Topic outline
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“European politics”
Course outline
Lydia Aly
The course outlines contemporary European Politics along 3 main axes:
1. The emergence of political parties and the sociological order that contributes to its continuous evolution.
2. The historical stages of European construction, and the “Europeanization” of political parties.
3. The contemporary crises that affect the European model.
Part 1: “The old and new cleavages”: the sociohistorical crystallization of contemporary political parties in Europe:
· The theory of cleavages: From Lipset and Rokkan to Inglehart.
· Classical/ traditional cleavages: Right/ left/ extremist.
· Recent evolutions of party systems:
1. Environment/ Green
2. Gender (3rd vague movements/ #Metoo)
3. Race: the civil rights movement and “the subaltern politics”
Discussion: National vs European: What matters most?
Part 2: The European construction: European integration and its impact of national political parties:
· History of the EU construction: special focus on the creation of the European Parliament (A supra- national integration model. Redefining sovereignty from a European perspective: institutions/ co- legislation procedure).
· Redefinign national versus European parties : how did European Politics find their ways into programs of national political parties and vice- versa?
· Focus of European Parliament: 2024 Elections and its tremendous implication on national levels (special focus on France and Germany).
Discussion: Is European integration a new historical “Revolution”?
Part 3: What went wrong? Crises affecting/ Limits of European integration: Redefining political parties position along national and supranational perspectives:
· Enlargement: Going to the west? Going to where? (Cases of Turkey, Georgia).
· Foreign and Defense Policy: Nato/ USA- Russian war on Ukraine.
· Brexit
· Migration
· Democracy and Human Rights.
Discussion: Pause and reflect on concepts such as “Europeanization”, “common defense and security policy”.
Free Discussion to end the Course: Europe and the Middle East.
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Lectures 1- 2
· The theory of cleavages: From Lipset and Rokkan to Inglehart.
· Classical/ traditional cleavages: Right/ left/ extremist.
- all contemporary democracies are representative.
- Instead of deciding directly, voters choose, through regular elections, a number of politicians to set policy and govern them. In other words, they fully delegate the power to make decisions and to supervise those decisions to their representatives for a given period of time, that is, until new elections are held. In turn, those future elections are roughly the only, albeit probably imperfect, mechanism to discipline policy makers to act on behalf of the voters’ interests
- political parties are a pervasive phenomenon in representative democracies. Factional coordination or the stable cooperation of political representatives came into being shortly after the formation of the West modern assemblies: in the United States since the 1780s, in France in the next year of the French Revolution, in Britain through the opposition of Tories and Whigs (Les Whigs étaient composés par des dynasties de dirigeants aristocrates de foi essentiellement protestante, d'où émergea ensuite des industriels et des marchands riches, alors que les Tories étaient associés à la landed gentry, l'Église d'Angleterre et l'Église d'Écosse).
- By the time the First World War started almost all electoral contests and parliamentary struggles pivoted around well-organized parties in all representative democracies
Current Theoretical Literature
Sociological Accounts
- In a path-breaking study published in 1967, Lipset and Rokkan emphasized the heterogeneity of interests and social groups to explain the emergence of different party systems in Western Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Lipset and Rokkan 1967):
- They claimed that the number and relative strength of different parties across European nations was determined by two crucial historical events: a national revolution, that is, the construction of modern, secular nation-states; and the industrial revolution.
- As the state elites engaged in the construction of a single administrative apparatus, a centralized bureaucracy and a national standardized culture, they faced the resistance of two social groups—the members of territorial peripheries that opposed the process of centralization and the Catholic Church, which was in danger of losing its properties, educational structures, and in some instances its direct influence over state policy. In turn, the industrial revolution, with the emergence of manufacturing societies and the parallel growth of cities, generated two additional dimensions of conflict: between countryside and cities (mostly around trade policy) and, within the latter, between the owners of capital and workers.
- The capital–labor conflict eventually emerged in all countries—and acquired full political significance with the full extension of universal suffrage. By contrast, the specific nature and the strength of the other three kinds of conflict (territorial, religious, and rural–urban) varied across Europe.
- The type of political parties that formed varied across countries as a function of those dimensions of conflict. To name a few examples, religious conflict was considerable in most Catholic countries as well as in those countries where there was a significant Catholic majority. But it was fundamentally absent in Scandinavia. Trade policy played a central role in the latter and in most large states but not in countries such as Belgium or the Netherlands
In those countries where the Reformation triumphed and the state controlled the national Protestant Church, the central conflict hinged around trade issues and the opposition of land versus town. In Britain landholders and the established Church coincided in the Conservative Party against a Liberal Party based on urban interests and Nonconformist Protestants. In Scandinavia, the urban center confronted the landed areas (and, in some cases, the dissident churches). Catholic countries experienced in turn a split between clerical and anticlerical parties and each of these was intertwined with the land–urban cleavage in different forms. Those countries sitting on the border between Protestant and Catholic Europe, that is, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, combined both worlds—with the electoral support of each party clustered in particular geographical areas.
they stressed both the temporal and the institutional factors at play in the formation of parties: they insisted on the rules that governed participation and representation during the nineteenth century; and they emphasized that parties were ultimately the result of choices made by elites about what groups they would ally with.
they postulated a set of ‘‘cleavages’’ and they derived from them several actors or groups (in the administrative, economic, territorial, and religious arenas) of universal application to explain Western Europe. And they even described the types of alliances (or, more precisely, the restrictions on the alliances) that could be struck among those diVerent groups.
Limits of the Sociological Account
1-some critics of the sociological approach question entirely the assumption that voters have a set of pre-existing preferences that politicians represent in a direct, immediate manner. They contend, instead, that identities and political preferences do not exist as objective data waiting to be channeled and mobilized by certain parties and that it is in fact politicians and parties that shape identities.
—voters are an ignorant set, at most endowed with private motives or passions, which an ambitious politician articulates around some ideological principle to serve his own private interests.
- politicians are not ideologically motivated actors that seek to represent certain interests and implement their policy preferences. They are, instead, vote-maximizing entrepreneurs who, calculating which types of issues may increase their electoral support, choose what groups to politicize and mobilize and in what ways.
this radical critique of the sociological theories of identity formation and mobilization has gathered steam in recent years to explain the formation of new cleavages in democratizing nations in the former communist bloc and the Third World.
Similarly, political constructivists generally present voters as fools that can be easily manipulated by politicians. Yet they are logically inconsistent in how they build their theory: whereas they break the central tenet of instrumental rationality for voters, they do not for political elites, which they assume to be fully strategic in their behavior
In short, to explain party systems we need to understand the type and distribution of preferences of voters, that is, the nature of the policy space.
2-political parties cannot be seen as the unmediated reflection of social and economic interests for at least three reasons.
- First, voters care about multiple issues—and their positions on the latter are not necessarily correlated in the same direction.
- Second, parties may break a straightforward relationship between the economic position of voters and the policy that would result from automatically satisfying their interests through the construction of broader policy bundles (higher public spending on education to compensate for trade openness)
But they may end up voting for a free trade candidate if the latter credibly promises compensatory mechanisms (such as vocational training) to adjust to future global shocks (Boix 2006a).
- Finally, most decisions of voters about whom to support are mediated by their beliefs about the effects that certain policies will have on their welfare.
Thus, a substantial portion of the low-income voters may end up voting for conservative parties if they believe that low taxes and laissez-faire policies, which in principle reduce the amount of net transfers they will receive from the state and weaken any protective regulations in the labor market, are the best mechanism to generate growth and raise their income in the long run.
At first sight, new parties seem to emerge whenever the electoral market changes abruptly فجأة— either because substantial numbers of new voters participate in the polls (due to a change in franchise rules حق الانتخاب- حق دستوري ) or when the interests of significant portions of the electorate change (for example, after massive migrations to the city or sudden political realignments precipitated by war). Yet, by and large, the formation and consolidation of new parties takes place only when their candidates are able to break the ‘‘expectations’’ advantage that the existing parties tap into to sustain their leading position. This can only happen if the entering parties enjoy sufficient organizational strength to mobilize their electors and move them away from the old equilibrium (in which they voted or are going to vote for one of the old parties because it was viable) to a new equilibrium (in which they support the new party). EX: the irruption of socialist parties in Europe followed the decision of trade unions to shift their support away from (left-leaning) liberal politicians to social democratic candidates.
Voters’ Preferences: The Franchise and the Space of Competition
In response to the nationalization of political life, politicians coordinated into permanent parliamentary (and, later, electoral) parties according to two key factors: FIRST, the space of electoral competition, that is, the economic and religious preferences of voters;
and, second, the sequence and pattern of electoral mobilization. I deal with the Wrst factor in this subsection. I discuss the timing of mobilization in the next subsection
Two main political conFLicts structured the space of electoral competition. On the one hand, the electorate divided over the regulation of economic life by the state. On the other hand, voters often split on the role the state should have on education and the creation of a common national culture
INGLEHART: NEW FORMS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION :
Voting is not the only way to act. For nearly twenty years, Ronald Inglehart has been announcing the shift from “elite-directed” to “POLITICS THAT DIRECT THE ELISTES”.
This would be evidenced by the "increasing rates of political discussion, an increase in unconventional forms of political participation and the rise of new social movements", as well as the propensity of citizens to act through ad hoc structures, outside of existing institutions (Inglehart, 1993, p. 411). The diffusion of post-materialist values, the rise in the level of information have increased the autonomy of citizens in Western democracies. They are less inclined to accept the mediation of elected representatives and parties, but more ready to mobilize directly for the causes that are close to their hearts.
-IN THIS COURSE WE ARE KEEPING AN EYE ON WESTERN SOCIEITIES, HOWEVER SOME EXAMPLES FROM MIDDLE EAST MAY BE MORE DEMONSTRATIVE. NOT BECUZ THESE FORMS OF NEW POLITICS DO NOT EXSIT IN EUROPE, BUT BECUZE THEY MIGHT BE A TOOL OF EXPRESSION USED BY SOCIETIES IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (ARAB SPRING/ NEW FORMS OF ENGAGEMENT).
Inglehart theorised that industrialization leads to related changes such as mass mobilization and diminishing differences in gender roles. Changes in worldviews seem to reflect changes in the economic and political environment, but take place with a generational time lag.
Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society
Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). Economic, technological, and sociopolitical changes have been transforming the cultures of advanced industrial societies in profoundly important ways during the past few decades. This ambitious work examines changes in religious beliefs, in motives for work, in the issues that give rise to political conflict, in the importance people attach to having children and families, and in attitudes toward divorce, abortion, and homosexuality. Ronald Inglehart's earlier book, The Silent Revolution (Princeton, 1977), broke new ground by discovering a major intergenerational shift in the values of the populations of advanced industrial societies. This new volume demonstrates that this value shift is part of a much broader process of cultural change that is gradually transforming political, economic, and social life in these societies. Inglehart uses a massive body of time-series survey data from twenty-six nations, gathered from 1970 through 1988, to analyze the cultural changes that are occurring as younger generations gradually replace older ones in the adult population. These changes have far-reaching political implications, and they seem to be transforming the economic growth rates of societies and the kind of economic development that is pursued.
Modernization and Postmodernization
In Modernization and Postmodernization (1997) Inglehart argued that economic development, cultural change, and political change go together in coherent and, to some extent, predictable patterns. Inglehart theorised that industrialization leads to related changes such as mass mobilization and diminishing differences in gender roles. Changes in worldviews seem to reflect changes in the economic and political environment, but take place with a generational time lag. Following industrialization, advanced industrial society leads to a basic shift in values, de-emphasizing instrumental rationality. Postmodern values then bring new societal changes, including democratic political institutions and the decline of state socialist regimes.
Rising Tide
Written with Pippa Norris, Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) examines how the twentieth century gave rise to profound changes in traditional sex roles. This study reveals how modernization has changed cultural attitudes towards gender equality and analyzes the political consequences. It systematically compares attitudes towards gender equality worldwide, comparing almost 70 nations, ranging from rich to poor, agrarian to postindustrial. This volume is essential reading to gain a better understanding of issues in comparative politics, public opinion, political behavior, development and sociology.
Sacred and Secular
Inglehart's 2004 book with Pippa Norris, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide reexamines the secularization thesis. This book draws on a base of new evidence generated by four waves of the World Values Survey executed from 1981 to 2001 in eighty societies, covering most of the world's major faiths. Examining religiosity from a broader perspective and in a wider range of countries than have been done before, this book argues that religiosity persists most strongly among vulnerable populations, especially those in poorer nations and in failed states, facing personal survival-threatening risks. Exposure to physical, societal and personal risks drives religiosity. Conversely, a systematic erosion of traditional religious practices, values and beliefs may have occurred among the more prosperous strata in rich nations. But at the same time, a growing proportion of the population—in both rich and poor countries—spends time thinking about the meaning and purpose of life. It is argued that in developed countries, the established churches are losing their ability to tell people how to live their lives, but spiritual concerns, broadly defined, may be becoming increasingly important.
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Political parties in western Europe: New tendencies
N.B.: On far right meeting in Madrid/ 8 February 2025.
- Patriots for Europe, the far-right group created in July in the European Parliament, held its first summit in the Spanish capital on Saturday. From Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to French far-right leader Marine Le Pen, all see Trump as a harbinger of future victories for their camp.
- where a dozen leaders from European far-right parties gathered on Saturday, February 8, for the first summit of the new Patriots for Europe (PfE) group. This movement, created in the European Parliament in July 2024 around the party of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and France's Rassemblement National (RN), brings together 86 MEPs, making it the third-largest force in Strasbourg.
- The slogan chosen, "Make Europe Great Again," is a direct reference to Donald Trump's "Make America Great Again" (MAGA). And the shadow of the Republican's victory in the US presidential election hung over the event. Not all the leaders present shared the same admiration for the US president as that shown by the leader of Spain's far-right Vox party, Santiago Abascal, who described Trump as a "comrade-in-arms in the battle for good, for truth, common sense and freedom," or by the vice president of the Italian council, Matteo Salvini (League), for whom "Trump has shown that the common-sense revolution is possible." Yet all celebrated his victory as a sign of a global shift in their favor.
- At some point, you have to look at what's happening in the world today: Milei, Trump, Orban, Meloni, our Austrian allied party is in the lead, we're in the lead, our Flemish friends are in the lead. We need to analyze this, and I think we're witnessing a kind of renaissance," said Marine Le Pen, a few minutes before the big rally attended by almost 2,000 people. On stage, the French far-right leader called for "the global disruption" that Trump's victory represents to "sound the awakening of the Old Continent." "This power challenge is an urge to exist in the world that is
- The Madrid summit was the first since the appointment of Spain’s Santiago Abascal as leader of the European party in November. The PfE now aims to secure majorities in national governments and EU decision-making, where only Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán currently holds a seat in the Council of the EU, representing the 27 member states.
"We have to do what Trump has told us, fight, fight, fight. We have to reconquer a Europe that is ours and that belongs to us. A Christian Europe," André Ventura, leader of the far-right Chega party in Portugal, said.
Le Pen also stressed that the election of Donald Trump cannot be analysed as a simple shift in a democratic country. "We are facing a truly global turning point (...) Everyone understands that something has changed. Meanwhile, the European Union seems to be in a state of shock," she said.
The PfE says it is founded on national sovereignty, traditional values, and the defence of free speech and security. It consist of Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (France), Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz (Hungary), Matteo Salvini’s Lega (Italy), Geert Wilders(The Netherlands), and Andrej Babiš (Czechia), among other parties.
In the European Parliament, Patriots for Europe has 86 MEPs and is the third largest group after the European People's Party (EPP) and the Socialists and Democrats (S&D).
We need a return to realistic policies based on a free market and strong nation-states,” said Petr Macinka from Czechia’s Motorists for Themselves party.
Neither liberals, nor progressives, nor socialists — “only patriots can make Europe great again,” Macinka added.
Czechia’s Andrej Babiš echoed these sentiments, arguing that mainstream parties are failing the EU. “They tell us Europe will be competitive, yet they impose regulations that strangle businesses and citizens,” he said.
Ten PfE leaders also discussed strategies for dismantling the Green Deal and the rainbow flag representing LGTBIQ rights, implementing their family and two-gender only policies, and expanding their influence across the EU.
They also hosted Kevin Roberts, president of the American conservative think tank The Heritage Foundation, and aired video messages from Venezuelan politician María Corina Machado and Argentina’s President Javier Milei.
“Patriots is a transatlantic party, but we are also open. It is not just an alliance with the North— the United States—but also with the South. That is where VOX plays a key role, bridging the connection with Milei and Peña,” VOX's Spanish MEP Jorge Buxadé told Euronews on Friday.
Buxadé emphasised that under Santiago Abascal’s leadership, one of the party’s main goals is to support each other in winning elections. “We are no longer just the future—we are the real, immediate future,” he declared.
GREEN PARTIES:
Once a fringe movement (MARGINAL), green parties are increasingly shaping the debate in countries around the world. How influential are they, and what comes next?
Green parties—once seen as radical outsiders—have increasingly claimed a place in mainstream politics, especially in Europe. Greens around the world have evolved from single-issue environmentalists into broad-based political parties capable of winning elections and serving at the highest levels of government.
With climate change a pressing issue and traditional parties losing support to various alternatives, greens are positioned to play a greater role than ever. In Germany, the world’s fourth-largest economy, they hold some of the government’s highest positions, including the foreign ministry, and have been at the forefront of pressing for stronger Western support for Ukraine in the wake of Russia’s invasion. Yet the movement remains divided over issues such as nuclear energy, military force, foreign policy, and cooperation with right-wing and populist parties.
What is a green party?
Green political parties reflect a broader social movement seeking to reorient civilization in what supporters say are more sustainable and humane directions. Their environmental concerns began with opposition to nuclear power but have expanded to include climate change, pollution, and industrial agriculture. According to the Global Greens network, there are close to eighty full-fledged green parties.
They also usually encompass broader—but interrelated—social and economic issues. Most green parties have committed themselves to four pillars:
- ecological sustainability;
- grassroots democracy;
- social justice; and,
- nonviolence.
Green platforms generally include opposition to war and weapons industries, especially nuclear weapons; skepticism about global trade arrangements and consumerist industrial society; a preference for decentralized decision-making and localism; and a commitment to social justice, racial and economic equality, and women’s empowerment.
The movement has important differences from both the left and right. Most greens see themselves on the economic and social left, but their focus on decentralization and local solutions separates them from many traditional socialist parties.
With greens poised to play the role of kingmaker in some of the world’s most influential countries, their choices could increasingly shape public policy and the future of democracy.
In Europe, mainstream parties have been losing support for years. Experts say a succession of shocks—including the global economic crisis that began in 2008, a spate of high-profile terrorist attacks, and a wave of migration from the Middle East and North Africa beginning in 2015.
In the midst of this turbulence, greens are further scrambling the political calculus. Their outsider status means that they have been able to benefit from dissatisfaction with the current system while their “clean/ green” ideology attracts supporters from across the traditional left-right spectrum.
Some analysts argue that they are uniquely positioned to win disaffected voters away from the far right—especially as, in the case of Germany’s greens, they have in many areas tacked to the center, supporting international institutions such as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military alliance.
Future of “greens”:
1. However, questions persist over the impact greens will have on climate policy. Also uncertain are the greens’ ability to stick with nonviolent principles and their willingness to form alliances with the far right or far left. In one example of flexibility, Austria’s greens have formed a coalition with the conservative People’s Party, resulting in a government platform that combines anti-immigration and tax-cutting policies with some of Europe’s most ambitious climate targets.
2. The early green parties in Western Europe saw themselves as vehicles for the broader protest movements led by the generation of ‘68—channeling activism, especially against the nuclear arms race and nuclear power but also against consumerism, greed, endless economic growth, and oppressive social norms. As a result, unity was rare, and many factions and internal divisions developed. However, nowadays with the return of “real politics”, the war on Ukraine, and the questions raised on defense policies ang grouwing up military budget, are “green parties” able to cope and adapt their discourse and programs?
However, real concerns are emerging regarding their real engagement to non violence: Soulvement de la terre en France.
3. Other topic/ debate on that makes debate among greens: The Energy policy: Despite long standing opposition to nuclear power, some greens (most notably in Finland) are reconsidering that stance in light of theurgent need to reduce greenhouse gaz emission (gaz a effet de serre).
4. Non- consistency over position from war (Kosovo: germany and France):
- One rather unexpected effect so far has been the Green parties’ embrace of armament and abandonment of their commitment to pacifism, forgetting that wars produce high volumes of greenhouse gasses and have a calamitous impact on the environment
- Since its founding in the 1980s, France’s Green party has followed a tradition of pacifism in terms of foreign policy and has upheld non-violent, anti-nuclear, and anti-military positions.
In this spirit, the party voted almost unanimously in 1990 against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. A few years later, however, the pacifism of the Greens began to suffer some exceptions. In 1999 the party supported the NATO military intervention in Kosovo, in 2011 two members of parliament voted for the continuation of the military operations in Libya and two years later the party’s leaders backed the attack against Syria. Today, the party justifies the use of force with the tired frames of “humanitarian intervention.”
- Likewise, the party leader and presidential candidate Yannick Jadot appealed immediately after the beginning of the war in Ukraine on the 24th February to send weapons and to impose sanctions on Russia,
- Lecture interessante:Green Apocalypse? How Green Parties are Embracing More War to Stop the War | Le Club
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History of EU construction:
- Why thinking about european integration?
The drama of the war shows the need for a united Europe. The post-war period is therefore the time for consultations, dialogue and the founding of new alliances and institutions. The OEEC (created in 1948 became later in 1961 the “OECD”, NATO, the Council of Europe and then the ECSC “European coal and steel community” were created before 1952.
"Making peace and protecting ourselves" is therefore the key objective behind the idea of European construction. It is about putting an end to the state of war that has reigned in Europe since the beginning of the 21st century. In this respect, linking the economic interests of European countries seems to be a decisive step. In addition, it is about protecting European states against any possible invasion by the USSR, in the context of the Cold War.
1. OEEC 1948: (Mathias Cormann/ Australien).
Three years after the end of the war in Europe, the United States decided to grant countries that wanted it massive aid to finance their reconstruction: this was the Marshall Plan. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation, based in Paris, took charge of distributing American aid. In 1961, it took the name of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Expanded to the scale of the developed world, the OECD now has 38 members (in 2021).
2. NATO 1949: (sec. gen: Mark Rutte, Nerlandais).
By the Treaty of Brussels signed in March 1948, the United States guaranteed the security of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. A year later, five other European countries joined the Brussels "Five" to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a military alliance against the Soviet threat. West Germany joined in 1955, following the failure of the
- EDC (European defense community: also known as the treaty of Paris, is an unratified treaty signed in 1952 by the 6 inner countries: Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, France, Italy and west germany).
- The treaty would have created a european defence community with a unified defense force acting as an autonomous European pillar within the NATO.
- It was proposed as a combination of the existing ECSC and the proposed “European defense community”.
- Failed because: French national assembly rejected the ratification by fear of loosing sovereignity. At the time, there was the fear from Germany to regain back its military power and become a threat in Europe.
NATO now has 32 member states (2024) spread between Europe and North America.
3. Council of Europe 1949:
Based in Strasbourg, the Council of Europe is responsible for a considerable legal work, particularly in the area of human rights. But it plays a modest role in the unification of the continent: the Council finds its limits in its mode of operation, the need for an agreement between all its members being a source of blockages.46 member states (Sec. Gen: Alain Berset).
Objectif : promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
EUROPEAN UNION
It is a voluntary interstate association.
It is a sui generis political and economic union, unique, between 27 member states
These states delegate or transmit, by treaty, the exercise of certain competences to community bodies, that is to say, the EU institutions.
Its institutional structure is partly supranational and partly intergovernmental. (For example, the European Parliament is elected by universal suffrage. While the representatives of each member state sit in the European Council and the Council of the EU.
Finally, the President of the European Commission is appointed by the Parliament after the proposal of the European Council.
It extends over a territory of 4.2 million km2, and is populated by 443 million inhabitants.
It is the third world economic power after the United States and China.
3 treaties manage its operation:
1. The Treaty of Maastricht (TEU of 1992)/
2. The Treaty of Rome (TFEU of 1957)/
3. The Treaty of Lisbon of 2007.
1. The Schuman Declaration 1950:
Made by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, on May 9, 1950. It is designed as the founding text of the integration of European construction. Inspired by Jean Monnet, French economist and deputy secretary of the former League of Nations, it proposes the creation of a European organization responsible for jointly managing the production of coal and steel in France and Germany. The choice of these sectors is very strategic, since the steel industry is closely linked to the arms industry
2. The Treaty of Paris 1951 (ECSC):
This is a founding act aimed at bringing together the victors and the vanquished of the SGm. On April 18, 1951, the Treaty of Paris was signed by 6 European States, thus creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). These States are: France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. By pooling their coal and steel production, France and Germany substituted solidarity of interests for rivalry and rancor, only five years after the end of the war. Another innovation: this organization opted for a supranational management mode, which broke with the intergovernmental experiments conducted until then. The ECSC was the first international organisation based on supranational principles and was intended, through the establishment of a single market for coal and steel, to support economies, increase employment, and raise the average standard of living within the Community.
3.The failure of the European Defense Community:
In 1952, these 6 founding states signed a treaty in Paris establishing the EDC. It aimed to allow the rearmament of West Germany within the framework of a common European army. This step was justified in particular by the danger represented by the USSR, in the context of the Cold War. However, only 5 member countries of the ECSC ratified the treaty. While the French parliament refused to ratify this treaty in 1954, rejecting the idea of creating a supranational army.
At that time, any attempt to create a common European defense body failed. The member states, being concerned about their respective national sovereignty, rejected any initiative in this direction. They were content with the existence of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), with the participation of the United States to protect themselves against the USSR and the Soviet camp in Eastern Europe.
The Treaties of Rome 1957 (EEC and EAC):
Based on the Treaty of Paris (ECSC) of 1951, the Treaty of Rome broadened the scope of supranational cooperation and thus relaunched European construction, slowed down by the failure, in 1954, of the political project of the European Defence Community (EDC). The economic domain, less subject to national resistance, appeared as a consensual field of cooperation.
These are 2 treaties, the first creates the EEC, the second creates the EAC
a. The European Economic Community (EEC):
• Its mission, through the establishment of a common market and the progressive rapprochement of the economic policies of the Member States, is to promote a harmonious development of economic activities throughout the Community, a continuous and balanced expansion, increased stability, an accelerated rise in the standard of living, and closer relations between the States it brings together.
• The single market or internal market is a customs union between all EU Member States, based on four fundamental freedoms: the free movement of goods and services, capital and people
• The common market implies a customs union between the Member States, i.e. the elimination of customs duties for the goods they exchange, as well as the establishment of a common commercial policy and customs tariff with regard to third countries. A transition period of 12 years is then provided for.
• In addition to the free movement of goods, the single market also provides for "the abolition, between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital".
• Its operation makes it necessary to approximate national legislation and develop common policies. The treaty provides for the establishment of common policies not only in the areas of trade and competition, but also in transport and agriculture.
Euratom (European Atomic Energy Community).
• The Euratom Treaty, signed in 1957 by the 6 member states of the ECSC. It sets up the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). It aims to coordinate the research programs of the member countries on nuclear energy. The essential objective is to ensure energy self-sufficiency.
• Euratom displays the ambition of building a large-scale nuclear industry. But the original reluctance of certain founding states, institutional blockages and the relative weakness of the means implemented will not allow this objective to be achieved.
• The Treaty of Rome thus sets up institutions and decision-making mechanisms allowing the expression of both national interests and a community vision.
• These institutions are: the European Commission/ the Council of Ministers/ the European Parliament/ the Court of Justice and the Economic and Social Council.
• The effects of the dismantling of customs and the removal of quantitative restrictions on trade during the transition period (1958-1970) were spectacular: intra-Community trade increased sixfold, while EEC trade with third countries increased threefold.