The Political Dimension of Apocalyptic Thought' and W. Lamont, *Marginal Prynne* (London, 1963), pp. 11–84.

60 P. Seaver, *Wallington's World* (London, 1985), ch. 6; that there were also respectable supporters of 'further reformation' amongst Ayly's Essex neighbours is clear from J. Sharpe, 'Scandalous and Malignant Priests in Essex; the Impact of Grassroots Puritanism', C. Jones, M. Newitt and S. Roberts (eds), *Politics and People in Revolutionary England* (Oxford, 1986).

61 J.-P. Sartre, in his *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, distinguished fused groups, those united by a common world-view or political or emotional project from serial groups, those united only by their relation to an external object (like the members of a bus queue, united only by their relation to the approaching bus). Opposition to popery clearly evoked stronger emotions than waiting for a bus and yet the community of the non-popish scarcely fulfilled the criteria of the fused group. The different conceptions of and attitudes to the popish threat operative in the early 1640s prevented that common sediment of agreement from providing the basis for a genuinely fused group, united by a positive religio-political programme and a common core of spiritual experience.

62 Fletcher, *Outbreak of the English Civil War*, Conclusion; R. Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort* (London, 1982), pp. 201–3; A. Hughes, 'The King, the Parliament and the Localities during the English Civil War' (Chapter 10 in this volume).

63 J.S. Morrill (ed.), *Reactions to the English Civil War* (London, 1982), pp. 89–114; for the splintering effect on the left see C. Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down* (London, 1972); and F. McGregor and B. Reay (eds), *Radical Religion in the English Revolution* (Oxford, 1984).

64 On the emergence of the stereotype of the quaker as populist incendiary and anti-nomian threat to order, see B. Reay, *The Quakers and the English Revolution* (London, 1985), ch. 5; see also J.C. Davis *Fear, Myth and History; the Ranters and the Historians* (Cambridge, 1986), which argues that the ranters were, in effect, a polemical invention, produced to label and control the threat posed to order by the sectarian left. For the role of the reworked version of the popish threat in all this see W. Lamont, *Marginal Prynne*, ch. 6 and *Richard Baxter*, pp. 109–13. See also I. Thackray, 'Zion Undermined; the Protestant Belief in the Popish Plot during the English Interregnum', *History Workshop Journal*, 18 (1984) and S.A. Kent, 'The Papist Charges against the Interregnum Quakers', *Journal of Religious History*, 2 (1982–3).

65 For Montague see Esther Cope, *The Life of a Public Man: Edward, First Baron Montagu of Boughton, 1562–1644* (Philadelphia, 1981).

66 Manning, *English People*, pp. 59–83, 249–58; D. Hirst, 'The Defection of Sir Edward Dering', *HJ*, 15 (1972); B.H.G. Wormald, *Clarendon; Politics, History and Religion* (Cambridge, 1952). For an example of the royalist propaganda, predicated on the existence of a populist Puritan and Presbyterian threat to order see Sir Thomas Aston, *Remonstrance against Presbytery* (London, 1641).